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attending to semantic broadening of the Greek/Coptic word prognosis. It argues that a range of late
antique Syrian communities like those responsible for the Ps.-Clementine Homilies, Neoplatonists like
Iamblichus, and Syrian Manichaeans began to theorize prognosis along converging lines and through
similar discursive and rhetorical strategies. The dissertation concludes by contextualizing the Sar Torah
macroform in Hekhalot literature alongside these broader intellectual shifts regarding the nature of
revelation and the acquisition of divine knowledge.

Degree Type
Dissertation

Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Graduate Group
Religious Studies

First Advisor
Peter T. Struck

Second Advisor
Annette Y. Reed

Keywords
Jewish Mysticism, Late Antique Syria, Manichaeism, Neoplatonism, Prophecy, Pseudo-Clementine
Homilies

Subject Categories
History of Religion | Religion

This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2811

RETHINKING PROPHECY IN LATE ANTIQUE SYRIA
Jae Hee Han
A DISSERTATION
in
Religious Studies
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2018

Supervisor of Dissertation

Graduate Group Chairperson

_____________________

_____________________

Peter T. Struck

Anthea Butler

Professor, Classical Studies

Associate Professor, Religious Studies

Dissertation Committee
Annette Yoshiko Reed

Associate Professor, New York University

David Stern

Harry Starr Professor of Classical and Modern Jewish and Hebrew
Literature, Harvard University

Peter Struck

Professor, University of Pennsylvania

Anthea Butler

Associate Professor, University of Pennsylvania

RETHINKING PROPHECY IN LATE ANTIQUE SYRIA
COPYRIGHT
2018
Jae Hee Han

For Appa

iii

Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I thank my advisor, Annette Yoshiko Reed, whose probing questions and expansive
scholarship has contributed no small part to the content and – I hope this will be taken as a compliment – to
the methodological impatience evident throughout this dissertation. I entered the Religious Studies program
at Penn with an opaque notion of scholarship as mastery over some aspect of the past; I learned from
Annette that such “critical” postures themselves need to be investigated, not as a way of foreclosing
possibilities, but of opening them. She exemplified for me the best of scholarly generosity and, if
collegiality can be measured by calories consumed, then I thank her for sushi, mochi ice cream, Korean
BBQ, and Indonesian coffee. Finally, I thank her for inviting me to participate in the Philadelphia Seminar
for Christian Origins (PSCO), which will long remain a cherished memory for me. May our paths never
part!
I also want to extend my deepest thanks to my two committee members, David Stern and Peter Struck. I
thank David for initiating me into the literary artistry of the rabbis; I am and will continue to be jealous of
David’s deft theoretical analyses and acute aesthetic sensibilities, which will remain lofty goals for me to
attain. The same can be said for Peter Struck, whom I regret I did not meet earlier in my time at Penn; I fear
that I am leaving Penn poorer for it. Thank you for sparking my interest in prophecy, which is at the heart
of this dissertation, the Neoplatonists, and for your patient reading and suggestions. I earnestly hope for
more interdisciplinary ventures between the Classics and Religious Studies.
To my dear Penn Religious Studies Department, a graduate student could not have asked for a better home.
To Phil Fackler, Phil Webster, and Alex Ramos, thank you for your willingness to listen, your unfailing
encouragements, and for leading the way. To Alex I owe weekly writing sessions, weekends for discussing
theory, Greek and Hebrew practice sessions, game nights, and bad-movie nights. It was Alex and Sarah
who made Philadelphia first feel like home for me. To Ali Karjoo-Ravary and Beeta Baghoolizadeh, thank
you both for your endless hospitality, hard conversations, delicious tea, coffee, and kebab. I hope that you
will look on our conversations together at Penn with the same quiet joy that I certainly will. Your presence
made my experience at Penn far richer than I could have hoped. To Donovan Schaefer, Megan Robb, and
Jolyon Thomas, our new(ish) faculty, thank you for your wisdom in navigating the job market and for
budding friendships. Whatever my success, it is only a reflection on the strength of our little department in
Philadelphia. As for people in the “other wing,” thanks are especially due to Jane Sancinito, whose constant
friendship and comments shaped this dissertation for the better, and to Eyal Meyer, who epitomizes for me
what it means to be a sabra. To Prof. Julia Wilker, I will miss our impromptu conversations in the hallway.
Thank you also to Marcie, who has been a constant source of kindness in the form of baked goods and
warm conversations. Finally, to many others I have had the good fortune to befriend, thank you, Susanne
Kerekes, Jillian Stinchcomb, Matthew Chalmers, Andrew Hudson, Paul McBain, James Shackelford,
Chijioke Azuawusiefe, Rasul Miller, Samiha Rahman, Noa Hegesh, Helena Dominguez, Jennie and Mike,
Ryan Pilipow, Isabella Reinhardt, Addie Atkins, Patricia Kim, Cindy Susalla – thank you all for your
abiding friendship. Of course, to Kate Stoler and Stephanie Palmer, thank you for “letting me” raid your
secret stash of chocolate for years and for the many laughs.
Thanks are due also to my patient family. To Jeremy, the makneh of our family, for nursing my hangover
that one time... To my sister Amy and brother-in-law Jon, thank you for hanging out with me in the
wasteland that is Orange County, California. I look forward to spoiling “little humba.” To my stepmother,
Joanne, who has been a mother to me in more ways than she knows. I dedicated this dissertation to my
appa, who has been the anchor of our family for many years. Thank you for teaching me the importance of
humility, gratitude, respect, and education. Finally, to umma, I remember how much you loved us.
Finally, to my wonderful partner Diana Kim, who buoyed me up with an endless encouragements and kept
my head on straight. My greatest joy in the past few years has been exploring Philadelphia with you. I look
forward to many more adventures with you, both in Providence and abroad!

iv

ABSTRACT
RETHINKING PROPHECY IN LATE ANTIQUE SYRIA
Jae Hee Han
Peter T. Struck
This dissertation explore constructions of prophethood and prophecy among a diverse set of late antique
Syrian communities, including communities commonly labelled as “Manichaean,” “Jewish Christian,”
“Para-Rabbinic,” and “Neoplatonist.” This dissertation aims to go beyond critiques of the “cessation of
prophecy” narrative by offering a historical representation of the development of “prophecy” and the
emergence of a discourse of “prophethood” in late antiquity. Methodologically, this dissertation heeds
repeated calls for the inapplicability of “religion” as an operative category for the study of the past and
adopts instead the parameters of time and place – late antique Syria – as an alternative framework within
which to navigate through the archive of ancient texts and across a range of disciplines. As such, this
dissertation forefronts the following texts emerging from and at play within this milieu: Cologne Mani
Codex, the Kephalaia of the Teacher, the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies, Iamblichus’ De Mysteriis, and the
Sar Torah macroform from the Hekhalot corpus. The first section of this dissertation centers on the
emergence of “prophethood” as an object of disembedded discourse, from its emergence among the early
followers of Mani (Cologne Mani Codex) to its continued transformations among “Manichaeans” living in
the Eastern Roman Empire (Kephalaia of the Teacher). It then maps the effects of this discourse of
prophethood on local Syrian theorizations of prophethood and prophecy (Ps.-Clementine Homilies). The
second section of the dissertation pivots the discussion to the concept of prophecy, primarily by attending
to semantic broadening of the Greek/Coptic word prognosis. It argues that a range of late antique Syrian
communities like those responsible for the Ps.-Clementine Homilies, Neoplatonists like Iamblichus, and
Syrian Manichaeans began to theorize prognosis along converging lines and through similar discursive and
rhetorical strategies. The dissertation concludes by contextualizing the Sar Torah macroform in Hekhalot
literature alongside these broader intellectual shifts regarding the nature of revelation and the acquisition of
divine knowledge.
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INTRODUCTION

Prophecy has a bad habit of disappearing. Sufficiently vitiated by the end of the Second
Temple period, some scholars argue, it could persist only under pseudepigraphic guise or,
at least among the rabbis, through a bat qol, an attenuated divine voice with no
substantial halakhic import.1 Along a slightly staggered timeline, this narrative of decline
repeats itself among early “Christians,” despite the emergence of late antique “prophets”
like Mani, the self-proclaimed Apostle of Jesus Christ whose teachings held none other
than Augustine captive for a decade, and Montanus, whose followers included
Tertullian.2 As if following Paul – “where there are prophecies, they will cease”3 –

For an exhaustive survey of past literature, see L. Stephen Cook, On the Question of the “Cessation of
Prophecy” in Ancient Judaism (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011). While Cook argues that “Second Temple
Jews did, on the whole, tend to believe that prophecy had ceased in the Persian period,” (Cook, On the
Question, 192), he notes that the question of whether prophecy continued or ceased often depends on one’s
methodology and definition of prophecy. This is perhaps telling of the impasse regarding the question as a
whole in so far as its highlights deeply embedded assumptions regarding “prophecy” as an ontologically
static category that undergoes periods of “transformations” from the “classical Biblical” era to its supposed
“decline” rather than as disjointed and discursive formations that must be interrogated according to
particular times, places, and communities. I keep historical change at the forefront of the study and bracket
all questions of universal “definitions” of prophecy.
2
Cook, On the Question, 119-21. Following Weberian metanarratives of charismatic decline and
institutionalization, Aune writes, “After the process of institutionalization was largely completed, a process
which did not occur at the same rate in all parts of the Greco-Roman world, the prophet became an
endangered species, primarily because of the social changes which had taken place,” in D.E. Aune,
Prophecy in Early Christianity and the Ancient Mediterranean World (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 1983), 204. It is curious that the Weberian model of institutionalization – one which emerges
from a peculiarly Protestant rereading of capital and history – should provide the interpretative model for a
pre-modern “Greco-Roman” world. For a strong critique on the scholarly practice of employing peculiarly
“European” models of analysis as “universal” models to interpret non-“European” phenomena, see: D.
Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2000), 47-71. Nevertheless, Aune sees the Odes of Solomon (2 nd / 3rd Century
(?); Syriac) as evidence for the continuation of prophecy as a representative of a “special form of
Christianity.” See D.E. Aune, “The Odes of Solomon and Early Christian Prophecy,” in Apocalypticism,
Prophecy and Magic in Early Christianity: Collected Essays (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 320-46,
322. For a lengthy critique of Weberian narratives of decline especially as it relates to prophecy, see L.
1

1

scholars of Judaism and Christianity have read what I will explore in this dissertation as
the persistence of “prophecy,” ironically enough, almost wholly through a narrative of
decline, a way station on the road to “classical” Judaism and “orthodox” Christianity.
As I will elaborate in the following section, scholars have critiqued this narrative
of decline on two parallel fronts. Scholars of Second Temple Judaism, for example, have
demonstrated that those literary practices long held to be evidence of prophetic decline,
especially “pseudepigraphic” attribution, demonstrate instead the continued vitality of
prophecy and revelation as a “legitimate” expression of Jewish literary imagination and
production.4 They flip the narrative of decline on its head, arguing that the continued
production of revelatory literature like Jubilees and 4 Ezra bears witness to the continued
relevance of prophecy among Second Temple Jews. In the same vein, scholars of ancient
Christianity have highlighted the continued interest among Christians in prophetic and
revelatory literature. As Paul Alexander demonstrates, Christians continued to recycle,
expand, and produce revelatory texts throughout late antiquity.5 Furthermore, as Laura
Nasrallah has insightfully argued, the narrative of prophetic decline falls in line with the
“rhetoric of ancient texts” and Weberian notions of progress.6 When scholars read these

Nasrallah, An Ecstasy of Folly: Prophecy and Authority in Early Christianity (Harvard Theological Studies
52; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 11-20.
3
1 Cor. 13.8.
4
E. Mroczek, The Literary Imagination in Jewish Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); A.
Jassen, Mediating the Divine: Prophecy and Revelation in the Dead Sea Scrolls and Second Temple
Judaism (Leiden: Brill, 2007); H. Najman, Past Renewals: Interpretative Authority, Renewed Revelation
and the Quest for Perfection in Jewish Antiquity (Leiden: Brill, 2010); ibid., Losing the Temple and
Recovering the Future: An Analysis of 4 Ezra (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
5
P.J. Alexander, The Byzantine Apocalyptic Trajectory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); D.
Frankfurter, “The Legacy of Jewish Apocalypses in Early Christianity: Regional Trajectories,” in The
Jewish Apocalyptic Heritage in Early Christianity (eds. J.C. VanderKam and W. Adler; Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 1996), 129-200.
6
Nasrallah, Ecstasy, 13.

2

texts that supposedly bear witness to a universal “disenchantment” with prophecy as
rhetoric rather than as transparent windows into the past, we open up space for more
plausible representations of the past. At the same time, Nasrallah’s arguments goad us to
be ever mindful of the contingent events that led to the naturalization of such narratives
of decline within particular academic disciplines in the first place.7
Nevertheless, one might admit that the narrative of decline is surprisingly durable
in part because its tropes are found in a wide range of texts, including those written by
Second Temple Jews, rabbis, “Christians,”8 and “second sophistic” Greeks like Plutarch.9
Is this, then, evidence for universal disenchantment with prophecy? Of course not. In
fact, the Weberian metanarrative of prophetic decline does a shockingly poor job of
accounting for our late antique evidence preserved in Hebrew, Aramaic, Greek, and
Coptic. Even if one accepts the “narrative of prophetic decline” among late antique Jews,
for example, one is hard-pressed to account for the resurgence of post-Talmudic Jewish
apocalypses like Sefer Zerubbabel or Sefer Eliyahu or the earliest Jewish “mystical”
literature known as Hekhalot literature.10 This is not to deny that “things changed”
between the latest extant “Jewish” apocalypse in the first century (4 Ezra; 2 Baruch) and
7

See now C.A. Barton and D. Boyarin, Imagine No Religion: How Modern Abstractions Hide Ancient
Realities (New York: Fordham University Press, 2016). For more on rhetoric in the Christian context, see:
A. Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1991).
8
Cook, On the Question, 149-73.
9
Plutarch, On the Obsolescence of Oracles (LCL 306; trans. F.C. Babbitt; Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1936), 348-501.
10
A.Y. Reed, Fallen Angels and the History of Judaism and Christianity: The Reception of Enochic
Literature (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 233-72; M. Himmelfarb, Tours of Hell: An
Apocalyptic Form in Jewish and Christian Literature (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1983); J.C. Reeves, “Exploring the Afterlife of Jewish Pseudepigrapha in Medieval Near Eastern Religious
Traditions: Some Initial Soundings,” JSJ 30 (1999): 148-77; ibid., Trajectories in Near Eastern
Apocalyptic: A Postrabbinic Jewish Apocalypse Reader (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005).
Curiously, the same might be said for later Syriac apocalypses as well. See M. Henze, The Syriac
Apocalypse of Daniel: Introduction, Text, and Commentary (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 17-22.

3

the emergence of Sefer Zerubbabel in the seventh century, but to insist that such changes
must be explained through a range of particular parameters rather than glossed over as the
dying gasps of the prophetic spirit.
The same might be asked about the Christians. Indeed, it is only by uncritically
following the precedence set by late antique heresiographers, who argued that
Manichaeans and those “Jewish Christians” responsible for texts like the PseudoClementine complex are not “Christian,” can scholars assume that prophecy “died out”
among “Christians.”11 As I demonstrate in this dissertation, conceptions of prophecy and
prophethood continued to be debated among such groups. Indeed, going beyond the
Jew/Christian binary, we also trace lines of continuity from the Second Temple Jewish
apocalypses into communities now typically labelled as “Jewish Christian” or
“Gnostic.”12 Finally, despite Plutarch’s arguments that divinatory power had diminished
in his day and age, we would be ill-advised to take such statements as emblematic of their
“true beliefs” or as evidence of universal disenchantment, especially when viewed vis-àvis Iamblichus’ developing notions of theurgy, divination, and divinization two hundred
years after Plutarch.
Representing Prophethood and Prophecy

It is important to recognize that even the epistemological structure by which scholars array “religions” –
especially Christianity, Judaism, and other heresies – is not a natural designation of “Christianity” or
“Judaism.” See T. Berzon, Classifying Christians: Ethnography, Heresiology, and the Limits of Knowledge
in Late Antiquity (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016).
12
J.C. Reeves, Heralds of that Good Realm: Syro-Mesopotamian Gnosis and Jewish Traditions (Leiden:
Brill, 1996).
11

4

Yet what is prophecy? Cook’s warning that one’s methodological approach and
definition of prophecy determines one’s conclusion should be taken seriously.13 In this
sense, any definition of prophecy opens a set of possibilities and closes another. As a way
of rendering this quandary useful for scholars, I lean on Frank Ankersmit’s distinction
between historical description and representation:14 whereas historical description
operates within an economy of value, essence, and truth that links “words” to “things,”
e.g., the description “the cat (thing) is black (word)” can be verified or falsified on the
basis of whether the cat is in fact black or not, historical representation is a metaphorical
operation that connects “things to things,” e.g. a painting (thing) of a cat represents a cat
(thing). Just as it would be senseless to say that the painting is “true or false,” so it is
senseless to state that any representation of the past is “true or false” without first
circumscribing the parameters of the discussion. The plausibility of historical
representation, however, remains entirely within the realm of scholarly analysis.
Therefore, as Ankersmit tells us, “truth” is not the criteria through which a scholar
produces historical knowledge, but what is at stake.15
With Ankersmit’s sage words in mind, I frame “prophethood” and “prophecy” in
particular ways in order to present a plausible representation of the past. It may therefore
be helpful to begin with how I position (not define) prophecy and prophethood within this
dissertation.16 First, this dissertation moves away from absolute definitions of prophecy,

13

Cook, On the Question, 192.
F.R. Ankersmit, Historical Representation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
15
Ibid., Historical Representation, 35.
16
For a recent application of contextual analyses, see L. Salaymeh, The Beginnings of Islamic Law: Late
Antique Islamicate Legal Traditions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 1-15; E.A. Clark,
History, Theory, Text: Historians and the Linguistic Turn (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004),
130-55; A.Y. Reed, “Rethinking (Jewish-)Christian Evidence for Jewish Mysticism” in Hekhalot Literature
14

5

which are interwoven with values of truth and worth against which one might measure
“prophecy’s” amplification or degradation, e.g., the movement from “classical” prophetic
“biblical” texts to non-“biblical” “pseudepigraphic” apocalypses, or the movement from
“charisma” to “institution.” For the purposes of this dissertation, I position “prophecy” as
a way about talking about knowledge above and beyond the normal processes of human
ratiocination, a discourse about “knowledge” beyond human ken and epistemological
capability.17 This can only ever be a provisional “definition” of “prophecy” as it is one
toggled to my particular position as a Korean-American within twenty-first century
academic culture. It does not pretend to be a pure artifact retrieved from the past, but a
lens for producing scholarly knowledge and a way of marking some texts as relevant
comparanda in the hopes of approximating an ancient discourse.
Second, while recognizing the value of sociological and anthropological
approaches to “prophecy” in the wider ancient Roman Empire, especially the study of
divination, this dissertation primarily attends to the textual surface and literature about
prophecy coming from a specific time and place. Consequently, it does not ask what
“prophecy” and “prophethood” might tell us about “society” or the Greco-Roman
mentalité, but attends to the poetics of the text and its discernible anxieties, modes of
persuasion, and the rhetorical goals that animate the text, that is, its discourse. As
discourse, “prophecy” in the ancient world is at the same time a conversation interwoven
by threads of power and pockmarked with sites of contestation. It sprawls into adjacent

in Context: Between Byzantium and Babylonia (eds. R. Boustan, M. Himmelfarb, and P. Schäfer; TSAJ
153; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013), 349-77, 364-76.
17
M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language (Trans. A.M. Sheridan
Smith; New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 21-39.

6

territories, e.g., the nature of “revelatory knowledge,” means of acquisition, nondiscursive modes of thinking, and the nature of divinity itself, which are also discussed in
this dissertation.
Furthermore, this dissertation distinguishes between “prophethood,”18 namely,
discursive statements that explicitly discuss the qualifications and characteristics of a
“prophet,” from prophecy. There are two primary reasons for this distinction. The first is
historical: As I argue in the first half of the dissertation, prophethood itself emerges as an
object of explicit theoretical discourse among local Syrian communities, partly due to the
intrusion of Manichaeans. The second is methodological and oriented towards expanding
the discussion to include affiliated yet understudied sub-fields. By positing prophethood
as a discursive category that emerges in late antique Mesopotamia, I articulate a concept
that will perhaps be of use for scholars of Mandaeism, a “religion” that emerged from the
same “Jewish Christian” roots as the Manichaeans in the fifth century, 19 and early
“Islamic” theorizations of the “prophethood” of Muhammad and his household, which
emerged in the first few centuries following the Arab conquests.20 I offer an
understanding of “prophethood” rooted in the “Jewish Christian” reception of Second
Temple Jewish apocalypses.21 Obviously, both prophecy and prophethood are rather

Michael Pregill proposes incorporating “comparative prophetology” into the study of the late antiquity.
See M. Pregill, “Ahab, Bar Kokhba, Muḥammad, and the Lying Spirit: Prophetic Discourse before and
after the Rise of Islam,” in Revelation, Literature, and Community in Late Antiquity (eds. P. Townsend and
M. Vidas; TSAJ 146; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011).
19
See now K.T. van Bladel, From Sasanian Mandaeans to Ṣābians of the Marshes (Leiden: Brill, 2017).
Van Bladel argues that Mandaeaism emerged in the fifth century in the Sasanian milieu from the same (or
similar) community of “Jewish Christians” from which Mani emerged.
20
P. Crone, The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran: Rural Revolt and Local Zoroastrianism
(Cambridge University Press, 2012); ibid., “Jewish-Christianity and the Qur’ān (Part One),” JNES 74.2
(2015): 225-53; ibid., “Jewish-Christianity and the Qur’ān (Part Two),” JNES 75.1 (2016): 1-32.
21
Reeves, Heralds, 209-11.
18

7

chunky categories and overlap to some degree. Nevertheless, in light of both the
emergence of “prophethood” as an object of discourse in late antiquity and in preparation
for the future horizons of this dissertation, theories of prophethood must be disentangled
from prophecy in general.
One might critique this methodological deferral of “real” prophecy as merely a
license to compare a range of texts based on a set of loose-resemblances, claiming, for
example, that the theorizations of revelatory knowledge among late antique Neoplatonists
have nothing to do with early Jewish mystical literature.22 Yet, to the degree that all
frameworks of comparison are already conditioned by disciplinary histories and
practices, this critique falls flat on its face;23 there is no inherent reason, to choose one
particularly salient example, that scholars must read early Jewish “mystical” literature
known as Hekhalot literature solely with Jewish texts as relevant comparanda. 24 In fact,
the historian’s indexing of time and place as the primary constraints on “discourse” might
provide a more robust method for comparing “unlike” materials than “internalist”
parameters erected by religious “tradition,” e.g. “Jewish literature” or “Christian
literature.” In other words, contemporary “Christian,” “Jewish Christian,” and “Pagan”

In this sense, it is important to remember J.Z. Smith’s point that “difference” or “uniqueness” only make
sense against a backdrop that presumes similarities. The goal is to make difference “interesting” for
scholarly analysis. Or, in his words, “It reminds us that comparison is, at base, never identity. Comparison
requires the postulation of difference as the grounds of its being interesting (rather than tautological) and a
methodical manipulation of difference, a playing across the ‘gap’ in the service of some useful end.” See:
J.Z. Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1982),
35.
23
For an example for the emergence and naturalization of a “World religions” model, see: T. Masuzawa,
The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of
Pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
24
Again, following Smith, “For the self-conscious student of religion, no datum possesses intrinsic interest.
It is of value only insofar as it can serve as exempli gratia of some fundamental issue in the imagination of
religion. The student of religion must be able to articulate clearly why ‘this’ rather than ‘that’ was chosen
as an exemplum” (Smith, Imagining Religion, xi).
22
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discourses on prophecy and prophethood may end up better illuminating particular
developments in Jewish literature, society, and culture than studies that forefront the
study of “Jewish” literature.
Finally, this dissertation begins where the critiques of the cessation of prophecy
ends. It recognizes that despite critiques of the “cessation of prophecy” narrative in both
ancient Judaism and Christianity, the parameters of scholarly discussion are largely taken
from the narrative itself, namely, Second Temple literature written in Hebrew and
Aramaic or the New Testament.25 As a result, the narrative beyond the “cessation of
prophecy” remains relatively unexplored. What about late antique notions of prophecy
becomes visible if we discard the Weberian narrative of cessation that inevitably colors
later prophecy as vitiated prophecy? How might we best contextualize late antique
literature centered on prophecy and prophethood?
To answer these questions, I look at the interlocking discourses on prophecy and
prophethood among late antique Syrians roughly between the destruction of the Second
Temple and the rise of the Islam. My dissertation focuses on one moment and place
within this history – late antique Syria – and draws on texts coming from this particular
milieu. These texts include the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies (4th century; Greek), the
Cologne Mani Codex (4th century; originally Aramaic and written in Mesopotamia,
preserved in Greek and transmitted throughout Syria and probably Egypt), the Kephalaia
of the Teacher (4th-5th century; originally Aramaic [?], preserved in Coptic), the Hekhalot
The “New Testament” often bookends the academic discussion of prophecy in “Christianity.” The
implication is that prophecy does not belong within the history of early “Christianity,” which in turn is
narrowly circumscribed as the New Testament and “patristics” literature. For a recent example, see J.
Verheyden, K. Zamfir, and T. Nicklas (eds.), Prophet and Prophecy in Jewish and Early Christian
Literature (WUNT 286; Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2010); Cook, On the Question, 119-21.
25
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corpus (5th century[?] onwards; Hebrew and Aramaic), and Iamblichus’ De Mysteriis
Aegyptorum (4th century; Greek). I contextualize these sources with one another and
through sources preserved in Syriac – including the Didascalia Apostolorum (3rd to 4th
century; originally Greek), the Syriac Acts literature, e.g., the Acts of Thomas, the
Teaching of Addai, the Acts of Mar Mari (3rd-5th century), and the writings of Mar
Ephrem (5th century), among others. In what follows, I frame my individual contributions
to separate fields and conclude with a reflection on the application of time and place as a
mode of navigating texts from a particular place methodological parameters to the study
of a particular historical phenomenon.

Pseudepigrapha, the Cessation of Prophecy, and its Reemergence
“Pseudepigraphic” apocalypses occupy one major area of debate in the broader
discussion on the cessation of prophecy. Though the practice of appending texts to earlier
collections is already well-attested within the Tanakh, perhaps most famously in the three
books of the prophet Isaiah, the Second Temple period bore witness to the birth of a
relatively stable literary genre of “apocalypse” in which heavenly secrets, whether
astronomical, eschatological, or broadly historical, were revealed to a set of “biblical”
heroes.26 These apocalypses were often written under a “pseudepigraphic” guise, which
some scholars argue furnishes evidence for the Jewish disenchantment with prophecy. As
Shaye Cohen writes, “This pseudepigraphy is not the result of the accidental and

26

J.J. Collins, The Apocalyptic Imagination: An Introduction to Jewish Apocalyptic Literature, 2nd Ed.
(Grand Rapids; Eerdmans, 1998), 1-42.
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incorrect attribution of an anonymous work but is the result of deliberate misattribution
by the author. Rather than admit their own identities, the authors of these works hid
behind the masks of figures who lived at the very beginning of the world.”27 Cohen
therefore reasons that scribes “forged” their documents in the name of earlier heroes
precisely because “prophecy” ceased to be a compelling mode of authorizing texts in the
scribes’ own time.
This broad characterization of a range of “pseudepigraphic” texts as somehow
degenerate prophecy has given rise in recent years to a chorus of objections. Echoing
earlier voices, Alex Jassen demonstrated that the Qumran community transformed the
broader Near Eastern phenomenon of “prophecy” to fit the needs of the Qumran
community.28 Other scholars, most notably Hindy Najman and Eva Mroczek, have taken
aim at the concept of the pseudepigrapha itself. In her recent study of 4 Ezra, Najman
reimagines the “pseudepigraphic” attribution of the apocalypse as way of “rebooting”
historical time in the face of world-ending, and time-ending, trauma.29 Though one
cannot posit this singular explanation as applicable to all “pseudepigraphic” works, much
less those that do not recount a particularly traumatic moment in Jewish history,
Najman’s work highlights both the dangers of foisting modern conceptions of
“authorship” unto the past and the demonstrates the value of positing a broad range of
27

S.J.D. Cohen, From the Maccabees to the Mishnah (2nd Ed.; Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press,
2006), 189. Nevertheless, even Cohen agrees that “it is unlikely that the authors were attempting to deceive
their readers, or, in fact, that their readers were deceived.” (From the Maccabees, 190).
28
Jassen, Mediating the Divine. Jassen defines prophecy according to Martti Nissinen’s definition, namely,
as “transmission of allegedly divine messages by a human intermediary to a third party.” Though Jassen
concludes that this ancient understanding of prophecy continued through the Qumran community, he
admits that “it” underwent transformation, thereby raising questions of how one defines “transformation” at
all. See: M. Nissinen, Prophecy in its Ancient Near Eastern Context: Mesopotamian, Biblical, and Arabian
Perspectives (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2000), 4.
29
Najman, Losing the Temple, 1-25.
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experiences behind “pseudepigraphic” works, even despite the perceived literary stability
of the “apocalypses.” Likewise, Eva Mroczek argues that scholars have foisted
anachronistic categories of “canon” and “author” to the study of our ancient texts and
instead draws out “native” conceptualizations of the ancient Jewish literary
imagination.30 For my purposes, her book highlights the sheer anachronism of the
category of pseudepigraphy, and where it falls, so too must narratives of prophetic
decline. Instead, as Mroczek reminds us, we must consider the ways that the Jews
themselves imagined the boundaries and contours of their texts.31
Yet, as important as Jassen, Najman, and Mroczek have been for pushing back
against the “tyranny of canonical assumptions,” and, by extension, narratives of decline,
they have tended to cleave closely to the texts set by the narrative itself, that is, texts
written in Judea written in Hebrew and Aramaic among Second Temple Jews. As a result,
their studies intervene most directly in the way that Second Temple Jews living in Judea
specifically narrativized the connections between revelatory knowledge and literary
imagination. Their interventions, moreover, do not apply a priori to apocalypses in
general, and certainly cannot be taken as blanket statements for the literary modes of
imagining apocalypses in the centuries that follow. Furthermore, their very choice of
texts tends to be rather selective, clustering around texts written by or transmitted by the
notoriously sectarian Qumran community or among Palestinian Jews following the
destruction of the Second Temple. As I think Najman and Mroczek would agree, we
should not take the literature of the Qumran community, for example, as representative of
30

Mroczek, Literary Imagination.
Also see, S. L. Sanders, From Adapa to Enoch: Scribal Culture and Religious Vision in Judea and
Babylon (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017).
31

12

Jewish literary production in general, especially if considered vis-à-vis the Egyptian
Jewish literature of the same period.
Having discarded the cessation of prophecy narrative and moving past the Second
Temple period into late antique Syria, two potential trajectories emerges. One trajectory
continues through those communities often labeled as “Jewish Christian.” Of course, the
category of “Jewish Christian” is itself a subject of debate, though it is not necessary for
the purposes of this dissertation to hash out whether these communities are or are not
“Jewish Christian.”32 Nevertheless, I follow Visotzsky, Fonrobert, and Reed in
understanding “Jewish Christianity” as both Jewish and Christian, instead of neither
Jewish nor Christian, and therefore important for tracing historiographical narratives in
the development of both “religions.”33 Returning to the topic, as John Reeves has made
clear, Second Temple Jewish apocalypses had long afterlives among “Jewish Christian”
communities that populated the Syro-Mesopotamian milieu. The most important of these
communities were the “Elchasaite” Baptists, from whom Mani, the self-proclaimed
Apostle of Jesus Christ, would emerge in the third century CE. The first section of this

For a helpful collection of “Patristic” references to Jewish-Christianity, see A.F.J. Klijn and G.J. Reinink,
Patristic Evidence for Jewish-Christian Sects (Leiden: Brill, 1974); D. Bernard, Les disciples juifs de
Jésus du Ier siècle à Mahomet: Recherches sur le mouvement ébionite (Paris: Cerf, 2017); F.
Stanley Jones (ed.), Rediscovery of Jewish Christianity: From Toland to Baur (History of Biblical
Studies 5; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012); A.Y. Reed, “The Modern Jewish Rediscovery
of ‘Jewish-Christianity’” in Jewish-Christianity and the History of Judaism (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck,
Forthcoming). For a trenchant critique of the category of Jewish-Christianity, see D. Boyarin, “Rethinking
Jewish Christianity: An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category (To Which is Appended a
Correction of My Border Lines),” JQR 99 (2009): 7–36.
33
C. Fonrobert, “The Didascalia Apostolorum: A Mishnah for the Disciples of Jesus,” JECS 9 (2001):
483–509; B. Visotzky, “Prolegomenon to the Study of Jewish-Christianities in Rabbinic Literature,” in
Fathers of the World: Essays in Rabbinic and Patristic Literatures (WUNT 80; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck,
1995), 129–49; A.Y. Reed, Jewish-Christianity and the History of Judaism.
32
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dissertation contextualizes this discourse of prophethood among the early Mesopotamian
followers of Mani.
The second trajectory continues through more familiar channels, from Second
Temple Judaism to Rabbinic Judaism and beyond. We hear little about rabbinic
speculation of revelatory matters throughout late antiquity, at least not in ways that align
with Second Temple era apocalypses. There is probably no single reason for the rabbinic
rejection of apocalypses, though I find Schwartz’s general argument persuasive: The two
failed Jewish revolts destroyed the institutional and ideological foundations that
legitimized the production and circulation of apocalypses.34 Attachment to the Jerusalem
Temple may help explain why Hebrew and Aramaic “revelatory” texts written in Judea
abruptly stopped while those outside the land of Judea, like the originally Egyptian
Sibylline Oracles, continued to be produced.35 Whatever the reason, as a result of the
rabbis’ characteristic downplaying of revelation, scholars are hard-pressed to account for
the resurgence of Hebrew and Aramaic revelatory texts in the early medieval era, most
notably the Hekhalot corpus, Sefer Zerubbabel, Sefer Eliyyahu, and the R. Shimon bar
Yohai “complex.” These texts have a complicated relationship with “classical” rabbinic
literature and are perhaps better characterized as “para-rabbinic” texts rather than
“rabbinic.”36

34

S. Schwartz, Imperialism and Jewish Society, 200 B.C.E. To 640 C.E. (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2001), 62-99.
35
J.J. Collins, “Sibylline Oracles: A New Translation and Introduction,” in The Old Testament
Pseudepigrapha Volume One (ed. J.H. Charlesworth; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson Publishers, 2009), 317472.
36
M. Himmelfarb, “Revelation and Rabbinization in Sefer Zerubbabel and Sefer Eliyyahu,” in Revelation,
Literature, and Community in Late Antiquity (eds. P. Townsend and M. Vidas; TSAJ 146; Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck, 2011), 217-36; ibid., Jewish Messiahs in a Christian Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2017); J.C. Reeves, “Sefer Zerubbabel: The Prophetic Vision of Zerubbabel ben Shealtiel,” in Old
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I exploit this gap between these para-rabbinic texts and “rabbinic” Judaism to
explore para-rabbinic late antique Jewish theorizations of divine knowledge.37 In this
dissertation, I focus specifically on the Hekhalot literature. Yet how does one approach a
corpus whose closest precedents are found centuries earlier in the Second Temple era?
There is simply no magic wormhole that will connect the Hekhalot corpus to the Second
Temple Jews.38 Recognizing this fact, scholars like Ra‘anan Bouston, Michael Swartz,
and Moulie Vidas have demonstrated the importance of contextualizing the Hekhalot
corpus through a range of corpora, especially alongside Jewish materials that overlap
with, but were not identical to, rabbinic literature.39 As Ra‘anan Boustan writes,

Testament Pseudepigrapha More Noncanonical Scriptures Volume One (eds. R. Bauckham, J.R. Davila,
and A. Panaytov; Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2013), 448-66; ibid.,
Trajectories in Near Eastern Apocalyptic: A Postrabbinic Jewish Apocalypse Reader (Atlanta: Society of
Biblical Literature, 2005). For a handy Hebrew collection of such texts, see A. Jellinek, Bet ha-Midrasch:
Sammlung kleiner Midraschim und vermischter Abhandlungen aus der jüdischen Literatur (6 vols; Leipzig,
1853-77; Repr., Jerusalem: Bamberger & Wahrmann, 1938). Also, see H. Spurling, “Hebrew Visions of
Hell and Paradise: A New Translation and Introduction,” in Old Testament Pseudepigrapha More
Noncanonical Scriptures Volume One (eds. R. Bauckham, J.R. Davila and A. Panayotov; Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2013), 699-753.
37
R. Boustan, “Rabbinization and the Making of Early Jewish Mysticism,” JQR 101.4 (2011): 482-501;
For broader shifts, see S. Schwartz, “Rabbinization in the Sixth Century” in The Talmud Yerushalmi and
Graeco-Roman Culture Volume 3 (ed. Peter Schäfer; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 55-69.
38
Nevertheless, for attempts to connect early mystical literature with priestly castes, see R. Elior, The Three
Temples: On the Emergence of Early Jewish Mysticism (Oxford: The Littman Library of Jewish
Civilization, 2004). In response, see M. Himmelfarb, “Merkavah Mysticism since Scholem: Rachel Elior’s
The Three Temples,” in Wege mystischer Gotteserfahrung: Mystical Approaches to God: Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam (ed. P. Schäfer; Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2006), 19–36; R.
Boustan, “Rabbinization,” 487-93.
39
R. Boustan, “Rabbinization,” 493-501; ibid., From Martyr to Mystic: Rabbinic Martyrology and the
Making of Merkavah Mysticism (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 281-88; M.D. Swartz, Scholastic Magic:
Ritual and Revelation in early Jewish Mysticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 220-21; M.
Vidas, Tradition and the Formation of the Talmud (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). In her
recent monograph on the seventh century “apocalypse” Sefer Zerubbabel, Martha Himmelfarb
demonstrates that post-talmudic apocalypses drew from traditions that the rabbis rejected or otherwise
sought to domesticate, pointing again to the value of contextualizing early medieval Jewish literature within
the Christian culture of the Byzantine Empire. (Himmelfarb, Jewish Messiahs).
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Rather than seek the ‘‘roots’’ of Jewish mystical and magical discourses within a hermetically
sealed Jewish culture and documenting their linear, even teleological development through
successive stages of Judaism, many scholars are increasingly taking up the challenge of tracing the
crisscrossing ‘‘routes’’ of conceptual and material exchange at and across the boundaries of
religious community and tradition.40

I take up Boustan’s challenge, though I frame the parameters slightly differently. Instead
of looking down from an aerial perspective to trace possible routes of intersection
between “communities and traditions,” I suggest that communities themselves navigated
shared conceptual spaces tethered to particular times and places. Their literature would
therefore come to express this movement through this culturally-inflected, local “time
and space.”41 This is not to discount possible points of intersection along communal
borders, but to suggest a complementary model that respects both the particular aspects of
late antique Jewish society, its continued “embeddedness” in a specific time and place,
and its passage through that local context. Speaking spatially and temporally about the
Hekhalot literature therefore allows me to frame it alongside the literature produced by
other communities within a shared environment and the visible similarities among these
regional and contemporary communities can then be attributed to analogous
developments produced under a common environment. As I argue in the second part of
this dissertation, this environment was characterized by multiple late antique

Boustan, “Rabbinization,” 486. For methodological considerations regarding the deployment of Syriac
sources for the study of Judaism broadly, and Hekhalot literature specifically, see A.H. Becker, “Polishing
the Mirror: Some Thoughts on Syriac Sources and Early Judaism” in Envisioning Judaism: Studies in
Honor of Peter Schäfer on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday (vol. 2; eds. R. Boustan, K. Hermann, R.
Leicht, A.Y. Reed, and G. Vetri; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013), 897-915.
41
I draw on Soja’s critique and exploration of “space.” See E.W. Soja, Thirdspace: Journeys to Los
Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996).
40
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communities theorizing the limits of human knowledge and the possibility of attaining
revelatory knowledge.

Localizing Christianity: Beyond “Religious” Representation and Towards “Context”
This dissertation builds on critical insights voiced by scholars of religion to move away
from the category of “religion” as an object of study in the ancient world.42 I translate this
call practically to mean that scholars should move away from “religious tradition” as the
operative principle for organizing our ancient texts and instead to experiment with other
parameters of analysis. This dissertation employs a regional and synchronic approach to
its chosen sources and therefore forefronts the “local” context in which “religious texts”
were “embedded.” After all, if “religion” as a category was exported “from the local,” to
use Dubuisson’s turn of phrase, by which he means the shift from “religion” as a
historically-contingent Western category to an ostensibly neutral “universal” category,
then this dissertation aims to return “religion” to the “local.”43 Even if, as Nongbri
reminds us, there is no such thing as “embedded religion” since there is no such thing as
“religion” in the ancient world, scholars still have the fact of embeddedness itself – that

To quote Judith Lieu in her critique of the “Parting of the Ways” model, she writes, “The problem of the
model ‘parting of the ways’ is that… it operates essentially with the abstract or universal conception of
each religion, when what we know about is specific and local” in “‘The Parting of the Ways?’: Theological
Construct or Historical Reality?,” JSNT 56 (1994): 101-19, 108. This insight applies even beyond the
narrow question of the “Parting of the Ways.” Indeed, if all our “Christian” or “Jewish” texts are “specific
and local,” then it makes sense to read these corpora laterally according to their specific and local contexts.
A.Y. Reed and L. Vuong, “Christianity in Antioch: Partings in Roman Syria” in Partings: How Judaism
and Christianity became Two (ed. H. Shanks; Washington, D.C.: Biblical Archaeological Society, 2013),
105-32.
43
D. Dubuisson, “Exporting the Local: Recent Perspectives on ‘Religion’ as a Cultural Category,” Religion
Compass 1 (2007): 787-800.
42
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is, a text’s particular regional and temporal “context” – as an arena of analysis.44 This
approach, while obvious in one sense, has radical consequences for how scholars
represent Christianity. In fact, when scholars approach “Christianity” from the grounded
perspective of a particular region and specific moment, much of what scholars assume,
explicitly or implicitly, as representative of “Christianity” becomes radically relativized.
The late antique Syrian milieu furnishes an excellent case study. For example,
there is little reason why one should a priori accept John Chrysostom or Mar Ephrem,
two of the more famous fourth century Syrian “Christians,” as more (or less)
“representative” of Syrian Christianity than the creators of understudied texts like the
Didascalia Apostolorum. Nor should we forget that Bardaisanites, Manichaeans, and
Marcionites, among others, still populated the Syrian borderlands. We might push this
logic further to incorporate “Jewish Christian” texts like the Book of Elchasai (2nd
century), the Pseudo-Clementine complex (3rd-4th century), or the Kephalaia of the
Teacher (3-5th century); these are all “representative” of Syrian Christianity and our
privileging of one over the other often depends on disciplinary boundaries and hidden
canons. Indeed, our vision of Syrian “Christianity” would look very different if we
privileged these understudied texts as somehow emblematic of “Syrian Christianity.”
An awareness of the limits of “Christianity” as a descriptive term for the various
“Christianities” populating the Syrian plateau invites scholars to reassess the place of
Syriac literature in particular, especially given its resurgence of interest precisely due to

B. Nongbri, “Dislodging ‘Embedded’ Religion: A Brief Note on a Scholarly Trope,” Numen 55 (2008):
440-60.
44
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its apparent ability to act as “contextual” material for other fields.45 In the face of such
evidence for the varieties of “Christianities” in late antique Syria, it would be odd to
sequester Mar Ephrem, to choose one outstanding example, solely within historiographic
narratives of the Church of the East.46 Would he not also be participating in the broader
patterns and discourses of his time and place? Part of the problem stems from the fact that
this Syriac-speaking poet is often pegged as a historiographic point of origin for a
recognizable “Church of the East” that is at once aligned with “Greek-speaking forms of
Christianity” and discontinuous with a presumed “Jewish Christian” past.47 Ephrem
therefore comes to “represent” Syriac Christianity in the fourth century because he aligns
with our sensibilities of what Christianity ought to be. Yet Aaron Butts has recently
argued that our picture of Ephrem is heavily mediated by the medieval scribes who
“sanitized” Ephrem’s writings to align with their later Christological sensibilities.48 If
Ephrem looks like an exemplary member of the Church of the East, it is because he was
deliberately packaged by later scribes to be so. If Butts is correct, then Ephrem cannot
In response to this trend, see A. Becker, “Polishing the Mirror.”
For example, see C. Shepardson, Anti-Judaism, 157-61. Following scholars like Sidney Griffith,
Shepardson demonstrates the ways that Ephrem used anti-Jewish rhetoric in order to bring the Syriacspeaking Church in line with Nicene forms of Christianity. My argument, however, is that Syriac sources
do not have to be used for the purposes of reconstructing a historiographic narrative of the Church of the
East, but can also be used as unwitting witnesses to broader local and regional shifts, dynamics, and
parallel developments. There is no reason why the institutions responsible for the transmission of
manuscripts needs to determine how they are used. For an example that compares Ephrem’s writings with
rabbinic legal terminology, see: Y. Monnickendam, “Articulating Marriage: Ephrem’s Legal Terminology
and its Origins,” Journal of Semitic Studies 58.2 (2013): 257-96.
47
L.W. Barnard, “The Origins and Emergence of the Church of Edessa during the First Two Centuries
A.D.,” VG 22 (1968): 161-75; S.B. Brock, “Jewish Sources in Syriac Sources,” JJS 30 (1979): 212-32; C.
Sheperdson, Anti-Judaism and Christian Orthodoxy: Ephrem’s Hymns in Fourth Century Syria
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2008). In response, see A. Becker, “Beyond the
Spatial and Temporal Limes: Questioning the ‘Parting of the Ways’ Outside the Roman Empire” in The
Ways That Never Parted: Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (eds. A.H.
Becker and A.Y. Reed; Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2007; repr. of Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003),
373–92.
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A. Butts, “Manuscript Transmission as Reception History: The Case of Ephrem the Syrian (d. 373),”
JECS 25.2 (2017): 281-306.
45
46

19

only be deployed as a point of origin for the Church of the East, but must also be
configured horizontally as one type of “Christian” within the broader late antique Syrian
environment.
Second, scholars of early Syriac literature have focused intensely on
demonstrating the “Greek” impact on “Syriac” Christianity. The sum of such scholarship
is to demonstrate that Syriac Christianity was not an untrammeled oasis of a Semitic form
of Christianity, but already deeply attuned to the Greek speaking Roman Near East.49 As
Drijvers had already recognized in the case of the early second century Syriac-speaking
“Christian” named Bardaisan, this “Aramean philosopher” was an active participant,
however unique, in the intellectual and religious currents of his day.50 Ute Possekel too
has exhaustively demonstrated that Ephrem was conversant in Greek philosophy.51
Examples of “Hellenic” features might be multiplied with regard to other early Syriac
texts like the Letter of Mara bar Sarapion.52 As Adam Becker has also argued,

S. Griffith, “Setting Right the Church of Syria: Saint Ephraem’s Hymns against Heresies” in The Limits
of Ancient Christianity: Essays on Late Antique Thought and Culture in Honor of R.A. Markus (eds. W.E.
Klingshirn and M. Vessey; Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 97-114; ibid., “Ephraem the
Deacon of Edessa, and the Church of the Empire,” in Diakonia: Studies in Honor of Robert T. Meyer (eds.
T. Halton and J.P. Williman; Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 22-52.
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H.J.W. Drijvers, Bardaiṣan of Edessa (trans. Mrs. G.E. van Baaren-Pape; Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp.
N.V., 1966), 218-27; I. Ramelli, Bardaisan of Edessa: A Reassessment of the Evidence and a New
Interpretation (Piscataway: Gorgias Press, 2009). In response, see A. Camplani, “Bardaisan’s Psychology:
Known and Unknown Testimonies and Current Scholarly Perspectives” in Syriac Encounters: Papers from
the Sixth North American Syriac Symposium Duke University, 26-29 June 2011 (eds. M. Doerfler, E. Fiano,
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Theologian?,” ZAC 10 (2006): 442-61; ibid., “Bardaisan of Edessa on the Resurrection: Early Syriac
Eschatology in its Religious-Historical Context,” OC 88 (2004): 1-28. For new directions for
contextualizing Bardaisan, see W. Adler, “The Kingdom of Edessa and the Creation of a Christian
Aristocracy” in Jews, Christians, and the Roman Empire: The Poetics of Power in Late Antiquity (eds.
A.Y. Reed and N. Dohrmann; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 43-62.
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Neoplatonic pedagogy also crept into Syriac education as part of this broader
rapprochement with Greek education.53
Having established that Syriac-speaking “Christians” were deeply conversant with
intellectual currents in the Roman Near East, scholars must now attend to the more
difficult task of navigating this enlarged “archive.” It is imperative, however, that
scholars do not end up reinscribing the binary of Greek/Syriac Christianity that they
sought to undermine lest we get cornered (or hoodwinked) into thinking that measuring
the degree of “Greekness” on Syriac Christianity is a worthwhile endeavor. At the same
time, the text/context framework that relegates Syriac literature as mere “context” to the
foregrounded “text” must also be rejected in so far as it predetermines the range of
possible conclusions to a question of how the expanded “context” informed the “text.” In
the text/context model there remains only a single possible axis of analysis, one that
extends from “accommodation” to “resistance.” What is lost in the process is a broader
vision of Syriac-speaking Christians among other Syrian communities. How might
expanding the range of comparanda for early Syriac literature inform scholarly analyses
of these texts? How did early Syriac-speaking Christian communities respond to and
participate in broader epistemic shifts?
Syriac sources play an active role within my representation of the development of
prophethood and prophecy. As such, they are not meant to compose the “background” or
“context” for my foregrounded object of study but occupy a shared evidentiary plane. In
this sense, I depend on the post-structuralist collapsing of text/context binary, which
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ultimately liberates scholars to experiment with models of comparative work.54 Such
theoretical interventions may help scholars resituate Syriac sources beyond their current
use as emblems of “Christian” identity, within trajectories of the “Church of the East,” or
as “contextual” materials for other fields. Even more broadly, by arraying figures like
Bardaisan and Ephrem as particular nodes within a wider interconnected net of Syrian
literati, I hope to demonstrate the value of situating those sources preserved in Syriac as
already participating in broader discourses of the Late Antique Near East.

Late Antique Greek Philosophy
This dissertation incorporates the writings of late antique Syrian philosopher Iamblichus
with the aim of emplotting them within broader Syrian epistemic shifts centering on the
revelatory knowledge. As such, I am less interested in approaching these figures
“philosophically” – that is, discovering what they “truly” thought regarding a certain
philosophical position – than in situating them among other local communities in a late
antique Syrian milieu. As was the case with Syriac literature, I respond to calls from
within the field of philosophy for a broader “contextualizations” of the “history of
philosophy.”55
Late antique Syria was marked by a peculiar density of philosophers allied with
the Neoplatonic “movement.” We know very little about the life of Plotinus, the
ostensible “founder” of “Neoplatonism,” yet we do know that he was accused of
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plagiarizing the works of Numenius, a Platonist philosopher from the Syrian city of
Apamea.56 In fact, Numenius’ works were read in Plotinus’ seminars in Rome. Plotinus’
most important student Porphyry was of Syrian descent, as was Porphyry’s student and
rival, Iamblichus.57 Both were probably conversant in a form of Aramaic. Indeed, their
names in the original Aramaic – Porphyry from Malkhus and Iamblichus from Yamlikhu
– preserve the m-l-k triconsonantal root (to rule; act as king), signifying their high station
among the Syrian elite. All three early Neoplatonists had read the writings of the
“Gnostics,” and reacted violently against them.58 Porphyry also read the writings of
Bardaisan, whom he calls the Babylonian, and cited him approvingly, despite Porphyry’s
distaste for Christians in general.59 Furthermore, given Apamea’s history with innovative
thinkers, it is no surprise that Iamblichus chose to retire there and establish relationships
with powerful socialites and politicians.60 We should remember that the Chaldean
Oracles, which both Porphyry and Iamblichus studied intensively, was written by Syrian
Platonic “theurgists” of some sort sometime in the second century.61 Later Neoplatonists
like the “Christian” philosopher Pseudo-Dionysius also emerged from Syria,
demonstrating the deep channels of “Neoplatonic” thought that persisted among Christian
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Syrians deep into late antiquity.62 At the same time, we should not underestimate the
spread of Neoplatonism – specifically, an Iamblichean form of theurgic Neoplatonism –
among the elite in the years shortly following Iamblichus’ death.63 None other than the
Emperor Julian would adopt Iamblichus’ program of theurgy and his reputation as
adherent of Iamblichean “divination” seems to have preceded him. In fact, Mar Ephrem
blasted Julian by calling him a “Chaldean” and mocking his particular penchant for
divinatory practices, which may signal that Mar Ephrem was aware of Julian’s adoption
of Iamblichean theurgy, which is strongly associated with the Chaldean arts.64 Finally, by
the time of the “School of Nisibis,” a curated form of Neoplatonic thought would enter
into the Syriac speaking academy, which would ultimately prove instrumental for the
spread and naturalization of “Neoplatonic” thought into the Islamic age. 65 Ultimately, all
this demonstrates that late antique Syria was a particularly fertile bed for both the
precursors to Neoplatonism and for the Neoplatonists themselves. Moreover, their ideas
crisscrossed in ways with both “Gnostics” and Syriac-speaking Christians in ways that
opens us up to the possibility of an integrated bilingual world of Syrian intellectual
thought.
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Recent monographs have demonstrated a bit of the range to which Neoplatonic
literature might be put to historical work. Jeremy Schott, for example, analyzes Porphyry
within a post-colonial framework to articulate how “Christianity” presented itself as a
hybridized threat to the Roman Empire.66 Aaron Johnson also situates Porphyry’s
interplay between the particular and the universal as a “product of Empire.” 67 More
recently, Heidi Marx-Wolf read Iamblichus as participating in what she identifies as a
late antique trend of “taxonomizing” spiritual beings.68 Dylan Burns has also recently
argued that the final separation between the “Jewish Christian” Gnostics and Plotinus’
school can be pinpointed to the moment when Plotinus “kicked” the Gnostics out of his
seminar.69 Though we are not beholden to follow Marx-Wolf or Burns to their ultimate
conclusions, they nevertheless highlight how scholars might continue to employ
“Neoplatonic” sources beyond their usual place within the “history of philosophy.” In
keeping with this methodological momentum, I also attempt to make sense of these
Syrian “Neoplatonists” within a late antique Syrian milieu.

Late Antique Syria: Between Method and Data
Syria has long been a crucible for studying the “limits” of imperial power.

Not
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operating in relation to a Greek or Roman center.70 In his recent book, for example,
Nathaniel Andrade argues that Syrians – broadly defined as those living in the Roman
Near East – ultimately wove together Greek, Roman, and “local” cultural idioms as a
mode of accommodating, appropriating, and/or resisting Roman-ness in a myriad of
individual ways.71 Though one might nitpick Andrade’s interpretations of particular texts,
his argument pushes scholars to rethink the “essentialist” identities and refocuses
attention on the Syrians’ role in the process of “Hellenization” or “Romanization” from
the bottom up as a strategy of resistance and accommodation. At the same time, while
such attention to the subaltern is certainly welcome, the limitations of such studies mirror
the problem alluded to above in the section on Syrian Christianity: when one understands
“Syrian”-ness or “Roman”-ness as meaningful descriptions of one’s identity, the
parameters of scholarly production are set to fixing “identity” along an axis of
accommodation and resistance. The irony lies in the fact that Andrade argues for the nonessential nature of “Syrian” identities while still understanding “Roman,” “Greek,”
“Local” as descriptive categories. Andrade’s recent monograph, then, while significantly
pushing forward the conversation by adopting concepts from post-colonial theory and
attempting to go beyond “essential” identities, ends up reinscribing the utility of these
70
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categories through his denial of their fixity; whether “both/and,” “neither/nor,” or
“already/always,” the categories of analysis – Greek, Roman, and Near Eastern – remain
the same.
Scholars of religious studies have approached Syria and “Syrian” identity in more
oblique ways, working through the writings of Syrian “religious” communities in order to
look at Syria from the inside-out. From this perspective, “Roman” power operates less as
a thing a Syrian might “talk back to” but as part and parcel of his or her participation in
“Roman-ness.” For example, Laura Nasrallah’s work complicates the processes of center
and periphery that dominates much of the scholarship alluded to above. 72 Her argument
that Justin, Tatian, and Lucian might be profitably read together through the lens of the
Second Sophistic cuts across entrenched disciplinary divides, especially between Classics
and Religious Studies, and nuances questions of cultural transformation. Another
example might be found in Hayim Lapin’s book on rabbinic literature as “the product of
Roman, provincial, city-dwelling men.”73 In Lapin’s categorization, the rabbis are not
“Roman-ized” Jews – as if these two were separate domains – but simply Roman Jews in
so far as they inhabited the material and ideological habitus of the Roman Near East. In
like manner, Annette Yoshiko Reed and Natalie Dohrmann have interrogated regnant
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practices of “contextualizing” Judaism and Christianity against a “Roman Empire,” and
instead seek to reorient these communities as inescapably Roman.74
Such experimentations in “contextualizing” Jews, Christians, and Pagans
alongside and together with the Roman Empire, rather than models that situates these
groups “in front of” or “behind” the Empire, might be profitably brought to bear on the
Syrian context itself. Though this dissertation does not explicitly address the poetics of
Roman imperial rule, following the studies raised above, it embeds the communities
studied here – Jewish Christians, Christians, Jews, Manichaeans, and Platonists – as
inevitably “Romans,” as if they could be anything but Romans. The common regional
and temporal prism is certainly not a license to collapse the often radical differences
among these communities – and to be clear, I am not arguing that various identities
dissolve into a homogeneous Syrian humanity – but an opportunity to descry parallel
developments, points of intersection, or to put it more poetically, “differences predicated
on similarities, and similarities predicated on differences.”75 In other words, though such
communities certainly acted, at times, in polemical exchange with one another in ways
that had significant ramifications for the ways they articulated their “identity” vis-à-vis
other “identities,” one cannot forget that they were interlocked along chains of power,
discourse, and affect that ordered the Roman Near East. As such, one can study these
communities together as Syrians to tell a single multifaceted narrative. Of course, one
must attend to how each community drew from a well of locally-available and
communally-delimited materials and strategies. Yet, in my view, that is only half the
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story; the other half is trying to understand how these communities deployed such
particular strategies and ordered materials in ways that “make sense” vis-à-vis their
neighbors.
Chapter Outline and Argument of Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on prophethood as an
emergent object of discourse and as a strategy of articulating difference. This first part
focuses on the Cologne Mani Codex, the Kephalaia of the Teacher, and the PseudoClementine Homilies as examples of how a particular cross-section of Syrian
communities began to theorize and articulate difference through concepts of
prophethood. The second part pivots to an exploration of prophecy as revelatory
knowledge. It argues that despite their differences, concepts of revelatory knowledge –
especially as they cluster around the word prognosis – began to converge among a broad
range of local Syrian communities.
In chapter one, I focus on the Cologne Mani Codex, a third century document
written by early followers of Mani. In contrast to scholars who look at the Codex as a
window into the origins of a distinct religion we now know as “Manichaeism,” I argue
that the “origin of religion” model does little to explain its complexities. I focus in
particular on Baraies the Teacher’s homily to his “brothers.” As opposed to most scholars
who interpret Baraies’ homily as an expression for an already well-established
Manichaean “prophetology,” I argue instead that we must read it as crafted text that was
delivered for a specific occasion. I argue that Baraies’ homily preserves evidence for a
fissure that developed among the followers of Mani, not between “Manichaeans” and
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“others.” Accoridng to Baraies, at least, this fissure split the community between those
who understood Mani as a prophet in the line of other prophets, and those who did not.
The Codex thus bears witness to the emerging importance of “prophethood” as a mode of
articulating between “true” and “false” forms of Mesopotamian “Christianity.”
Chapter two examines the discursive transformations of “prophethood” as it
entered the Roman Near East. It focuses on the prophetological systems found in the
Coptic Manichaean text known as the Kephalaia of the Teacher. I argue that despite
sharing a tendency towards systematization, the

Kephalaia

has

no master

“prophetological” system, but multiple systems that bear witness to their different origins.
I argue that these diverse prophetological systems respond to Manichaean anxieties
regarding the relationship between “Manichaeism” and other local Syrian forms of
Christianity, as evidenced by the Didascalia Apostolorum and the Syriac texts narrating
the spread of “Christianity” into Syria and Mesopotamia. Syrian Manichaean
prophetology emerges as a way for Manichaeans to identify themselves as Christians and
to claim superiority over Christians. In so doing, the Syrian Manichaeans responsible for
the creation of the Kephalaia engage in a type of oblique competition with nonManichaean forms of Christianity.
Chapter three turns to examine the unique system of prophethood found in the
Pseudo-Clementine Homilies, an early fourth century text. I follow other scholars in
agreeing that its unique privileging of the oral-aural transmission of prophetic knowledge
evinces awareness of the developing rabbinic ideology of the Oral Torah. At the same
time, I demonstrate that contemporary medical and embryological discourses provide the
raw conceptual materials for this system of prophethood and prophecy. Ultimately, I
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situate the Homilies as a counter-Manichaean prophetological system, one that adopts the
position as Jews in order to critique what it conceives to be false prophetic teachings,
which from its own peculiar “Jewish Christian” position, included not only the doctrines
of the “Catholic” Church, as demonstrated by the Didascalia, but also those espoused by
the Manichaeans.
Part Two turns to explore the concept of revelatory knowledge by attending to the
shifting semantic field of the Greek/Coptic word prognosis. Chapter four argues that a
range of late antique Syrian communities expressed deep skepticism towards humanity’s
ability to apprehend the divine. As might be expected, there is no single reason for this
trend but a stream of converging discursive statements. Their explanations range from
faulty bodily composition (Ps.-Cl. Hom.), the futility of human reasoning processes,
especially Greek modes of logic-splitting (Iamblichus, Ps.-Cl. Hom., Ephrem), the threat
of destruction (rabbis), or simply because God is too transcendent (Iamblichus, Ephrem).
Nevertheless, while some communities were perfectly content with “horizontal” forms of
knowledge-production, e.g., the analysis of “mysteries” embedded in Scripture and nature
(Ephrem) or by approaching “Torah” – broadly conceived – as an expansive endeavor
tied to creation (rabbis), others sought to establish a “vertical” link with the divine by
rhetorically fashioning an alternative domain of “revelatory knowledge,” that is, “divine
prognosis.” This conception of prognosis was absolutely distinct from human modes of
knowledge production and acquisition (Iamblichus, Ps.-Cl. Homilies, Manichaeans). As I
argue in this chapter, “divine knowledge” belongs solely to the divine and therefore
cannot be “transmitted” or even “experienced” through the channels of normal human
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physiognomy. In this sense, divine knowledge as prognosis is not “knowledge,” at least if
conceived as a discrete “byte” of information, but its divine cause, source, or essence.
The final chapter extends the argument of chapter four to the Sar Torah
macroform in the Hekhalot corpus. I examine the Sar Torah as a privileged example for
how Syrian theorizations of divine knowledge generated the broader environment for the
development of the Sar Torah traditions. I argue that the Sar Torah’s flirtation with
“angelic contemplation” as well as its articulation of an “instantaneously knowable”
Torah that stands apart from rabbinic models of transmitting Torah aligns well with the
argument explored in chapter four. I conclude by arguing that the Sar Torah traditions
and the late antique Syrian discourse on divine prognosis might be viewed profitably as
analogous developments within a common late antique Syrian environment.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE EMERGENCE OF A DISCOURSE OF PROPHETHOOD
AMONG EARLY FOLLOWERS OF MANI

The study of prophecy and prophethood in the Syrian borderlands cannot be told without
first going across the Roman limes into Sasanian Persia, where the third century
Mesopotamian prophet named Mani was rapidly finding adherents across the entire
spectrum of Sasanian communities, ranging from “Jewish-Christian” Baptists to
Zoroastrian nobles. Proclaiming himself the Paraclete and an Apostle of Jesus Christ,
Mani sent his missionaries westward deep into the Roman Empire and eastward towards
China. His aggressive missionizing efforts can be understood, in part, alongside his
unique understanding of regional prophethood. Just as Buddha was sent as a prophet to
India and Kushan, Zoroaster to Persia, Jesus to the West, Plato to the Greeks, and Hermes
to Egypt,76 Mani was sent to the middle of the world, Mesopotamia. Unlike his
predecessors whose churches were narrowly circumscribed to particular regions, Mani
was a universal prophet who came to restore the entire world to the original and true
teachings of Jesus the Savior.77
It was only with the discovery and decipherment of the Cologne Mani Codex,
henceforth CMC,78 that scholars gained access into some of the problems that beset the
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early followers of Mani in the years shortly following his execution in the late third
century. The CMC demonstrated that Mani’s earliest followers were still debating what it
meant for Mani to be a “prophet.” In fact, “prophethood” is the main topic of debate in
Baraies the Teacher’s homily (CMC 45.1-72.7). Indeed, the entirety of this lengthy
homily amounts to a sophisticated argument proving that Mani was a prophet like the
prophets who had come before him. Baraies cites passages from texts ostensibly written
by their ancestral “biblical” prophets – Adam, Sethel, Enosh, Shem, Enoch, and Paul 79 –
and patches these passages together to construct a “typology” of prophethood.80 This
typology defined a prophet as someone 1) who was “raptured” and acquired revelatory
knowledge, 2) who inscribed that revelation as a “memoir” for posterity, and 3) who
chose an elect community to safeguard and propagate his teachings. Just as the ancestral
prophets had met all three criteria for prophethood, so too had Mani. Therefore, Baraies
argues, Mani should be considered a prophet in the same order as the earlier prophets.
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In stark contrast to triumphalist narratives of the rise of Manichaeism from its
Elchasaite roots,81 Baraies’ homily bears witness to a community beset by uncertainty,
riven by deep feuds, and characterized by intense struggles for the authority to speak on
behalf of the recently deceased Mani. By interrogating the rhetoric, audience, and goals
of Baraies homily, I argue that Baraies’ homily points to the emergence of a late third
century Syro-Mesopotamian discourse of “prophethood” that played an increasingly
important role in defining communal identity, as the following chapters will demonstrate.
This discourse on “prophethood” was not a “natural” evolution from earlier
prophetological doctrines stemming either from Elchasai or from Mani, as has been
commonly assumed, but can be better understood as a local and occasional strategy of
curating and presentating an ancient prophetic past for the purposes of negotiating intracommunal politics. How one understood prophethood determined one’s “identity” either
as a “true” follower of Mani or as a “false brother.”
To argue this point, I first explore the identity of “the brothers” as followers of
Mani. In contrast to other scholars who see Baraies’ homily as written after the hardening
of boundaries between the “Manichaeans” and the “false brothers,” I argue that the “false
brothers” are still “brothers,” in a sense, and that the homily can be more profitably read
as a work that addresses both camps. The “brothers” are still “followers of Mani,” just
not Baraies’ faction of brothers.
I then turn to investigate the dispute between Baraies and his opponents. I first
argue that the authority to interpret Mani’s writings and therefore to “represent” Mani
following his death is what at stake in the larger debate between Baraies and his false
81

I speak more about this in the concluding section.

35

brothers. Baraies insists that he understands the signs embedded in Mani’s writings and
that he and his faction were legitimate spokespersons for how the community should
think about Mani’s prophethood. In order for Baraies’ to convince anyone, however, he
must also demonstrate that he understands the deeper meaning of Mani’s writing. I argue
that Baraies does this by showcasing his excellent command of the community’s literary
heritage. Baraies’ ability to weave together multiple texts into a coherent argument and
presentation demonstrates that he truly understands the meaning of the ancient prophetic
texts, the “sense of their voice.”82 My goal in this section is to bring out the “occasional”
nature of Baraies’ homily, rather than looking it as a transparent expression of “SyroMesopotamian” gnosis or as an articulation of some inner “systematic” theology.
In the concluding section, I contextualize Baraies’ homily against the broader
narrative of Mani’s “biography” as depicted in the CMC. I demonstrate that the CMC as
a whole shows Mani to be deeply involved with his “Elchasaite” community.83 Therefore,
we cannot assume that Mani “broke” away from the Elchasaite community, but that he
represents a fissure within that community. This directly parallels Baraies’ own vision for
where Mani fits within Elchasaite history since he argues that Mani occupied the latest
rung in a continuous Elchasaite past. Against this background, then, the fissure that
developed among the early followers of Mani over “prophethood” may have ultimately
fractured the community irrevocably in two.
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Who were the “Brothers?”
The comprehensiveness and length of Baraies’ homily suggests that Baraies is not just
constructing a rhetorical “other,” but that his opponents’ arguments were sophisticated
and perhaps even effective. But who were these brothers who had, according to Baraies,
“changed allegiances,”84 “put on unbelief,”85 and who “think they know something about
this revelation and vision of our father?”86 There is surprisingly little work done on this
question, as scholarly interest is diverted either to Mani’s earlier life or to the various
apocalypses embedded in Baraies’ homily. Tigchelaar suggests that these are “opponents
of the early Manichaeans, who may have been originally believers themselves.” 87 Based
on a “text-pragmatic” reading of the homily, he argues that Baraies’ homily is “not
directed against opponents, but aims to boost the disciples’ relation to Mani, and hence to
the Manichaean community.”88 He also hypothesizes a “Christian background” for both
the “brothers” and the opponents.89 Tigchelaar therefore distinguishes between the early
“Manichaean community” and their “original” identity as Christians. He further
postulates that Baraies’ opponents were “non-Manichaeans” or possibly “former
Manichaeans,” who once may have had or continue to have Christian predilections. In
my view, the existence of a distinct “Manichaean” community must first be proven and
not asserted a priori, especially in light of methodological questions regarding the
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category of religion and the subsequent reverberations of that question into the field of
late antique religions, as I have already discussed in the introduction. When we consider
the evidence altogether, I argue that Baraies’ “opponents” were also “brothers,” but
brothers who did not understand the prophethood of Mani in the specific manner that
Baraies argued.

The Brothers as Followers of Mani
In the introduction to his homily, Baraies urges his brothers to “know and understand”90
the “sending of the Spirit of the Paraclete,”91 so that they would not provoke those who
had “changed allegiances” (μεταβληθεὶς) into saying “They alone (οὗτοι μόνοι) wrote a
rapture of their teacher in order to boast.” 92 Whereas some might argue that this passage
already presupposes an absolute separation between Baraies’ community and his
opponents, it can be interpreted in another way. After all, why would Baraies even care
about what these “false brothers” were thinking if they were already two distinct
communities? Moreover, how is he able to preempt their response, unless he had spent
significant time with those naysayers? Such questions suggest that the lines of
communication between the two parties are still open and that boundaries between the
two had not yet hardened to the point of no return. Baraies also calls his opponents “those
who think they know something regarding the revelation of Mani.”93 He does not say that
these brothers altogether dismissed the revelation of Mani, as one might expect, but that
90
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they understood it incorrectly, or better, not in the specific manner that Baraies argues.
Again, this presupposes that Baraies knows what they think about the revelation of Mani,
which again requires that the lines of communication remain open. Even false brothers
are still brothers.
These observations compel us to revisit Tigchelaar’s identification of Baraies’
opponents with “non-Manichaean Christians.” First, we have to take seriously Baraies’
explicit claim in the introduction and the conclusion that he wrote the homily so that the
ones who changed allegiances might acknowledge that Mani received the same prophetic
ordinance as earlier prophets. Baraies says that the brothers should learn the apostleship
of the Spirit so that the one who changed allegiances might not say, “They alone wrote a
rapture about their teacher in order to boast.” Why is it the case that the brothers learning
the Apostleship of the Spirit would prevent the one who changed allegiances from
saying, “They alone wrote a rapture about their teacher?” The simplest answer is that
“brothers” encompasses both Baraies’ faction and the “one who changed allegiances.”
This interpretation is bolstered by Baraies’ initial address to the brothers, namely, “Let he
who is willing, hear and heed how each one of the forefathers showed his own revelation
to his elect, which he chose and brought together in the generation in which he appeared,
and how he wrote it down and bequeathed it for posterity.” Tigchelaar argues that this
phrase distinguishes between “one who changed allegiances” and the one who is
“willing.”94 I would instead argue it is an attempt to adopt an open if not ostentatiously
welcoming tone for both parties, which in turn suggests that those “who changed
allegiances” were part of Baraies’ intended audience.
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We can make a similar argument when we turn to the conclusion of the homily.
There, Baraies states,

Now many superior [ὑπερβολαὶ] things like these [παραπλήσιαι] are found in the books of our
father, books that demonstrate both his revelation and the rapture of his apostleship. For the
superiority [ὑπερβολή] of this coming is great, which, through the Paraclete, the Spirit of Truth, is
coming to us. Concerning these things, why do we sift them thoroughly, we who are once and for
all convinced that this apostleship is superior [ὑπερβάλλειν] in its revelations? We have repeated
from our forefathers each of their raptures and their revelations for the sake of those who have put
on unbelief and who think they know something about this revelation and vision of our father
(Mani), so that they might say/know [εἴπωσιν or εἰδῶσιν] that this same ordinance [ἡ διαταγή] was
given to the ancestral apostles.”95

There are two points worth dwelling on in this passage. First, Baraies makes it clear that
he believes that Mani’s revelation was superior to the revelations of the ancestral
apostles, as demonstrated by the forms of the verb ὑπερβάλλω used in reference to
Mani’s apostleship.96 This in turn helps us make better sense of Baraies’ rhetorical
question. Baraies is saying that even though he knows that Mani’s apostleship is superior
to that of the forefathers, nevertheless, for the sake of those “who have put on unbelief,”
he thought it necessary to demonstrate that Mani received the same “ordinance” of
prophethood that they had received. The difference between Mani and the earlier
prophets was a matter of degree, not of kind. Furthermore, Baraies frames his “sifting” as
an act of good-will for those who have “put on unbelief,” so that they would reach the
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same conclusions that he had presented. This suggests, again, that Baraies and his
opponents were still part of a shared community. Second, as in the introduction, the very
fact that Baraies believes that those who hear his homily might agree with him suggests
that we are dealing with factions within the same community, rather than two entirely
different communities separated on the basis of “religion.”
We can bolster and sharpen the profile of the brothers further. Since Baraies’
homiletical argument works on the basis of comparison between Mani and a common set
of forefathers shared by both Baraies and his opponents, the so-called “ancestral
apostles” (τῶν προγόνων ἀποστόλων), for Baraies’ homily to have had any rhetorical
effect whatsoever, the opponents must have also understood their lineage to be the same
as Baraies’ faction. Baraies and his “opponents” must have still understood themselves as
descendants of a common ancestral lineage. This lineage of ancestral apostles, that is –
Adam, Sethel, Enosh, Shem, Enoch, Paul – can also be interrogated. After all, Baraies
says, “In conclusion, all the most blessed apostles, saviors, evangelists, and prophets of
truth – each of them beheld in so far as the living hope was revealed to him for
proclamation.”97 It this list representative of all the apostles? Why these apostles and not
others? Does this list comprise the full roster of “all the most blessed apostles?” We
cannot know whether these were the “core” apostles or merely a representative sampling.
It may even be the case that Baraies had access only to their writings. Nevertheless, it
seems more likely to me that Baraies selected this particular list of “apostles” to
maximize his rhetorical impact on his false “brothers.” I will speak more about Baraies’
rhetorical agenda in the following sections.
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We now have a relatively robust profile of Baraies’ audience. They are followers
of Mani who are divided on the issue of how one should understand his status as a
prophet. Their ancestral apostles include and are possibly limited to Adam, Sethel, Enosh,
Shem, Enoch, and Paul. Who fits this profile? Were these followers those who had
“Christian backgrounds” as Tigchelaar suggests? It certainly does not have to be
restricted specifically to any one group. After all, many communities in the late Parthian /
early Sasanian Persia era could have called Adam, Enoch, Enosh, and the other “biblical”
figures as among their forebears. Indeed, the Syro-Mesopotamian milieu was dotted with
groups that resist modern categorizations of “Jewish” or “Christian.” In this regard, Kartir
the Zoroastrian priest’s inscription in Naqsh-i-Rustam (~late 3rd CE) is instrumental for
highlighting this regional diversity.98 In it, he mentions that he struck down “Jews,
Buddhists, Brahmins, Nazarenes, Christians, Baptizers, and Manichaeans99…” Though
we cannot take this list as representative of the “religious” communities within the
Sasanian Empire, since Kartir was trying to demonstrate the magnitude of his own
contribution in promulgating “state Zoroastrianism,” it nevertheless suggests that there
were many “biblically”-affiliated communities dotting the Sasanian era. It is precisely
among such communities that Mani and his missionaries found their first followers, as
demonstrated by numerous passages in the CMC.100
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What was at stake?
I have argued above that Baraies’ community of brothers were followers of Mani who
were divided over how they should understand Mani’s prophethood. In this section, I
explore more fully the point of dispute between these brothers. As in the case above,
there is a surprising lack of scholarship on the polemical context of Baraies’ homily.
Instead, scholars have tended to read through Baraies to better understand Mani’s genius
or as a window into the wider Syro-Mesopotamian world. This is perhaps most explicit in
Frankfurter’s approach to Baraies’ homily. Ignoring Baraies, the local context, and the
particular occasion for the homily altogether, he ultimately concludes that Mani invoked
these antediluvian prophets in “sheer interest of self-promotion.”101 Mani thus gravitated
towards these ancestral “pre-Jewish” figures in order to gain more followers.
Reeves represents another approach to the texts. Like Frankfurter, he is
uninterested in the local polemical context but instead focuses on exploring the wider
Syro-Mesopotamian context in which the passages from apocalypses embedded in
Baraies’ homily were transmitted, read, and inculcated. Reeves concludes by saying,
“Not only do they (Baraies’ passages from various apocalypses) collectively bear witness
to the apostolic credibility of Mani as a ‘teacher of truth,’ to his cultural authority, but
they also firmly ensconce the Babylonian sage within the common conceptual universe of
his environment.”102 Like Frankfurter, then, Reeves reads through the homily to
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reimagine the ways that the various apocalypses “cited” in the homily “fit” their cultural
and religious milieu.
In contrast to Reeves and Frankfurter, Tigchelaar emphasizes Baraies’ role in the
construction of the homily. He argues that Baraies’ homily emerged from a “context of
disputes and accusations,”103 and, consistent with his claim that these “outsiders” were
ex-Manichaean Christians, he envisions Baraies’ homily as a defense against “Christians”
who “valued ‘apocalyptic’ visionary experiences and journeys as a source of revelation or
as a token of having been sent.”104 Therefore, Tigchelaar argues that the means of
acquiring revelatory knowledge lay at the heart of this Christian-Manichaean dispute.
Tigchelaar is certainly correct to draw out the polemical context in which Baraies forged
his homily. He also correctly highlights the “rapture” as a key point of dispute. Yet, as I
argued above, the dispute was not between “Christians” and “Manichaeans” but between
brothers who both followed Mani. I further depart from Tigchelaar in arguing that the
conflict between Baraies and his opponents was, in fact, a symptom of a deeper intrafraternal struggle for the authority to interpret Mani’s writings in the post-Mani era.
Let us first recap the key point of contention between the two camps. In brief, this
particular dispute between Baraies and his opponents centered on the question of whether
Mani did or did not receive the same apostolic ordinance given to the ancestral prophets.
To argue his point that Mani did receive the same ordinance, Baraies constructed what I
called a “typology of prophethood.”105 He argued that all prophets were “raptured,” wrote
their revelation in books as a memoir for future generations, and chose an elect
103
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community. Even though his revelations were superior to the earlier ancestral prophets,
Mani did all three things that prophets are wont to do, and therefore, he received the same
prophetic ordinance that they had. This is the “dispute” in a nutshell. It is important,
however, not to confuse the topic of the dispute with the question of what is at stake.
Indeed, Baraies’ focus on articulating a lineage of ancestral prophets may have less to do
with the “facts” – that is, the “fact” that Mani was a prophet who fit into a certain ancient
lineage – as much as it was about Baraies’ ability to speak from a position of authority on
Mani’s writings, and therefore, to shape the future of the community.
To explore this point, let us turn to the passage where Baraies first introduces
Mani. Having just summarized his argument on the apostleship of the ancestral prophets,
Baraies writes,

Also in this way, it is fitting for the all-praiseworthy Mani, through whom and from whom the
hope and inheritance of life has come to us, to write to us and to signify [σημᾶναι]106 for all
posterity and householders of faith and spiritual offspring, who are increasing through his most
limpid waters, so that his rapture and revelation would be made known to them. For we know, oh
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brothers, how great is his superiority of wisdom in relation to us with the coming of the Paraclete
of Truth.107

According to Baraies, Mani wrote his books in order to ensure that his revelations would
be safeguarded for all posterity. This is a well-known trope throughout the Manichaean
corpus.108 Peculiar to this context, however, is Baraies’ implication that Mani’s writings
are also “signs,” which in turn draws attention to the act of interpretation.109 To the best
of my knowledge, this intertwining of writing and signifying is unparalleled in other
Manichaean texts, which generally strive to present itself as the clear and self-evident
words of Mani. Here, Baraies goes the opposite direction by suggesting that Mani’s texts
need to be interpreted. This subtle assertion can be understood as a tactical move on
Baraies’ part to arrogate for himself the authority to interpret Mani’s writings.
Baraies’ suggestion that texts written by prophets are “signs” that need to be
interpreted reappears in his gloss on the apostle Paul. Baraies writes, “Now while he
[Paul] was outside himself and raptured to the third heaven and paradise, he saw and
heard, and that which he saw and heard he inscribed enigmatically [αἰνιγματωδῶς] in his
writings concerning his rapture and apostleship for the fellow initiates of the mysteries
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[τοῖς συμμύσταις τῶν ἀποκρύφων]” (CMC 62.8). As is well-known, Mani modeled his
apostleship off of Paul’s, even calling himself the “Apostle of Jesus Christ.” Baraies
implies that just as Paul had written his revelations in an enigmatic manner, so had Mani.
Both required Baraies’ interpretative expertise to uncover their meanings. The following
passage bolsters this reading of Baraies’ gloss. There, Baraies says,

In conclusion, all the most blessed apostles, saviors, evangelists, and prophets of the truth – each
of them beheld in so far as the living hope was revealed to him for proclamation. And they wrote
down, bequeathed [καταλελοίπασιν] and stored up as a memoir [εἰς ὑπόμνησιν] for the future sons
of the divine Spirit, who will understand the sense of his voice [γνωσομένων τῆς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ τὴν
αἴσθησιν].110

Baraies invokes the language of textual inheritance, memory, and expertise. Just as the
ancestral apostles wrote their revelation for “those who will understand the sense of his
voice” – that is, those who have the expertise to truly understand their writings – so too
did Mani write down his revelation for those who had the expertise and knowledge to
understand the importance of his words. Indeed, the ancestral apostles had written for
these “future sons of the divine Spirit” as a “memoir,” a claim repeated throughout the
homilies.111 Who were these rightful inheritors of the writings of these ancestral authors?
Who would be so bold as to claim that they had a “sense of the voice” of the prophets?
There is no doubt that Baraies is referring to himself. The counter-claim is apparent as
well: the ancestral apostles did not write to Baraies’ opponents, as evidenced by the fact
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that they do not have a “sense of his voice” and by the fact that they “think they know
something about this revelation and vision of our father,” when in reality, they do not.
The importance of interpretation for Baraies helps us better understand an
enigmatic phrase in the concluding line of Baraies’ homily. There, Baraies writes that
although the apostles were themselves the “witnesses” to their own revelations, their
disciples were the “seals of his apostleship.”112 Tigchelaar connected the term “seals of
apostleship” with 1 Corinthians 9.2, where Paul calls the Corinthian community his
“seals of apostleship” who verify that his apostleship was truly from the Lord. 113 Baraies
too seems to understand the “seal” as primarily a mode of authenticating or verifying,
rather than signifying “finality.” Baraies is a true “disciple” of Mani because he verifies
the “truth” of Mani’s prophethood, not in the general sense of verifying whether Mani
was a prophet or not, but in the specific sense of verifying the manner in which Mani was
a prophet. Because Baraies verifies Mani’s prophethood by measuring it against the
things that the earlier prophets had done, Baraies and his faction are Mani’s “Seal of
Apostleship.”

Prophethood and the Demonstration of Textual Expertise

In the section above, I argued that the dispute among brothers was in fact a symptom of a
deeper contestation for the authority to interpret Mani’s writings. In this section, I argue
that Baraies pressed his claim as heir to the ancient prophetic writings through a
112
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homiletical demonstration of his hermeneutical cunning and textual mastery. That is, the
manner in which Baraies constructed his homily is itself an argument against his
opponents. Baraies had argued that he understood the “sense of the voice” of the
prophets; now he has to prove it. When seen in this light, Baraies’ argument for Mani’s
inclusion into a lineage of ancestral prophets is not a mere resurfacing of an earlier
“Elchasaite” Christology.” Without getting into the methodological problems involved
with such an assumption, the tendency to read “Elchasaite” Christology into Baraies’
homily should not be done at the expense of rendering Baraies a mere precipitate of
earlier christological discourses. Indeed, to do so would be to ignore the very processes of
selection and compilation that undergirds his typology of prophethood and that Baraies
himself highlights. In this section, I approach Baraies’ homily as an example of literary
bricolage and the “work” of the homily as an inscribed performance of an expert
bricoleur. To do so, I first review the Baraies’ construction of prophethood as a mode of
argumentation. I then go further into the discursive framework of the homily itself,
highlighting the various terms Baraies’ uses to imply, forge, and “discover” continuity
among the prophets and thereby amplify his own claim to textual expertise.
As already stated in the introduction, Baraies’ typology of prophethood is defined
by 1) the acquisition of revelatory knowledge framed as a rapture114 2) the textualization
of that revelatory knowledge for future generations, and 3) the selection of an elect
community.115 I use the language of typology in order to highlight its status as a “secondorder” category, that is, a literary statement that presents itself as emerging from a
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process of reflection on the extensive similarities and dissimilarities of multiple sources,
in this case, from ancient apocalypses. I do not claim to know what Baraies’ “thinks” or
“intends,” therefore I make no claim on Baraies’ inner life. Nevertheless, Baraies’ homily
literarily constructs and argues the typology of “ancestral prophethood” through the
extensive citation and arrangement of passages from apocalypses attributed to figures like
Adam, Seth, Enoch, Paul, and, of course, Mani.
To get a better sense of how Baraies argued his point, we first turn to the
conclusion of Baraies’ homily. There, he asks, “Concerning these things, why do we sift
them thoroughly, we who are once and for all convinced that this apostleship is superior
in its revelations?” The verb “to sift” – διακεκίνηται – evokes a sense of the textual labor
involved in constructing his homily, the evidence of which is visible in the discursive
seams that undergird each of the passages, as I will show below. More importantly, the
verb frames Baraies’ construction of a “typology of prophethood” as a discovery into the
deep patterns of prophethood, revelation, and prophetic community. Baraies and his
faction had “sifted” through the books in order to uncover what was there all along. Yet
even this may be part of a rhetorical strategy, in so far as Baraies may have edited or even
fabricated passages of some of the apocalypses to make them “fit” into his typology. 116 In
any case, Baraies’ concluding statement highlights his inscribed role as bricoleur – as one
who “sifts” of the ancient prophetic texts and “builds” an argument with what emerges.
Baraies’ role as bricoleur is more evident when we look closely into the
interaction between the various passages he cites and the terminology he uses to
“discover” continuity among the ancestral apostles and Mani. The range of terms he uses
116
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to express continuity between each passage are rather limited. He uses the words “again”
[πάλιν, used 10 times], “similarly” [ὁμοίως, used 2 times], “in this manner” [ὃν τρόπον,
used 1 time] and [τούτωι τῶι τρόπωι, used 1 time]. Baraies also concludes each section
with a phrase like “Now many such things are found in his [the prophets’] writings”
[πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα τούτοις παραπλήσια ὑπάρχει ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς αὐτοῦ, used 5 times].
To get a better sense of how Baraies uses these terms, I have schematized the discursive
framework of the homily based on this set of words.
Passages from the Apocalypse of Adam
“Now many other things like these are in his [Adam’s] writings”
“Similarly” – Introduces Passages from the Apocalypse of Sethel
“Now many things like this were said in his [Sethel’s] writings
“Again” – Introduces section on Apocalypse of Enosh
“Again” – introduces another passage from Apocalypse of Enosh
“Now many other things like these are in his [Enosh’s] writings, which talk about his
rapture and revelation.”
“Similarly” – Introduces the Apocalypse of Shem
“And again he said” – introduces another passage from the Apocalypse of Shem
“Now many other things like these are in his writings, including what the angels revealed
to him and said to write down for a memoir.”
“Again” – Introduces Apocalypse of Enoch
“And again he said thus” – introduces another passage from the Apocalypse of Enoch
“Again he said” – introduces another passage from the Apocalypse of Enoch
“He beheld everything and questioned the angels. Whatever they said to him, he
inscribed in his writings…”
“In this manner…” – Introduces passages from the Pauline corpus
“And in the second Letter to the Corinthians…”
“Again in the Letter to the Galatians…”
Summary conclusion of the ancestral prophets
“In this manner” – Introduces passages from Mani’s corpus
“For he said thus (in the Letter to Edessa)”
“He wrote again…” – introduces passage from Mani’s Gospel
“Again he said” – introduces another passage, probably from Mani’s Gospel
“Again he said” – introduces another passage, probably from Mani’s Gospel
“Now very many superior things like these are in the books of our father, which
demonstrate both his revelation and the rapture of his apostleship.” – Concludes passages
from Mani’s corpus

The regularity, dense placement, and rapid flow of these terms are in themselves an
argument for Baraies. They do not merely “organize” the homily nor are they simply
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placeholders that introduce a section or conclude it, but these words “do work” for
Baraies by effecting literal continuity among the apostles, which in turn proves Baraies’
point that Mani stands in essential continuity with the ancestral apostles. Phrases like
“again” and “in like manner” and “similarly” string the various passages together into a
coherent and formidable whole. The phrase “There are many more such things in the
writings” is an underhanded threat that implies that Baraies has more examples he could
deploy for each set of his apocalypses. It signals that Baraies’ textual mastery extended to
other relevant comparanda and implies that Baraies could have cited many other passages
from these various apocalypses to confirm his argument. When set against its intrafraternal polemical context, it is not difficult to see Baraies’ construction of his typology
as itself a literary argument, one that relies on and showcases the performance of his
textual mastery and expertise.
Another example might help drive home the point I am trying to make in this
section. The rhetorical ability of terms like “again” and “similarly” to effect continuity
among diverse passages, emerges when we interrogate the slippage between what Baraies
wants his excerpts to say and what the passages themselves actually say. By doing so, we
question Baraies’ claim that he had “discovered” the typology of prophethood within the
sources themselves. Indeed, when we actually examine Baraies’ excerpted passages
without the larger rhetorical framework, we find that they lack key parts of Baraies’
tripartite typology of prophethood. For the sake of space, I will restrict my argument to
only those passages taken from Mani’s corpus.
Let us first turn to Baraies’ excerpt from Mani’s Letter to Edessa. Baraies
introduces this excerpt on the pretext of arguing that Mani did not receive his revelation
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from men or from other scriptures117 and concludes this section by stating that this is
proof of his rapture and revelation.118 The larger purpose is clear: to demonstrate his
textual mastery by inserting Mani into the typology of prophethood of revelation,
textualization of that revelation, and the choosing of an elect community. Let us now
focus on the passage itself. Mani wrote,

“The truth and the secrets which I speak about – and the laying on of hands which is in my
possession – not from men have I received it nor from fleshly creatures, not even from studies in
the Scriptures. But when my most blessed Father, who called me into his grace, beheld me, since
he did not wish me and the rest who are in the world to perish, he felt compassion, so that he
might extend his well-being to those prepared to be chosen by him from the sects. Then, by his
grace, he pulled me from the council of the many who do not recognize the truth and revealed to
me his secrets and those of his undefiled Father and of all the cosmos. He disclosed to me how I
was before the foundation of the world, and how the groundwork of all the works, both good and
evil, was laid, and how everything of this aggregation was engendered according to its present
boundaries and times.”119

In this passage, Mani is expressly interested in demonstrating that his teachings did not
come from human sources, but from divine ones, and that this all happened according to
the Father’s compassion. He goes on to describe briefly his separation from the “council
of the many who do not recognize the truth” and his acquisition of cosmological wisdom.
This passage highlights the first aspect of Baraies’ typology, that of the importance of
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revelation, but not the other two aspects, namely, the textualization of that revelation and
the choosing of an Elect community.
Baraies’ second excerpt from The Gospel of Mani anticipates to a greater degree
Baraies’ tripartite typology. Mani writes,

I, Mani, an apostle of Jesus Christ through the will of God, the Father of Truth, from whom I also
was born, who lives and abides forever, existing before all and also abiding after all. All things
which are and will be subsist through his power. For from this very one I was begotten, and I am
from his will. The truth of ages which he revealed I have seen, and that truth I have disclosed to
my fellow travelers; peace I have announced to the children of peace, hope I have proclaimed to
the immortal race. The Elect I have chosen and a path to the height I have shown to those who
ascend according to the truth. Hope I have proclaimed and this revelation I have revealed. This
immortal Gospel I have written, including in it these eminent mysteries, and disclosing in it the
greatest works, the most eminently powerful works. These things which he revealed, I have shown
to those who live from the truest vision, which I have beheld, and the most glorious revelation
revealed to me.120

All three parts of Baraies’ typology are present here: Mani received a true revelation
(though it is not framed as a rapture), he wrote down that revelation, and he chose an
Elect. Nevertheless, Mani does not attempt to consolidate those elements into a secondorder typology of prophethood. There is no suggestion that the textualization of
revelation and the choosing of an Elect are necessary components to his call as prophet
nor is there evidence that “prophethood” is an isolatable or disembedded discourse, as it
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is in the case with Baraies’ homily. We turn finally to the last two sources, which are also
possibly from the Gospel of Mani.

And again he said: All the secrets which my Father has given to me, while I have hidden and
covered them from the sects and the nations, and still more from the world, to you I have revealed
according to the pleasure of my most blessed Father. And if again he would be pleased, once more
I shall reveal them to you. For indeed, the gift which was given to me from the Father is very great
and rich. For if the whole world and all people obey it, I would be able from very possession and
advantage, which my father has given to me, to enrich them and establish wisdom as sufficient for
the entire world.121

And finally,

And again he said: When my Father was pleased and had shown compassion and care for me, he
sent out from there my most unfailing Twin, the entire fruit of immortality, so that he might
redeem and ransom me from the error of those followers of that Law. In coming to me, he has
provided me with the best hope, redemption that is based on immortality, true instructions, and the
laying on of hands from my Father. Now when that one came, he preferred and chose me, severed
and pulled me out of the midst of those followers of that Law in which I was reared. 122

Again, both passages dwell on the greatness and richness of Mani’s revelation. Yet they
are curiously silent regarding the other core elements of Baraies’ typology. Because these
passages were probably both from the Gospel of Mani, Baraies could point to its writtenness as proof of the textualization of revelation. Nevertheless, Mani himself does not
121
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emphasize the “written-ness” of revelation. There is also no mention of Mani’s rapture
nor is there an emphasis in the choosing of an Elect. There is certainly no impulse to
compile all of these elements into a coherent typology either. In other words, when we
examine these passages without Baraies’ framework to undergird and effect “continuity,”
there is no evidence that Mani actually constructed a “typology of prophethood” in the
manner that Baraies did. Ultimately, then, the continuity that Baraies draws among all the
ancestral prophets and Mani is a product of his own argumentation. This alone should be
sufficient proof for the necessity of locating Baraies’ homily to its time and place, rather
than reading it as a mere resurfacing of “Elchasaite” doctrine. Indeed, in my view, it is
precisely this mismatch between Mani’s words and Baraies’ usage of Mani’s words that
demonstrates Baraies to be a bricoleur. If my argument above is sound, we can
understand Baraies’ typology through a sharper contemporary lens, calibrated for his
particular time and place.

Prophethood and the Birth of Manichaeism
In the sections above, I argued that “prophethood” emerged as a point of contention
among the early followers of Mani and that this was part of a larger dispute regarding the
authority to speak “for” Mani following his death. In this section, I would like to pick up
the thread in the first section of this section, where I drew attention to the identity of these
early followers of Mani as “originally” from “biblically”-affiliated communities in
Sasanian Mesopotamia. I argue in this section that Baraies’ emphasis on “Prophethood”
anticipated the birth of a “Manichaean” community distinct from other “biblically”56

affiliated communities. While Baraies’ conception of prophethood sought to include as
many followers of Mani as possible through his expansive definition of prophethood,
which as we saw extended from Adam all the way to Mani, he also unwittingly
contributed to “prophethood” as a defining marker of one’s identity as Manichaean, a
claim that I will explore in the next chapter. To argue this point, however, it is necessary
to critique the dominant scholarly narrative regarding the Manichaean “triumph” over its
Elchasaite roots.
The question of the Manichaean “parting of ways” from its Elchasaite Baptist
roots has not been given sustained scholarly attention. This question is nevertheless
timely, especially in the wake of the intense debates on the so-called “parting of ways”
between Jews and Christians in the Roman Empire,123 as well as parallel discussions in
the field of early Islam.”124 It is ironic, therefore, that while scholars of Late Antique
“religions” and early Islam have become hyper-sensitive to the theoretical underpinnings
of “religion” itself, especially regarding its genealogy from the Roman West125 to its
crystallization during Europe’s colonial exploitation of indigenous populations,126
scholars of Manichaeism – ostensibly a non-“Western” “religion” – have all but
embraced the category. In their introduction to “Manichaean Texts from the Roman
The literature is vast. One should perhaps begin with: A.Y. Reed, “‘Jewish Christianity’ after the
‘Parting of the Ways’: Approaches to Historiography and Self-Definition in the Pseudo-Clementine
Literature,” in The Ways that Never Parted: Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle
Ages (eds. A.H. Becker, A.Y. Reed; Tübingen: Mohr, 2003).
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Empire,” Gardner and Lieu go so far as to say that “Manichaeism is the first real
‘religion’ in the modern sense, because Mani established it directly and deliberately, with
its scripture and its rituals and its organization all in place.”127 Of course, Manichaeism
cannot be a ‘real religion in the modern sense’ because it not modern, and therefore not a
“religion.” What is meant by “real religion” is also frustratingly opaque. Indeed, in so far
as “Manichaeism” emerged from a “Jewish-Christian” sect in Sasanian Mesopotamia, it
is twice removed from the familiar categories of “Judaism” and “Christianity” incubated
as they were within a “Greco-Roman” context, categories that ultimately undergird our
notion of religion itself. Therefore, “Manichaeism” could, or perhaps even should,
potentially provide a way to break open our categories of “religion” rather than to
confirm it.
Henrichs, one of the primary editors of the CMC, identifies the “actual birth hour
of Manichaeism,”128 to use his memorable words, with Mani’s violent expulsion from his
Elchasaite Baptist sect. He continues the motif of birth by stating that the Baptists’
violent reaction to Mani’s teachings was the “very cutting of the umbilical cord,” 129 and
from then on, Mani emerged as an “independent personality, ready to lead his own
life.”130 Yet to claim that Manichaeism “began” at a certain moment is not a descriptive
claim. It is already deeply interpretative. Henrichs does note in passing that Mani’s
expulsion led to a process of defection from the Elchasaite-Baptist ranks into Mani’s
camp and though this process may have been much more troubling than expected, it was
127
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relatively short.131 Yet Henrichs’ innocuous description from one “religious” identity to
another is deeply teleological. Indeed, one might ask, at what point do “Elchasaite
Baptists” cease to be “Elchasaite Baptists” and become “Manichaeans?” What is the
calculus of sufficient difference that demonstrates that “Manichaeism” is categorically
different than “Elchasaite Baptists,” and who decides such a thorny question? What
epistemological basis do scholars have to declare something “new” rather than a
continuation of the “old,” and by which criteria is this assessed?132 Such questions, in my
view, demonstrate the limits of the category of “religion” so heavily assumed by scholars
of early Manichaeism. “Religion” exchanges the uneven and often inaccessible processes
of “history” for a seductively easy story of “progress,” that is, from “Elchasaite Baptists”
to “Manichaeans.”
In the following section, I extend this argument by highlighting the continuity
between Elchasaite Baptists and “Manichaeans.” I will use Elchasaite and Baptists
interchangeably. In doing so, I extend Henrichs’ and Koenen’s argument on the deep
influence that Elchasaite teachings had on Mani.133 I am also inspired by F. Stanley
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Jones’ critical rethinking of the “origins” of Manichaean church order to its Elchasaite
roots.134 I differ from these two scholars, however, by asserting that this “influence” is
not only evidence of Mani’s past as an “Elchasaite Baptist” – as if those parts of Mani’s
thoughts most influenced by Elchasaite Baptists are suddenly no less so once they are
incorporated into “Manichaeism” – but as evidence that he remained a “Baptist,” albeit a
“reformed” one or, depending on who is asking, an “aberrant” one. That is, instead of
only understanding “Manichaeism” as a moment of “rupture” with the Elchasaite Baptist
community, I highlight those moments when the narrative demonstrate continuity with
that community. For example, if Mani developed his church order based on an earlier
Elchasaite background, as Jones argues, this would speak more towards continuity with
Baptists, not rupture. The same argument can be made regarding Mani’s “ElchasaiteBaptist” schooling. This is not to say that there is no “difference;” Mani makes it
absolutely clear that he will not follow “their law.”135 Nevertheless, as we will see, even
this is not a sufficient grounds for assuming an absolute “break” between the “Elchasaite
Baptists” and “Manichaeans.”

Alchasaios may be of some value to the investigation of Baptists ideas and practices but it is doubtful
whether they permit any conclusions relating to the teaching of a baptist Alchasaios.” Luttikhuizen, 161.
Luttikhuizen expresses deeper doubts elsewhere in the same book, “I doubt whether the reverence for
water, earth, and bread (in fact for the light particles of divine light in the material world) expressed in the
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contain Manichaean ideas.” N.A. Pedersen, “Early Manichaean Christology,”182-83.
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Mani’s Expulsion as both Rupture and Continuity

After being flogged and beaten by his fellow Baptists on charges that he was leading the
community into error, Mani complains to his divine Twin, saying,

When in that Learning [ἐν τούτωι τῶι δόγματι], [there were those] who knew about the Purity
[περὶ ἁγνειας] and the Chastisement of the Flesh [σαρκοδερίας] and the taking of the Rest of the
Hands [κατοχῆς ἀναπαύσεως τῶν χειρῶν], who know me by name and the value of my body [τὴν
τοῦ σώματος .. ἀξίαν] more than all other sectarians, since I received bodily nourishment, nursing,
and care in that Learning, and I often met with its leaders and elders according to the rearing of the
body. If, then, they did not provide me space for the reception of the truth, how would the cosmos
with its masters and teachers hear these unutterable secrets and accept these difficult
commandments?136

As discussed above, Henrichs and others have taken this moment as the “hour” in which
Manichaeism was born and Mani’s Elchasaite heritage abandoned. This explanation,
however, does not do justice to the full passage. After all, there were “those in that
Learning” – that is, Elchasaite Baptists – who knew about the “Purity,”137 the
“Chastisement of the Flesh,”138 and the “Resting of the Hands,”139 and who understood
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the “value” of his body140 more than all the other “sects” of the world. These are not
insignificant aspects of Manichaean doctrine. In fact, in so far as the Manichaean
“system” constitutes an integrated whole, they are not easily extricated from or
disentangled from Mani’s system, which suggests additional points of intersection
between “Elchasaites” and “Manichaeans.” Not only that, Mani states that he had had
extensive contact with the leaders of that community since he had been with them since
his youth. This allows Mani to make his rhetorical point, namely, if those who share
many aspects of my teachings nevertheless reject me, then how much more would the
world reject me!
The importance of this passage should not be lost among scholars. On the one
hand, it does demonstrate a break between Mani and his natal community. On the other
hand, it also demonstrates that early followers of Mani saw specific doctrinal similarities
between Mani’s teachings and the system of the Baptists at the very moment when
“Manichaeism” was supposedly born. One might object by saying that these Baptists
“learned” these points from Mani, yet even if they had, it would still be the case that they
remained “Baptists.” This is not to say that these Baptists “truly” believed in the “Purity,”
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the “Chastisement of the Flesh,” and the “Rest of Hands;” that question will likely never
be satisfactorily answered. Nevertheless, it is sufficient for my argument that the early
followers of Mani would admit to such a high degree of continuity with the Baptists. At
the very least, it poses a challenge to the regnant scholarly framing of Mani’s expulsion
as a “rupture” with the Baptist community, and instead allows us to interpret it as a
rupture within the Baptist community.

After the Expulsion: Complicating the Supposed Rupture
The assumption that Mani’s break with his particular Elchasaite community represented a
moment of rupture from Elchasaites in general is complicated by the fact that even after
his expulsion, Mani traveled with members of his natal community and continued to
frequent Elchasaite gathering-places and churches. This much is presaged in the Divine
Twin’s response to Mani’s expulsion from his community, where he tells Mani,

You are not only sent out into this sect (εἰς τοῦτο μόνον τὸ δόγμα), but to every People (ἔθνος)
and Teaching (διδασκαλίαν) and into every city (πᾶσαν πόλιν) and place (τόπον), the Hope will be
made clear and declared through you in every region (πάντα κλίματα) and section of the cosmos
(περιοχὰς τοῦ κόσμου).141

The Twin does not envision Mani’s expulsion as an absolute break with the Baptists as
much as it was an opportunity for Mani to teach every community, including other
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Baptist communities. Thus, when Pattikios searches for his son Mani following his
expulsion, he enters other “synods”142 – presumably meeting places for other Baptists –
because these are places that Mani would have been expected to frequent, even after
having been expelled from his “Baptist” community just moments before. Mani
continued to visit other communities, including a “Church of the Holy Ones [ἐν τῆι
ἐκκλησίαι τῶν ἁγίων],”143 possibly a “Jewish” Synagogue [εἰς τὴν συναγωγὴν τῶν...],144
and even another “Church of the Baptists [ἐν τῆι ἐκκλησίαι τῶν βαπτιστῶν].”145 Nor
should we forget that Mani’s earliest followers came from his own Baptist sect, including
his biological father Pattikios and his two neighbors [πλησιόχωροί], Simeon and
Abizachias. These points suggest, again, the early followers of Mani might not have
thought of themselves as entirely distinct from Mani’s Baptist community, but still
related to them in some attenuated fashion. This is perhaps most clear when Mani enters
the “Church of the Baptists” mentioned above.

When my Lord [Mani] and Pattikios the overseer of the house had come to Pharat, he preached in
the church of the Baptists… He revealed his kingdom to us. We, however, were astonished at him
and were shaken by his words. When the hour of prayer came, we said to Pattikios, “Let us pray!
For the commandment of God calls my Lord [Mani] and us to prayer…” “… Why do you pray
differently from us?” Furthermore, when at the time when fasting was... he went out and asked for
alms before the houses. He did not put… I said to him: Why did you not partake the daily food?
… “is with your son as it is with the elders and teachers. (Earlier, I) saw already in him, that he
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with all his wisdom, intelligence) and exposition of the scriptures bore witness to us… in contrast
to the words of our teachers…

Though fragmentary, the gist is clear. Mani and Pattikios enter a “Church of the Baptists”
and begin to preach. The Baptists of that church are disturbed by what they hear, yet they
invite Mani and Pattikios to pray and fast. They are surprised, however, that both Mani
and Pattikios pray differently than they do and that they do not partake of the food. A
member of that Baptist community is convinced by Mani’s words regarding the
“Scriptures” over and against the interpretation of his teachers, and becomes a follower of
Mani.
But why is the Church of the Baptists surprised by Mani’s and Pattikios’
behavior? The best explanation is that they expected Mani and Pattikios to be one of
them, even after Mani had uttered statements that the community found disturbing, and
even after Mani’s supposedly decisive break with the Elchasaites. Indeed, the speaker
here even invites Mani and Pattikios to pray with them, since he believes that the
“Commandment of God” still applies to them as Baptists. The Church is again surprised
that Mani and Pattikios pray differently and do not partake of the daily meal, evidently
because they still assume Mani and Pattikios to be “Baptists.” At the same time, the fact
that Mani prays and fasts at all already demonstrates both ritual similarity and difference
between the Baptists and Mani. As a result, it is difficult to make a claim that Mani
emerges as the founder of a “new religion,” when both contemporary Baptists and early
followers of Mani saw such similarities between “Manichaeism” and the “Baptists.”
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Elchasaite Debates on Purity
We can also turn to the uproar surrounding Mani’s teachings to find additional strands of
continuity between the Baptists and Mani.146 This uproar was not between a monolithic
“Baptist” community and Mani, but a dispute among Baptists regarding whether Mani
was in continuity or in rupture with their laws. There were three parties involved. The
first party regarded Mani as a “prophet” and a “teacher,” and voted to make Mani a
teacher of their doctrine.147 Clearly, even according to early followers of Mani, there was
a faction of Baptists who could regard Mani as an authority figure of their community.
The last group, predictably, accused Mani of leading the community astray. 148 Most
interesting, however, is the middle group of Baptists who were cautiously optimistic
regarding Mani’s prophethood. This group seemed to understand Mani to be in continuity
with the teachings of their forefathers, not in spite of his disturbing teachings but because
of them! They said,

Is this really the one whom our teachers [prophesied] saying, ‘A certain young man will [rise up]
from our midst and a new [teacher] will come forth to disturb all our teaching in the manner that
our forefathers spoke concerning the Rest of the Garment?149

μή[τι οὗτ]ός ἐστιν περὶ οὗ [ἐπροφ]ήτευσαν οἱ διδά[σκαλο]ι ἡμῶν λέγοντες [ἀναστή]σεταί τις
ἠίθε[ος ἐκ μέσ]ου ἡμῶν καὶ [διδάσκα]λος νέος π[ρο]σελεύσεται ὡς καὶ κινῆσαι ἡμῶν τὸ πᾶν
δόγμα ὅν τρόπον οἱ πρόγονοι ἡμῶν πατέρες ἐφθέγξαντο περὶ τῆς ἀναπαύσεως τοῦ ἐνδύματος;
146
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Scholars have generally understood the passage above to mean that the forefathers had
prophesied about Mani’s coming through their prophecy on the “Rest of the Garment.”
Therefore, they reason that the “Rest of the Garment” must refer to Mani, and interpret
the “Rest of the Garment” as the “final stage of reincarnation of the Spirit of Christ.”150
Yet Baraies never uses the preposition ὅν τρόπον in this sense. Instead, he always uses it
to mean “in the manner that” or “similarly” or “similar to.”151 Therefore, I translate this
passage to mean that the Baptists’ forefathers had previously disturbed the entire law
through their interpretation of the “Rest of the Garment,” whatever that means. They also
prophesied that a “young man would rise up and a new teacher will come forth to disturb
our entire teaching,” as they themselves had. Therefore, the “Rest of the Garment” does
150
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“garment,” when all the Light Elements are restored to its rightful place. Or, as Mani says, “They will
gather together and make a single form, and a single name, unaltered and unchangeable forever in the land
of their first essence, from which they were sent forth against the enemy.” This return to its original
primeval essence and form is probably the “Rest of the Garment” mentioned in the CMC.
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not refer to Mani, but to a prior moment when the Baptist forefathers disagreed with an
earlier legal status quo and thus “disturbed the entire law.”
This reading of the passage above would ultimately mean that the disturbance that
Mani brought to the Baptist community was itself a reiteration of an earlier disturbance
that arose due to the forefather’s interpretation of the “Rest of the Garment.”
Paradoxically, this means that Mani was in continuity with the Baptists in so far as
“disturbance of the law” already constituted a foundational moment in the etiology of the
Baptists. It also opens up different avenues for understanding Mani’s “disturbing the
law,” not merely as an act of “superseding” Baptist laws and starting an entirely new
“religion,” but as a necessary clarification, purification, or even purging of the false
elements in the laws of the Baptists. After all, this is exactly the way that Mani himself
frames his teachings vis-à-vis the members of “that Law.” Finally, it also strongly implies
that the early followers of Mani who wrote, compiled, and read the CMC would have
understood the “Rest of the Garment” as originally a Baptist doctrine, thus strengthening
the lines of continuity between Baptists and the early followers of Mani.
In concluding this section, it must be said that I am not arguing that
“Manichaeism” as a distinct “religion” did not emerge at some point in time in
Mesopotamia. This section only aimed to disrupt a triumphalist narrative of Manichaeism
that located its “cause” to the genius of single person or from a single incident of
expulsion. It demonstrated that the early followers of Mani were not shy in admitting to
similarities between them and the Baptists. Perhaps, I suggest, it was because they
thought of themselves as Baptists, though as “true,” “reformed,” “better,” or even
“universal” Baptists and different from those Baptists who still clung to “that Law.” And
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while the CMC does not, in my opinion, bear evidence that there were “Manichaeans” or
“Manichaeism” qua religion, it does capture a “snapshot” of that process, a “snapshot”
that may nevertheless tell us something about the immediate trajectory of the early
followers of Mani.
It is within this larger world that the intra-fraternal argument regarding the
“prophethood” of Mani might have proven to be pivotal in the formation of
“Manichaeism.” Indeed, it seems likely to me that Baraies’ brothers saw themselves as
Baptist followers of Mani, who brought them back to the true interpretation of their
ancestral laws. Yet, while the lines of communication between the two factions remained
open for Baraies, it is not difficult to see how this intra-fraternal dispute centered on the
prophethood of Mani might have led into hardened boundaries. Perhaps it was this
dispute that proved pivotal for the “parting” of “Manichaeism” from its BaptistElchasaite roots. Of course, we must not overestimate “prophethood” as the sole
determinative factor for the “parting of the ways,” as if supposing that such complicated
processes can be reduced to single causes. Rather, we can only venture to say that
discourses of “prophethood” served as one contributing crack in the fissure that
developed between the “Baptists” and the “Manichaeans.”

Conclusion

In this chapter I attempted to provide a broader and richer context through which we
might understand the emergence of “prophethood” in late antique Syro-Mesopotamia. I
argued that “prophethood” was not a natural or inevitable development of earlier
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Elchasaite doctrine, nor was it simply a resurgence of Mani’s words in a different setting.
It emerged within a context of intra-fraternal struggle for defining how one should
understand Mani’s role as a prophet, and by extension, the right to speak on his behalf
following his execution. Baraies’ construction of “prophethood,” in turn, contributed to
the emergence of the “Manichaeans” as a distinct community apart from other
“biblically”-affiliated communities. Baraies and his faction clearly emerged victors from
these intra-fraternal skirmishes; his is the only homily preserved in the CMC and clearly
occupies an important place in that text. Yet as we will see in the next chapter, Baraies’
typology of prophetology soon became divorced from its original context and entered a
broader discursive stream of “prophetologies” as the Manichaeans took their message
into the Roman Near East, where they would formulate new “prophetologies” to meet
new challenges.
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CHAPTER 2: TRANSFORMATIONS OF MANICHAEAN PROPHETHOOD IN
THEIR SYRIAN CONTEXT
Baraies’ homily would not be the last time that Manichaeans discussed the prophethood
of Mani. As the movement spread throughout the known world, this prophetological
discourse continued to morph in regionally specific ways. In the Manichaean texts
preserved in Chinese, for example, we see Mani portrayed as a Buddha or as a
Bodhisattva. Lao Tzu, too, was added to the roster of ancient prophets. 152 This chapter
seeks to trace this discourse as Manichaeans went westward towards Syria and down the
Mediterranean coastline to Egypt, where many of the extant Manichaean texts were
unearthed. It focuses in particular on the introduction and the first chapter of the
Kephalaia of the Teacher [ⲛⲕⲉⲫⲁⲗⲁⲓⲟⲛ ⲙⲡⲥⲁϩ; henceforth, 1 Ke] and chapter 342 of the
Kephalaia of the Wisdom of the Lord Mani [ⲛⲕⲉⲫⲁⲗⲁⲓⲟⲛ ⲛⲧⲥⲟⲫⲓⲁ ⲙⲡϫⲁⲓⲥ ⲡⲙⲛⲭⲥ;
henceforth, 2 Ke]. Though these sections contain elaborate treatments of Manichaean
prophetology, even tending towards systematization of these traditions, as I argue in this
chapter, these passages articulate prophethood independently of one another and with
different aims. We cannot speak about a single “prophetological” Manichaean system nor
should we assume a wholly unified prophetological discourse in the Kephalaia or among
Manichaeans as a whole. Therefore, I attend to each “chapter” as literary representations
of a particular prophetological discourse, without assuming a unified system behind the
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text. By doing so, I argue that theorizations of “prophethood” emerged as a conceptual
tool for Manichaeans to map out their relationship with communities deeply “affiliated”
with the early followers of Mani, most notably Syro-Mesopotamian “Christians,” and as a
way of asserting their own orientation as followers of Christ through Mani. The
Kephalaias thus turn Baraies’ understanding of prophethood inside out. Instead of
operating as a discourse for constructing a shared prophetic history within the early
“Manichaean” community, prophethood emerges as a way of engaging in a sort of
oblique competition with those “inside” an ideal Manichaean community – a community,
which from the perspective of the Manichaeans, included the “Christians” and
“Zoroastrians” – yet who for some reason remained “beyond” the immediate confines of
existing Manichaean circles. In other words, prophetology emerges as a way of positing
identity as Christians and Zoroastrians and as a way of asserting a truer and purer
“Christianity” or “Zoroastrianism.” Since I will focus specifically on “Christians” and not
Manichaeans in this chapter, I argue that we can see prophetology as a diagnostic for
assessing how early Manichaeans negotiated their own position as Christians alongside
other local Christian communities.

Situating the Kephalaias

One can do no better at situating the two sets of the Kephalaia than to quote Timothy
Pettipiece’s summary statement. He writes,
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While the Kephalaia (literally the ‘Chapter-book) may present itself as a record of Manichaean
oral tradition based on Mani’s discourses to his inner circle, it is essentially the product of later
theological developments and elaborations that seek to respond to a wide array of specific
questions, many of which appear to be rooted in ambiguities found in the canon.153

In contrast to earlier scholars who had assumed that the Kephalaia was “a record of
Mani’s actual discourses and teachings, or a systematic (albeit secondary) presentation of
the ‘main points’ of Manichaean theology,”154 Pettipiece argues that it can be better seen
as “representing the emergence or evolution of a scholastic, interpretive tradition…” 155 In
this view, then, we can see the Kephalaia’s self-presentation as the ipsissima verba of
Mani in the same way that Foucault discusses the “author-function.” Mani serves as the
ideological center – the “author” – that unites and legitimizes a diverse range of texts,
traditions, and discourses within a specific community. More intriguingly, Pettipiece
demonstrates that Kephalaia alters even the “canonical traditions” to suit its own
needs.156 His insights help us understand the text as a “living” document that emerges
from multiple contexts and occasions, prone to change even key doctrinal matters if
doing so facilitated the Manichaean advancement into the Roman Near East.
We must also take care not to reduce the Kephalaia as part of a monolithic
“Western” Manichaeism. As Paul van Lindt ably demonstrates, the differences between
the Manichaean Psalm-book and the Kephalaia challenge the assumption that we can talk
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about the Coptic Manichaica as a single “coherent library.”157 Van Lindt traces the
similarities and the differences between these two texts as indicative of two different
waves of Manichaean missionaries, traversing through Syria, possibly Palmyra, and
located the “final” redaction of the Psalm-book and Kephalaia in Alexandria and
Lycopolis, respectively.158 Ultimately, he argues that “the Kephalaia are probably a
Coptic composition, based on Syriac fragments on the Manichaean religion.” 159 His
argument refocuses scholarly habit to attend to textual and literary differences over and
against assuming an idealized Manichaean system.
In attributing the roots of the Kephalaia to Syrian missionary efforts, Van Lindt
follows the basic outline of Michel Tardieu’s suggestive claim that Mar Adda, an early
Manichaean missionary to Syria, was the “author” of our Kephalaia.160 Pettipiece does
not accept Tardieu’s attribution of the Kephalaia to Mar Adda, but he too echoes that
someone like Mar Adda may very well have been responsible for the heavy-handed
“pentadic redaction” so apparent in many of the chapters.161 Perhaps the most responsible
way to contextualize the Kephalaia is to see it as an expansive anthology rooted in the
Aramaic-speaking Levantine belt of the late third-century, yet sprouting westwards
towards Palmyra and down the Syrian coastland into Egypt, where it was either translated
into Coptic from Greek or Syriac by the early fifth century. It is thus neither wholly
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“Syro-Mesopotamian” nor is it reducible to an “Egyptian” context, but must be
understood according to the local contexts as far as possible.
This cautious yet persistent attribution of the formative stages of the Kephalaia to
a Syrian provenance deserves continued attention. Indeed, the curious density of texts
from late third / early fourth century Syria that bear the marks of prophetological
discourse, as we will see in the next two chapters, makes Syria a promising place to
contextualize the passages of the Kephalaia under discussion here. To do so, I draw from
the Laws of Various Countries, the Didascalia Apostolorum, and the Syro-Mesopotamian
expansion of the “Acts” genre, that is, the Acts of Thomas, the Teachings of Addai, and
the Acts of Mar Mari, to contextualize these chapters of the Kephalaia.

1 Ke: Manichaeans and Christians: A Case of Oblique Competition
The Kephalaia opens with a concise, though poorly preserved, treatment of Mani’s core
teachings, which it calls the “Three Great Lessons [ⲥⲉϫⲉ].”162 These three lessons
comprise the “Measure of all Wisdom [ⲡϣⲓ ⲛⲧⲥⲟⲫⲓⲁ ⲧⲏⲣⲥ]”163 and whoever writes or
teaches these three lessons are “true” teachers and scribes. Mani boasts that he wrote
these three lessons in his books, yet laments that “the world did not permit him to write
down all my wisdom.”164 As a result, he urges his disciples to “remember them [his
lessons] and write them, gather them in different places, because much is the wisdom that
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I have uttered to you.”165 The “wisdom” that Mani had written did not contain the entirety
of the “wisdom” that had been revealed to him. Rather, this “unrecorded” wisdom
became manifest in Mani’s face-to-face encounters with his disciples, teachers, leaders,
the Elect, the Catechumens,166 and even with members of the sects [ⲛⲕⲉⲇⲟⲅⲙⲁ] and
heresies [ⲛⲕⲉϩⲁⲓⲣⲉⲥⲓⲥ].167 These are, not surprisingly, Mani’s main interlocutors in our
Kephalaia. While it is doubtful that the Kephalaia emerged whole-cloth from “actual”
encounters between Mani and others, the calculated pretense of Mani’s face-to-face
encounters also legitimizes the form and structure of the Kephalaia, that is, as an
anthology of dialogues between Mani and another person. Mani demarcates such “oral”
discussions as “interpretations [ⲛϩⲉⲣⲙⲏⲛⲓⲁ],” “homilies [ⲛϩⲟⲙⲓⲗⲓⲁ],” and “lessons
[ⲛⲥⲉϫⲉ].”168
This patently transparent mode of self-legitimization quickly takes a
prophetological turn. Mani evokes the “Fathers of Righteousness,” Jesus, Zoroaster, and
Buddha, who are, like Mani, incarnations of the “Apostle of Light.” He states that
because they failed to personally publish books of wisdom, their “righteousness” and
their “churches” will pass away.

And this, in that the fathers of righteousness did not write their wisdom in books… know that their
righteousness and their church will pass away [ⲛⲁⲟⲩⲓⲛⲉ(?)] from the world; because they did not
write… Since… write it in books… will lead astray [ⲛⲁⲣⲡⲗⲁⲛⲏ]… fall … and they … lead

165

1 Ke 6.25-27.
1 Ke 6.23-24.
167
1 Ke 7.3.
168
1 Ke 6.21-22.
166

76

astray… adulterate, and they … mix… all of it, of the knowledge… will reveal [ⲛⲁϭⲱⲗⲡ]… in the
world…169

Despite the gaps in the text, the gist is clear. The “righteousness” and the churches of
Buddha, Jesus, and Zoroaster will pass away from the world because their prophets failed
to write down their teachings in books. Their disciples will be led astray, their teachings
adulterated, and their church will perish. In contrast, Mani’s church will persevere
precisely because of the books he had published. It should be noted that the text does not
assume that the churches of Buddha, Jesus, or Zoroaster have already passed away but
that they will at some future moment.
Why frame the superiority of Mani’s church in these terms? The anxiety about the
persistence of Mani’s church reflects, in part, the experiences of persecution in both the
Roman and Sasanian Empires. The churches of Jesus and of Zoroaster, both of which
should have aided Mani in promulgating the truth since Mani inhabited the same “Spirit”
as these two prophets, instead aligned themselves with imperial powers and persecuted
Mani and his followers. Mani himself witnessed the forging of a Zoroastrian alliance with
the Sasanian shahs,170 an alliance that ultimately led to his own execution, and his
disciples would have seen the gradual but no less powerful “Christianization” of the
Roman Empire and its violent discourse against the Manichaeans. Nevertheless, Mani
assures us, their churches will pass away, if only because for their “founders” had
neglected to record their wisdom in books.
1 Ke 8.7-19. Unfortunately, the verb for “will pass away” is lost. Nevertheless, it is clear that the
missing verb was in the future tense since the verb “to lead astray” [ⲛⲁⲣⲡⲗⲁⲛⲏ] and “to reveal” [ⲛⲁϭⲱⲗⲡ]
are both securely in the future tense.
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At the same time, this introductory chapter exposes the tenuous nature of Mani’s
superiority over the other prophets. In fact, it is not quite sure what to do with the fact
that the churches established by Jesus and Zoroaster continued to persist side-by-side
Mani’s church. Mani assures his disciples that his church is superior to the “affiliated”
churches of Jesus and Zoroaster, yet he thrusts the demonstration of that superiority into
the future – their churches will perish and their disciples will be led astray. I characterize
this positioning as reflecting Mani’s own ambiguous relationship to the churches of his
predecessors and operating as a form of oblique competition. After all, Mani’s claim to
be an “Apostle of Jesus Christ” and the Paraclete asserts both filiation with and
differentiation from the “Church of Jesus.” This mode of oblique competition can be
detected on both the “Manichaean” and “Christian” sides. Kephalaia 105, for example,
presents a concise example of this dynamic: there, Mani says that just as the “Christian
people” [ⲛⲣⲱⲙⲉ ⲛⲭⲣⲓⲥⲧⲓⲁⲛⲟⲥ] use the name of Christ in their invocations, name their
children after Jesus, and take oaths in his name, so too do Manichaeans with the name of
Mani.171 “Mani” adopts a curious position here; though he asserts parity with Jesus, the
very act of asserting parity suggests distance and difference from Jesus and his church.
Mani argues that his followers do everything that Jesus had done, though this boast only
makes sense within a context that took Jesus’ deeds as the “gold standard.” Mar Ephrem,
the fifth century Syriac poet, attacked the Manichaeans on similar grounds, writing, “For
their works are like our works, their fasts are like our fasts, but their faith is not like our
faith. And therefore, rather than being known by the fruit of their works, they are
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distinguished by the fruit of their words.”172 Ephrem adapts Jesus’ words in Matthew
7:15-16 regarding false prophets, “that you shall know them by their fruits,” to mean by
the “fruit of their words” not of their deeds. He therefore acknowledges that the
Manichaeans are very similar to the “Christians,” yet he replaces the Manichaean
prophetological model, which can tolerate the existence of “affiliated” churches, with a
model that distinguishes sharply between “Christians” and the Manichaean “heretics.”
Finally, this introductory chapter highlights the active role that disciples have in
demonstrating the superiority of Mani’s church vis-à-vis the other churches. After all, the
disciples are responsible for the preservation of their prophet’s wisdom and the
continuation of their churches. Thus, Mani urges them to “Remember, and write a little
something of from the great wisdom you heard from me [ⲁⲣⲓⲡⲙⲉⲩⲉ ⲛⲧⲉⲧⲛⲥϩⲉⲓ ⲟⲩⲕⲟⲩⲓ
ⲛⲗⲁⲩⲉ ϩⲛ ⲧⲥⲟⲫⲓⲁ ⲉⲧⲛⲁϣⲱⲥ ⲉⲧⲁⲧⲉⲧⲛⲥⲁⲧⲙⲉⲥ]!”173 This utterance legitimizes the
compilation and publication of the Kephalaia itself by elevating scribal activity as a key
marker of the superiority of Mani’s church. Mani depicts the disciples as vanguards of
the faith, safeguarding his “authentic” teachings from pollution through the very act of
scripturalization. In the long war of attrition that marks this present age until the second
coming of Jesus, Mani intends that his church will be the last one standing.
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The first full chapter of the Kephalaia also engages in oblique competition with the
Christians and highlights the role of scripturalization, though it does so in different ways.
In fact, an awareness of the Kephalaia’s own “sub-canonical” status permeates
throughout this chapter. In its conclusion, for example, after having explained to his
disciples various questions regarding his apostolate, Mani says,

I have written for you about it in full in my books [ϩⲛ ⲟⲩⲁⲓⲉⲩⲧⲉ ϩⲛ ⲛⲁϫⲙⲉ] already. Today you
have again questioned me. Behold, now I have repeated the lesson to you in brief [ϩⲛ
ⲟⲩⲥⲩⲛⲧⲟⲙⲓⲁ]! When his disciples heard all these things from him, they rejoiced greatly. Their
mind [ⲡⲟⲩⲛⲟⲩⲥ] was enlightened. They said to him in their joy, we thank you master! For while
you have written about your advent in the scriptures [ⲁⲕⲥϩⲉⲓ ⲙⲉⲛ ϩⲁ ⲧⲕϭⲓⲛⲉⲓ ϩⲛ ⲛ [ⲅⲣⲁ]ⲫⲁⲩⲉ], how
it came to be, and we have received it and believed in it, still you have repeated it to us in this
place in a “gathered” form [ϩⲛ ⲟⲩⲥⲱⲩϩ]. And we, for our parts, have received it in full [ϩⲛ
ⲟⲩⲁⲓⲉⲩⲧⲉ]. We have also believed that you are the Paraclete, this one from the Father, the revealer
of all these hidden things!174

This chapter is extremely conscious of its “sub-canonical” status. It does not overtly
“compete” with the canonical “seven” written by Mani himself, but instead presents itself
as a distillation of the teachings found therein. There is, of course, some latent tension:
the disciples had already read about the apostleship “in the books,” yet it is only after
they hear Mani utter the lesson in person that they receive it “in full.” The parallels

1 Ke 16. 21-31. It is worthwhile noting that Mani’s first response begins with, “I… but I will recount to
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underlined above capture this nicely: though Mani had written about his prophethood “in
full” [ϩⲛ ⲟⲩⲁⲓⲉⲩⲧⲉ], it is only after the disciples receive it “in a gathered form” [ϩⲛ
ⲟⲩⲥⲱⲩϩ] that they actually receive it “in full” (ϩⲛ ⲟⲩⲁⲓⲉⲩⲧⲉ). The Kephalaia thus exploits
the gap between the canonical “Scriptures” and the practical-didactic needs of a growing
community by presenting itself as a condensation of the former albeit in a more
comprehensible and perhaps even superior form. This dual orientation of the Kephalaia
endows its redactors/authors with the freedom to articulate conceptions of prophethood in
ways that interact with their present circumstances while at the same time legitimizing
itself as Mani’s own words. It is, I suggest, also a nod that acknowledges the chapter –
and perhaps the Kephalaia as a whole – as a living document. To demonstrate this
requires a thorough and somewhat lengthy look into the structure of this unusually long
chapter, which I will attempt below. To be clear, I am not arguing that the Kephalaia is,
in fact, a “distillation” of Mani’s scriptures. That question cannot, and most likely, will
never be answered satisfactorily. Rather, I am interested in contextualizing what I argue
are the two primary strata of this chapter within their Syro-Mesopotamian contexts.
The larger intent of the first chapter of the Kephalaia is to frame Mani’s
apostleship as the culmination of a cosmic cycle of prophets and prophetic communities,
their “churches.” Like Baraies, the authors/redactors of this chapter articulated Mani’s
superiority not as one of kind, but of degree. Interestingly, instead of constructing a
typology of prophethood as Baraies had done, they articulated a notion of “prophethood”
as a cyclical process of descent of the apostle, his choosing of an Elect community, and
their staggered ascent back to the realm of light. Scholars have tended to understand this
81

cycle of prophetic descent and ascent as part of a larger concept of a “chain of prophets,”
tying it to both Elchasaite and other “Jewish-Christian” understandings of
prophethood.175 Though this is true at some level, it does not capture the complex
nuances of the cycle of prophecy, nor does it attend to the inner contradictions and
problems within the chapter itself. In this section, I focus on such problems, first to argue
a source-critical point that the first half of the chapter is an intrusion into an “original”
text that extended directly from the introductory questions to the latter half of the chapter,
and second, that this textual insertion helps us better understand the contested nature of
prophetological discourse in the late third / early fourth century Syria. Before proceeding
further, however, it is necessary to summarize the two halves of this chapter.

Summary of the First Half: The Parable of the Farmer and the Months of Parmuthi and
Paophi
The first half of the chapter176 is essentially an extended parable about the descent of the
“Apostle of Light,” his duties as prophet in this world, his return back to the Heights, and
the gradual ascent of his church. The apostle is compared to a farmer, and the cycle of
descent and ascent of his church is compared to the Egyptian months of Parmuthi and
Paophi. The parable illustrates that before each apostle is sent into the world, he “frees”

N.A. Pedersen, “Early Manichaean Christology, Primarily in Western Sources,” in Manichaean Studies:
Proceedings of the First International Conference on Manichaeism (ed. P. Bryder; Lund, 1988), 166-72; L.
Cirillo, “From Elchasaite Christology to the Manichaean Apostle of Light: Some Remarks about the
Manichaean Doctrine of the Revelation,” in Il Manicheismo: nuove prospettive della ricerca (eds. A. van
Tongerloo and L. Cirillo; Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2005), 51-54; Reeves, Heralds, 7-17. More recently,
see: P. Crone, The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran: Rural Revolt and Local Zoroastrianism
(Cambridge University Press, 2012), 279-301.
176
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[ⲣ-ⲣⲙϩⲉ] the “forms” [ⲛⲟⲩⲙⲟⲣⲫⲁⲩⲉ] of his church in the heights – that is, he chooses his
Elect community prior to his entering the cosmos.177 When the “forms of the church” are
to be “born in the flesh [ϫⲡⲁⲥ ϩⲛ ⲧⲥⲁⲣⲝ],”178 the apostle descends immediately to tend to
his church. When the “season” of harvest approaches, the apostle returns to the Land of
Light, leaving his church behind (ⲛϥⲕⲁ ⲧⲉϥⲉⲕⲕⲗⲏⲥⲓⲁ ⲙⲛϫⲱⲥ).179 Though he goes up
before them (ⲛϥⲥⲱⲕ ϩⲏⲧⲟⲩ),180 the ascended apostle remains a “helper” and a “guardian”
for his still-enfleshed church. This ascent of the prophet prior to the ascent of his church
is crucial in so far as it allows the apostle – who has now returned to his previous state as
the pre-incarnate ‘Apostle of Light’ – to begin the process of “freeing the forms” of his
church for the next cycle of descent. When the “first-fruits” of his church – presumably
referring to those he himself had chosen prior to entering the cosmos – become ripe for
harvest, they in turn propagate other fruits on the tree. These newly-propagated fruits
probably refer to Manichaean converts, who were not chosen directly by the Apostle, yet
nevertheless constitute his church. Given this continuous cycle of choosing an elect
community propagating further converts, “there is not any time that the tree is bare of
fruit!”181 The work of the Apostle is endless.

1 Ke 10.25, 12.5. The Apostle “frees” the forms of his church in the Heights. According to 1 Ke 36.911, when the Church whom he chooses on earth decide to follow Mani, they receive their “Light Form”
[ⲡⲙⲟⲣⲫⲏ ⲛⲟⲩⲁⲓⲛⲉ]. This may be the idea in 1 Ke 9.9 as well, though the text is too fragmentary to tell
[ⲛⲥⲉⲣⲣⲙϩⲉ…]. See: Pedersen, “Early Manichaean Christology,” 166-67. It should be noted that in 1 Ke
36.9-11, there is no indication that it is the apostle’s responsibility to “free” the forms of the church.
178
1 Ke 11.1. Presumably the “forms of the church” will be “born in the flesh.” In contrast, the statement in
1 Ke 36.9-11 states that the members of Mani’s church receive [ϫⲓⲧⲥ] the “light forms” only if they
“renounce the world [ⲉⲩϣⲁⲛⲁⲡⲟⲧⲁⲥⲥⲉ].” Is the Manichaean church “predestined” or is it a matter of one’s
choice?
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As a whole, the parable in the first half of the chapter is interested in two
intertwined aspects of Manichaean theology: the manifestation of the Apostle of Light
and the ultimate origin and destination of his Church. It is not interested in the historical
narratives of individual prophets, which occupies the bulk of the second half, as we will
see.

Summary of the Second Half: The Chain of Apostles, Jesus, his Church, and Mani

Given the state of the text, it is difficult to state with certainty when the second half
actually begins.182 Nevertheless, a good place is with the “chain of apostles.” This
supposed “chain” includes Adam, Enosh, Enoch, Sem, Buddha, Aurentes, and
Zarathustra. In reality, this “chain” is merely a prelude to the two most important figures
in Manichaean history, Jesus and Mani. The text continues by outlining Jesus’
incarnation into the sect of the Jews, his obedient life, death, and resurrection.183 Before
Jesus ascends to the heights, however, he chooses his seventy-two disciples and his
twelve apostles, and breathes into them his holy spirit.

184

After he ascends, Paul the

apostle and another “righteous man” [ⲁⲩⲇⲓⲕⲁⲓⲟⲥ]185 strengthens Jesus’ church. Despite
their best efforts, the church of Jesus withers away. When the last of Jesus’ church
ascends, Mani’s apostleship begins.186 Mani discusses his apostolate starting with the
sending of the Paraclete, from whom he received the revelatory knowledge that he would
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later inscribe in his books. He then recounts his travels in the Sasanian Empire as well as
in India.187 He boasts that he is superior to the other apostles because his church had
spread to every corner of the earth, and as a result of its wide propagation, it will remain
until Jesus returns as a judge to separate between his church, who will sit at Jesus’ right
side, and those who belong on his left, presumably the various sects whom Mani aligns
with the forces of darkness.188
Perhaps more importantly, this half of the chapter demonstrates the superiority of
Mani’s “church” over and against earlier apostles, especially Jesus’. Whereas Jesus’
church ultimately perished, or to speak charitably, “ascended,” Mani’s church was so
widespread that it continued to conceive and bear new “fruit.” Its global reach guarantees
the superiority of Mani’s church since it continues to expand and gain new adherents. It
also guaranteed that there would no longer be any need for another prophet, thus ensuring
Mani as the final prophet. Though one might be tempted to assume that this
understanding of Mani’s superiority is in continuation with how it was portrayed in the
introduction, in reality, it flatly contradicts it. There, as we saw, the dissolution of Jesus’
church will occur in the future because Jesus failed to author books of wisdom. Here,
Mani’s apostleship occurs as a result of the dissolution of Jesus’ church, without any
mention of scripturalization as the key cause for that dissolution.
As is evident from even this brief summary, the focus of this second half differs
from the first. It is wholly concerned with the narrative of Jesus’ life and how it relates to

187
188

1 Ke 15.25-16.9.
1 Ke 16.14-17.
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the coming of Paraclete in Mani. It is, in fact, very difficult to detect the cosmic cycle of
prophethood outlined in the parable in the first half.

Deconstructing the Chapter: The Parable and the Narrative

This chapter can thus be roughly divided into two halves. Of course, there is no a priori
reason why we should assume this chapter was written by a single “author” or in a single
moment. In fact, in the following sections, I ultimately argue that this chapter is the
product of at least two moments of redaction. I suggest that 1) the second half of the
chapter is in fact the original response to the disciples’ questions as framed in the
introduction, and thus, the first half is a later intrusion, and that 2) the parable is, in fact,
an expansive “parabolization” of the cycle of Jesus’ descent and ascent in the second
half. It should be noted, however, that the following must remain tentative until scholars
launch a more dedicated effort at unraveling the inner composition of the Kephalaia.
Nevertheless, even if my redaction-critical analysis is ultimately overturned, the
differences between the two halves are worth pointing out, if only to get a sense of the
architectonics of this chapter.
There are good reasons for reading the second half of this chapter as “original” to
the text and the first half as an “intrusion.” These reasons are 1) Mani only responds to
his disciples’ questions in the second half of the chapter. Therefore, the second half is
necessary and sufficient for the entire chapter. 2) The parable in the first half comprise a
self-enclosed unit, only loosely affiliated with the second half, and is therefore
superfluous to the chapter. Lest one think that the parable is supposed to introduce the
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second half, I argue 3) that the parable actually introduces obscurities into the chapter. 4)
Nevertheless, there are a few parallels between the two halves that must be explained. As
stated above, I suggest that the parable is, in fact, a “parabolization” of the second half.
This explains both why the parable is so loosely connected to the introduction and why
there are parallels to the second half. These points altogether suggest at least two
moments of redaction. Let us begin with the first point.

1) Mani only responds to the disciples’ questions in the second half of the chapter. The
opening chapter of the Kephalaia begins with Mani’s disciples requesting Mani to
explain his coming into this world. They ask concerning,

… his apostleship and his coming to the cosmos / for how did it happen [… his] / journeying in
each city, in each la[nd] ; / in what [manner] was he sent […] first, before he had yet chosen his
church.”189

ⲧϥⲁⲡⲟⲥⲧⲟⲗⲏ ⲙⲛ ⲧϥϭⲓⲛⲉⲓ ⲁⲡⲕⲟⲥⲙⲟⲥ ϫⲉ ⲛⲧⲁⲥϣⲱⲡⲉ ⲛⲉϣ ⲛϩⲉ ... ⲧⲉϥϭⲓⲙⲙⲁϩⲉ ⲕⲁⲧⲁ ⲡⲟⲗⲓⲥ ⲡⲟⲗⲓⲥ
ⲕⲁⲧⲁ ⲭⲱⲣⲁ ⲭⲱⲣⲁ ⲛⲧⲁⲩⲧⲛⲛⲁⲩϥ ⲛⲉϣ ⲛϩⲉ ... ⲛϣⲁⲣⲡ ϩⲁⲧⲉϩⲏ ⲉⲙⲡⲁⲧⲉϥⲥⲱⲧⲡ ⲛⲧⲉϥⲉⲕⲕⲗⲏⲥⲓⲁ

It is imperative to note that the disciples are only interested in the coming of “the”
apostle, Mani, and the narratival arc of his sojourn in this cosmos. This is clear not only
from the third person singular masculine marker – ⲧϥϭⲓⲛⲉⲓ – but also assumed from the
references to Mani’s journeys in various cities and lands - ⲕⲁⲧⲁ ⲡⲟⲗⲓⲥ ⲡⲟⲗⲓⲥ ⲕⲁⲧⲁ ⲭⲱⲣⲁ
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ⲭⲱⲣⲁ. There is thus a noticeable gap between the disciples’ questions and Mani’s
immediate response, that is, the parable that dominates the first half of the chapter, which
does not focus on Mani’s apostleship at all, but on the relationship of the Apostle of Light
and his multiple churches. This wide gap suggests that the parable in the first half is not,
in fact, responding to the disciples at all.
Let us now examine each of the disciples’ questions. The disciples ask regarding
“his apostleship and his coming to the cosmos, for how it happened.” Mani responds to
this question multiple times in the latter half. For example, by way of introducing the
“historical” section on Jesus, Mani says, “… the advent of the Apostle happened at the
occasion… as I have told you…”190 In this passage, the “Apostle” refers to the “Apostle
of Light,” Mani’s Divine Twin, also known as the Paraclete, whose union with Mani
initiates Mani’s tenure as Apostle. Mani also responds to these questions on the specific
circumstances of his apostleship when he says, “When the church of the savior was raised
to the heights, my apostleship began, which you asked me about (ⲉⲧⲁⲧⲉⲧⲛϣⲛⲧ
ⲉⲧⲃⲏⲧⲥ).”191 This phrase is strong evidence that Mani is responding directly to the
questions posed in the introduction, and though it only occurs three times, 192 they are all
in the latter half of the chapter. Finally, Mani responds to his disciples when he says,
“This is how [ⲧϩⲉ ⲧⲉ ⲧⲉⲓ] everything that has happened and that will happen was
unveiled to me by the Paraclete…”193 He thus answers the questions in the introduction
regarding the manner in which the Apostle of Light, the Paraclete, entered into the world.
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The disciples also ask about the cities and regions Mani visited in his travels.
Again, Mani discusses this only in the latter half of the chapter, where he discusses his
travels in India and Persia, Babylon, Mesene, Susiana, the land of the Parthians,
Adiabene, and the borders of the provinces of kingdom of the Romans.194
They also ask “in what manner he was sent (ⲛⲧⲁⲩⲧⲛⲛⲁⲩϥ)… The “he” in this
situation probably refers to the Paraclete, Mani’s divine twin. This is, after all, a major
theme in the second half of the chapter. There, Mani says, “From that time on was sent
(ⲁⲩⲧⲛⲛⲁⲩ) the Paraclete, the Spirit of Truth…”195 again, “Since the Spirit is of the
Paraclete, the one who was sent to me (ⲡⲉⲧⲁⲩⲧⲛⲛⲁⲩϥ ϣⲁⲣⲁⲓ ⲁⲃⲁⲗ) from the
Greatness.”196 Mani also dates the coming of the Paraclete by referring to the ascension
of Ardashir. He writes, “In that same year, when Ardashir the King was crowned, the
living Paraclete came down (ⲉⲓ ⲁⲡⲓⲧⲛ ϣⲁⲣⲁⲓ) to me. He spoke with me. He unveiled to
me the hidden mystery…”197 He then describes everything that the Paraclete proceeded to
teach him. These three examples demonstrate that Mani is responding to his disciples’
questions in the second half.
Finally, the disciples ask about the things Mani did “… before he had yet chosen
his church [ⲛϣⲁⲣⲡ ϩⲁⲧⲉϩⲏ ⲉⲙⲡⲁⲧⲉϥⲥⲱⲧⲡ ⲛⲧⲉϥⲉⲕⲕⲗⲏⲥⲓⲁ].” In order to understand this
question, it is necessary for us to nuance what it means to “choose a church.” The apostle
is responsible for two acts of “choosing,” one when he is in the “Heights” and another
when he is in the “Cosmos.” While in the “heights,” the Apostle chooses an Election
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[ⲙⲛⲧⲥⲱⲧⲡ],198 which is the same as “freeing the forms of his Church.” But when he is in
the “cosmos,” the incarnate apostle “chooses” his church [ⲧⲉϥⲉⲕⲕⲗⲏⲥⲓⲁ] whose “forms”
he had freed in his pre-incarnate stage. The term “Church,” then, is only an earthly
phenomena. This is why the Apostle goes to “another” Church [ⲛⲧⲕⲉⲉⲕⲗⲏⲥⲓⲁ] when he
descends into the cosmos199 and leaves behind his “Church” when he ascends.200 The
Church itself refers specifically to the earthly manifestation of the “Forms” which the
Apostle freed while he is in the heights. Again, the Paraclete reveals to Mani the
“mystery of the apostles who were sent to the world to enable them to choose the
churches [ⲁⲧⲣⲟⲩⲥⲱⲧⲡ ⲛⲛⲉⲕⲕⲗⲏⲥⲓⲁ]…”201 A “church” can only be chosen while in the
world. Again, later on, Mani says, “I have chosen you, the good election, the holy church
[ⲁⲓⲥⲱⲧⲡⲧⲏⲛⲉ ⲛⲧⲱⲧⲛ ⲧⲙⲛⲧⲥⲱⲧⲡ ⲉⲧⲁⲛⲓⲧ ⲧⲉⲕⲕⲗⲏⲥⲓⲁ ⲉⲧⲟⲩⲁⲃⲉ] that I was sent to from the
Father.”202 In this last example, the essential congruity of the heavenly “Election” and its
earthly form, the Church, is emphasized.
All these points demonstrate that the disciples are asking about Mani’s deeds
while he was incarnate and thus within the cosmos, and not about his duties in his preincarnate form as the Apostle of Light. They are curious about Mani’s deeds before he
chose them as members of his church, a question that Mani answered by describing how
he received his revelations from the Paraclete and subsequently wandered throughout the
Sasanian Empire, at times in the retinue of the emperor Shapur. Again, Mani only
answers these questions in the latter half of the chapter.
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Of course, one might simply argue that the parable is a prelude to the latter half.
For evidence, one might argue that the reference to the “coming to the cosmos,” the
“manner in which he was sent,” and his “pre-existence” prior to his “choosing his
church” are all elements present in the first half. Yet, as I argued, all these points are
already sufficiently explained in the second half of the chapter with direct reference to
Mani. Furthermore, if the parable was in fact an “original” prelude to the second half, it
should clarify the narrative in the second half. In fact, as I will show below, the parable
actually obscures it.

2) I argued above that the second half of the chapter responds directly to the disciples’
questions. It is thus both necessary and sufficient for the integrity of the chapter. Here, I
advance an argument that the first half – that is, the parable of the farmer and the seasons
– can be considered its own self-contained unit, and as a result, is superfluous to the
chapter.
As already summarized above, the first half is an extended parable of the farmer
and the seasons of sowing and harvest. The boundaries of the parable can be assessed by
marking both its content and patterns in terminology. I have already summarized the
content of the parable above and will discuss here the terminology that binds this first
half together as a discrete unit. Given that the first half is essentially an extended parable,
it is riddled with phrases and terms that marks it as part of a continuous parabolic
discourse. They are:
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1. “All the apostles who are on occasion sent to the world resemble farmer, while their church,
which they choose, are like Parmuthi and Paophi…203
2. “This is the way of the apostles who are come to the world… They are like a… of the
greatness”204
3. “Also the way…”205
4. “Like the farmer…”206
5. “Again, this too is how the apostles…” 207
6. “Like the farmer who shall be glad of heart…” 208
7. “Or like the merchant who shall come up from a country…”209
8. “The apostles are like this also…”210

Such terms mark the first half of the chapter as a discrete and internally-coherent unit.
Naturally, both the parable and their explanations are part of this unit as well. The end of
the unit, then, must be when the parabolic discourse ends, which is roughly in 1 Ke 12.9,
where the “chain of prophets” discussed above begins. Apparently, Mani had already
forgotten that he had just discussed this very topic in his parable. From there, the chapter
leaves behind the parabolic discourse and enters into the more “narratival” second half.
Related to the argument above, one might also identify the boundaries of this
parabolic unit by paying attention to the “cycle” of prophet and churches itself. A single
cycle begins with the Apostle freeing the “forms” of his church, the descent of the
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church, the descent of the Apostle, the ascent of the Apostle, and concludes with the
ascent of the church. We can trace this single cycle through the chapter in the following
manner.

Freeing the Forms of the Church
1. All the apostles who are on occasion sent to the world… 211
2. This is the way of the apostles who are come to the world… they choose a selection of the… the
elect and the catechumens… their forms, and they make them free… in the flesh…212
3. Also, the way… many years before… the world… makes the forms of his church free… of the
flesh, whose forms he had made free.213
4. Again this too is how the apostles… before everything he shall… free above, first.214

Descent of the Apostle
5. Yet, when it [the church] will be born in the flesh, he shall come down to it and at once… He
shall continue in the world at this time… 215

Ascent of the Apostle
6. When the season will mature he is raised up from the world… / and he leaves his church behind
and goes forth…216

Ascent of the Church
7. When the apostle will be raised up from the world, he and his church… for every apostle…217
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8. The apostles are like this also. Now, when the apostle will be raised up to the heights, he/ and
his church, and they depart from that world; at that instant another apostle shall be sent to it, to
another church … Yet first he shall make the forms of his church free in the Heights… 218

The “chain of apostles” mentioned above immediately follows this cycle. With a few
exceptions that will be discussed below, the second half is devoid of any sustained
“parabolic” aspects that so heavily marked the first half. Furthermore, this parable is
concerned with the relationship between the apostle and the origins, duration, and telos of
his churches, whereas the second half centers strongly on answering the disciples’
questions, as demonstrated above. Therefore, the parable itself can be understood as a
discrete unit, only loosely affiliated with the rest of the chapter. Granted, superfluity does
not determine whether it was “original” to the chapter or not. To assess that point, I will
argue in the following section that the parable, in fact, obscures the meaning of the
“original” second-half of the chapter.

3) Despite the arguments made above, one might argue that the first half was also
“original” to the chapter and that it served to elucidate the second half. There is no doubt
that the first half affects the way that the entire chapter is read in its final form.
Nevertheless, this alone does not make it original to it. In fact, the first half does not
clarify the second half, but introduces obfuscations and tensions.
Let us first turn to the conclusion of what I argue is the first half of the chapter.
We have already seen this passage above. Mani says,
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The apostles are like this also. Now, when the apostle will be raised up to the heights, he and his
church, and they depart from the world; at that instant another apostle shall be sent to it, to another
church… it… Yet, first, he shall make the forms of his church free in the heights, as I have told
you. When … again, he too shall come down and appear… and he releases his church and saves it
from the flesh of sin …219

Though the passage is full of holes, the gist is clear. When an apostle’s church ascends,
another apostle descends from the heights to begin the process all over again.
Presumably, another prophet will not descend until the previous church had been entirely
redeemed. Therefore, there can only be one prophet and one church in the world at a
time. The parable, then, understands prophethood within a single “register” that is, as
incarnations of the “Apostles of Light.”
Let us now turn to the passage that immediately follows, which I argued above,
was the beginning of the second half and the original response to the disciples’ questions.
It says,

The coming of the Apostle has occurred… as I have told you: From Sethel, the firstborn son of
Adam up to Enosh, together with Enoch, from Enoch up to Sem, the son of Noah … church after
it… Buddha to the east, and Aurentes, and the other who were sent to the orient, from the advent
of Buddha and Aurentes up to the advent of Zarathustra to Persia, the occasion that he came to
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Hystaspes, the king; from the advent of Zarathustra up to the advent of Jesus the Christ, the son of
greatness.220

With this passage, there is a shift from the parabolic discussion on apostles as
incarnations of the Apostle of Light to the more “historical” discussion of the Apostle par
excellence, Mani. If, for the moment, we understand this passage as a continuation of the
“parable” that came prior to this passage, then we are meant to understand this “chain of
prophets” as incarnations of the Apostle of Light. Or, if we read it in light of what
follows, then it is merely a prelude to the coming of the apostle par excellence, Mani.
Can it be read as both? I argue here, no. It is easier and more consistent to read this
passage as an introduction to the second half rather than a continuation of the first.
Let us first read the passage above with what follows it. This half allows for
multiple apostles to exist simultaneously and at the same time. It thus has a rather flexible
understanding of who is an apostle. For example, though Jesus is an incarnation of the
“Apostle of Light” in one sense, he himself has “apostles” whom he chooses. These
“apostles” are not “incarnations” of the Apostle of Light, though they share in some of
his power. Paul too is one of these apostles who strengthens Jesus’ church. There is also a
mysterious “righteous man” who may also be an “apostle” of some sort. In light of this
relatively unproblematic understanding of “prophethood,” I would suggest that the “chain
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1 Ke 12.9-21. The traces of earlier traditions of prophethood are also visible in this passage. For
example, Sethel, Enosh, Enoch, Sem, and Noah are clearly one set of prophets and Buddha, Aurentes, the
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of apostles” discussed above is allied more closely with this half of this chapter because it
too has overlapping eras of apostleship, e.g., Enosh and Enoch, and Buddha and Aurentes
and the “others.” Clearly, for the author/redactors of this second half, “multiple” apostles
in the same span of time and place was not a major issue.
Though the “chain of apostles” is relatively straightforward if one connects it to
the following passages, it becomes obfuscated if one reads it as part of the earlier
parabolic discourse. For example, as already stated, Enosh and Enoch both occupy the
same “prophetic” time, as does Buddha and Aurentes. By itself, it would not be a
problem were it not for the fact that it contradicts the plain sense of the prior passage,
which stated that a prophet descends only when the previous church had been raised.
There cannot be two prophets at the same time. Or perhaps, one might think that there
can be two prophets, as long as they occupy different regions. Yet the passage also states
clearly that Buddha and Aurentes were both sent to the “East.” Presumably, Enoch and
Enosh were also present in the same region, though the text does not state this explicitly
nor does it care to do so. It would also mean that there were two incarnations of the
Apostle of Light at the same time, which would completely obviate the need for the
Apostle to return to the Heights prior to the ascent of his church. Or, perhaps the parable
explicates only a “higher register” of prophethood, that of incarnations of the “Apostle of
Light” like Jesus and Buddha, as opposed to the “lower tier” of prophets, like Seth and
Enoch. This too falls flat because the Coptic does not distinguish between upper-case
“Apostles” and lower-case “apostles.” Moreover, if this were the case, why juxtapose the
parable with a “chain of apostles” that contains both “major” and “minor” apostles at the
same time, thus leading to more confusion?
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Even more fundamental to the problem, the text does not explain what exactly
was “from Sethel firstborn of Adam up to Enosh, together with Enoch.” Sethel, Enosh,
and Enoch are clearly some sort of temporal markers, but what are they marking?221 If we
read this passage in light of what follows, these temporal aspects do not necessarily have
to mark anything at all. In fact, as is readily apparent, this “chain of apostles” is nothing
more than a prelude to the main figures of history, Jesus and Mani. Indeed, the passage
almost stumbles in its rush to discuss these two figures, as evidenced by the awkward
insertions of “Enosh” and “Aurentes.” In other words, the point of the chain of apostles is
not to explicate any doctrine of the descent of the prophet, but merely to link Mani’s
apostleship to a prophetic and historical past.
If read as a continuation of the parabolic discourse, however, these prophets must
be seen as “incarnations of the Apostle of Light,” which leads to further complications.
Predictably, these problems come from the implicit rule from the parable that the world
cannot tolerate more than one prophet and church at a time. We are therefore forced to
come up with increasingly unlikely interpretations for figuring out what precisely is being
demarcated “From Sethel son of Adam up to Enosh.” Is it the lifetime of the prophets?

I suspect that these terms actually mark the possession of revelatory knowledge, not one’s incarnation as
an Apostle of Light, as the parable would lead its readers to think. This is best attested in sources that relate
to the Šābuhragān. For instance, the Šābuhragān begins with the following passage: “Then Xradešahr (the
god of the world of wisdom) – he who first gave that male creation, the original First Man, wisdom and
knowledge, and who afterwards from time to time and age to age, close to the renovation…” (Mackenzie,
“Mani’s Šābuhragān,” 505). This is corroborated in later Islamicate sources. For example, ‘Abd al-Jabbar
writes, “The first whom God most exalted sent with knowledge (‘ilm) was Adam, then Seth, then Noah.
Then he sent Zarādusht to Persia, Buddha to India, Jesus Christ to the countries of the West, and the, Mani,
‘seal of the prophets.’ Also Shahrastānī writes, “… the first whom God Most Exalted commissioned with
knowledge and wisdom was Adam…, then Seth after him, then Noah after him, then Abraham after him…”
See: Reeves, Islamicate Manichaeism, 102-104. The “biblical forefathers” do not align exactly with the
chain espoused in our chapter, but these passage suggest that it was knowledge (‘ilm) that was being
transmitted from one source to another. Presumably, after the flood, the knowledge was lost which
necessitated the need to transmit incarnations of the Apostle of Light himself.
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Perhaps, but the parables makes clear that the prophet needs to ascend prior to the ascent
of his church. This would mean that there is a significant gap of time between the ascent
of the prophet and his re-descent as a prophet to another church. This seems unlikely.
Perhaps it is marking the duration of his churches? This is more likely, yet even here
there is a major difficulty. After all, the churches of Enoch and Enosh, as well as of
Buddha, Aurentes, and the “others,” would have to exist simultaneously and in the same
region. This is impossible, at least according to the parable, since there can only be one
prophet at a time. Such complications only emerged if we understand the “chain of
prophets” through the lens of the parable. When we read the “chain” with what follows it,
rather than what comes before, there is no problem. This leads me to conclude that the
author/redactors of the “chain of apostles” does not belong originally to what precedes it,
but to what follows it.

4. Before discussing the implications of an understanding of this chapter as a redacted
whole, it is necessary to explain the parallels present in the two halves. I argue that these
parallels are best explained if we assume that the parable in the first half is an abstraction,
or perhaps better, a “parabolization” of the second half. As we will see, these parallels are
too similar to be mere chance. Barring the discovery of another source that demonstrates
that these two halves composed a single unit, one can cautiously assert some sort of
genetic relationship between the two halves. To be more provocative, I argue that a later
author/redactor responsible for the parable on the cycle of descent and ascent in the first
half based his parable on the cycle of Jesus’ descent, the ascent of his church, and the
descent of Mani in the second half. Therefore, the cycle of descent and ascent in the
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second half of the chapter, which in fact only explains the advent of Mani’s apostolate,
becomes the standard for all cycles of prophetic and ecclesiastical descent and ascent; the
second half was the conceptual germ for the first half.
To argue this point, let us turn to the first parallel. This parallel is in fact a short
passage appended a larger passage on a mysterious “righteous person” who, like Paul,
strengthened the church. It reads,

After those one again, little by little, the church perished. The world remained behind without a
church, like a tree that will be plucked, and its fruits on it taken away. And it remains behind
without fruit.”222

The imagery of a tree, its fruit, and the demise of a “church” finds its closest parallel in
the parable, where it is used to explain the opposite point, namely, that the fruit of the tree
propagates other fruits, therefore, the tree is never barren of fruit.223 For our purposes, we
must determine if the passage above is an intertextual invocation to the parable in the first
half. The brevity of the statement makes it difficult to ascertain a definite answer. At the
same time, its very brevity also signals that it is not meant to invoke the parable. Its
casual mention of the tree is far too incidental to bear the weight as an intentional
intertextual reference to the grand cycle of prophetic descent and ascent discussed in the
first half of the chapter. The imagery of the tree is only instrumental to this particular
passage, and is not essential to it. This is in contrast to the parable, in which the tree and
the harvest take center stage. My interpretation that this is more of a “local” illustration
222
223

1 Ke 13.35-14.2.
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than a strong intertextual link is further bolstered by its placement at the end of a major
passage on the demise of Jesus’ church.
I posit essentially the same argument with the second parallel. This parallel is
embedded in a larger passage regarding the beginning of the apostleship of Mani as the
prophesied Paraclete. The passage is a bit patchy, yet it seems to describe the actions of
the Paraclete as “freeing” the forms of the “Manichaean” church.

“… And he makes them free. Yet, when the church assumed the flesh, the season arrived to
redeem the souls, like the month of Parmuthi in which cereal shall ripen to be harvested.”224

The idea of the “freeing the forms” as well as the reference to Parmuthi, cereal, and the
harvest are all familiar from the parable. Yet, are these intertextual referents to the
parable? Again, I would argue no. They are instead narrowly circumscribed illustrations
of the advent of Mani’s apostleship and does not suggest any awareness of a larger cycle
of prophethood. Also like the previous parallel, the reference to Parmuthi is appended
towards the end and is illustrative only of Mani’s apostleship. Taken within its immediate
context, then, the reference cannot be used to indicate a wider horizons of “prophethood”
that the parable presents.
Nevertheless, the two parallels adduced so far are conceptually identical to the
parable. Another parallel makes this clear.

224
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“When the church of the savior was raised to the heights, my apostolate began, which you asked
me about! From that time on was sent the Paraclete, the Spirit of truth: the one who has come to
you in this last generation. Just like the savior said, “When I go, I will send to you the Paraclete.
When the Paraclete comes, he can upbraid the world concerning sin, and he can speak with you on
behalf of righteousness and about judgement…”225

Compare this with the following parallel in the first half.

The apostles are like this also. Now when the apostle will be raised to the heights, he and his
church, and they depart from the world; at that instant, another apostle shall be sent to it, to
another church… Yet first, he shall make the forms of his church free in the heights, as I have told
you. When… again, he too shall come down and appear … and he released his church and saved it
from the flesh of sin.226

It is clear that the passages from both halves envisage an identical process of ascent and
descent. A prophet descends when the previous prophet and his church ascends. Yet
whereas the passage from the latter half is limited in scope to the case of Jesus and Mani,
the passage in the first half expands and systematizes this particular example to apply to
all cycles of prophetic descent and ascent. Jesus no longer needs to proclaim the coming
of a “Paraclete,” as he does so in the second half, because the cycle of descent and ascent
is already built into the broader understanding of prophethood and church.
We might also draw attention to the fact that in the parable the “Apostle of Light”
ascends to heaven prior to the ascent of his church, which is directly paralleled by Jesus
225
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ascending to the heights in the latter half of the chapter, leaving behind his “apostles” and
his church. Again, there is no indication that this passage is aware of a cosmic cycle of
descent and ascent. After all, its primary goal is to set the scene for the beginning of
Mani’s apostolate. The parable, then, predictably weaves the “premature” timing of
Jesus’ ascent as an integral part of its cycle.
In retrospect, this argument is not at all surprising. Jesus and Mani are, after all,
the two principal figures of the cosmic soteriological drama of “Manichaeism.” My
reading of this chapter would necessarily mean that the author/redactors of the second
half (that is, the “original” creators) did not envision Mani’s prophethood within the
cosmic cycle of descent and ascent as explicated in the first half. In fact, it was quite the
opposite. The disciples, after all, were asking only about the particularities of Mani’s
apostleship. One might even interpret the inclusion of Jesus’ prophecy of the coming
Paraclete as marking the uniqueness and particularity of the Paraclete that united itself
with Mani. If my argument so far is sound, the parable in the first half does something
else altogether, denuding the “historical” particularities of Mani’s apostleship and
integrating it instead into a cosmic “cycle” of prophethood, of which Mani’s apostleship
is only one albeit final instantiation.

Putting it back together: Prophethood of Mani and Oblique Competition

What might an understanding of this chapter as a redacted composition tell us about the
corpus in general and the wider pressures facing the early Manichaean movement? It
must first be stressed that the inclusion of a parable into this chapter aligns with the
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didactic goals of the Kephalaia itself. As is abundantly evident from both its content and
in form, the Kephalaia strives to frame Mani’s teachings in ways that facilitated
comprehension and memorization, and frequently employed parables to that end. The
parable of the farmer and the seasons of Parmuthi and Paophi are no exception to this
rule. At the same time, this does not answer pressing questions on why a later
author/redactor thought it necessary, useful, or apt to expand this opening chapter in this
way. To begin to broach this question, this chapter – both in its constituent parts and as a
redacted whole – must be understood within its late antique Near Eastern contexts.
Ultimately, I argue that both halves of the parable are engaging in the same mode of
oblique competition that I have discussed in relation to the introduction of the Kephalaia.
It is especially illuminating to compare this chapter’s understandings of
prophethood alongside the writings of other Syrian “Christians.” After all, these would
have been the first “Christians” that Mani and his disciples met and interacted with on a
regular basis. Indeed, as the CMC illustrates, Mani had regular contact with his followers
in Edessa, a city brimming with Christians of various stripes.227 Even our chapter in the
Kephalaia boasted about Mani’s venture up to “Adiabene, and the borders of the
provinces of the kingdom of the Romans.”228 The anti-Manichaean polemic Acts of
Archelaus also imagines Syria as the first bulwark against the spread of this “Persian
heresy.”229

S.H. Griffith, “Christianity in Edessa and the Syriac-Speaking World: Mani, Bar Daysan, and Ephraem;
The Struggle for Allegiance on the Aramean Frontier,” Journal of the Canadian Society for Syriac Studies
2 (2002): 5-20.
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The density of such evidence invites us to reconsider Mani’s prophethood within
the wider world of early Syro-Mesopotamian ‘Christian’ literature. Though both
redactional moments within the literary history of this chapter requires a different set of
comparanda, both captures a snapshot in the shifting ways that “prophethood” helped
Manichaeans demonstrate both superiority over and filiation with the “Christian” church.
I argue that Mani’s claim in the second half of the chapter that his church is superior to
the other apostles, and hence his own superiority as a prophet, competes with
contemporaneous and regional discourses of the “universal” presence of Christians, as
witnessed by Bardaisan and the emerging Syrian-Mesopotamian “Acts” genre. The
parable, in contrast, responds to discourses of “Apostleship” among Syrian Christians and
the construction of a golden “Apostolic Age,” as demonstrated by the Didascalia
Apostolorum.

Bardaisan, the Syriac Acts, and the Universality of the Church of Christ

Towards the conclusion of his account of his apostleship in the second half, Mani
declares that he was superior to all the other apostles who came before him. Mani boasts,

I have sown the seed of life. I have… them … from east to west. As you yourselves are seeing,
my hope has gone toward the east of the world and every inhabited part; to the clime of the north,
and the… Not one among the apostles did ever do these things… because all the apostles who
were sent… they preached... the world… [my hope] will remain in the world until…
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ⲁⲓϫⲟ ⲡⲃⲣⲉ ⲛⲧⲉ ⲡⲱⲛϩ ⲁⲓⲡⲱϩⲣⲉ ⲛϯ... ⲃⲉ ⲙⲙⲁⲩ... ϫⲛ ⲙⲡⲉⲓⲃⲧ ⲁⲡⲉⲙⲛⲧ ⲧϩⲉ ϩⲱⲧⲧⲏⲛⲉ ⲉⲧⲉⲧⲛⲛⲉⲩⲁ
ⲧⲁϩⲉⲗⲡⲓⲥ ⲃⲱⲕ ϣⲁ ⲧⲁⲛⲁⲧⲟⲗⲏ ⲙⲡⲕⲟⲥⲙⲟⲥ ⲙⲛⲛⲥⲁ ⲧⲏⲣⲟⲩ ⲛⲧⲟⲓⲕⲟⲩⲙⲉⲛⲏ ⲁⲡⲕⲗⲓⲙⲁ ⲙⲡⲙϩⲓⲧ... ⲙⲡⲉ ⲟⲩⲉ
ϩⲛ ⲛⲁⲡⲟⲥⲧⲟⲗⲟⲥ ⲣ ⲛⲉⲓ ⲁⲛⲏϩⲉ... ⲉⲡⲉⲓⲇⲏ ⲛⲁⲡⲟⲥⲧⲟⲗⲟⲥ ⲧⲏⲣⲟⲩ ⲉⲧⲁⲩϫⲁⲩⲥⲟⲩ... ⲁⲩⲧⲁϣⲉⲁⲓϣ... ⲡⲕⲟⲥⲙⲟⲥ...
ϫⲉ ⲥⲛⲁϭⲱ ϩⲙ ⲡⲕⲟⲥⲙⲟⲥ ϣⲁⲛⲧⲉ230

Mani boasts that his church had spread into every region of the inhabited world, an
accomplishment unparalleled by the earlier apostles. Yet this is not entirely true. After
all, as our chapter makes clear, Jesus too had “sent them [apostles] out into the whole
world [ϩⲙ ⲡⲕⲟⲥⲙⲟⲥ ⲧⲏⲣϥ]…” and thus, his church too could be considered as farreaching as Mani’s. Indeed, in another chapter of the Kephalaia, Mani reiterates and
emphasizes the boast made above, saying that he is better than all apostles “except for
Jesus… the father of all the apostles [ⲭⲱⲣⲓⲥ ⲓⲏⲥ... ⲉⲧⲉ ⲛⲧⲁϥ ⲡⲉ ⲡⲓⲱⲧ ⲛⲛⲁⲡⲟⲥⲧⲟⲗⲟⲥ
ⲧⲏⲣⲟⲩ]!”231 This interjection is quite puzzling, and captures the sense of oblique
competition that characterizes Mani’s relationship with the church established by Jesus.
Unlike Mani’s church, which Mani boasts will continue until the second coming of Jesus,
Jesus’ church was one in constant decline. Even after the efforts of the twelve apostles,
whom Mani says were quite diligent [ⲁⲩⲣⲙⲛⲧⲁϣⲓⲣⲉ]232 in their task, the efforts of Paul
the Apostle and of another mysterious “righteous man,” Jesus’ church eventually
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perished [ⲧⲉⲕⲕⲗⲏⲥⲓⲁ ⲱϫⲛⲉ],233 or to speak more charitably, it “ascended” [ϫⲉⲥⲧⲥ
ⲁⲡϫⲓⲥⲉ],234 triggering the advent of Mani’s Paraclete.
Mani thus argues that the superiority of one’s apostleship depends on the spread
and persistence of his church. We have already seen this concern for duration of his
church in the introduction to the Kephalaia, though as we will see, he discusses it in a
different manner here. His preoccupation with the universality of Jesus’ church and his
oblique criticism of it makes better sense when we compare it to two other early Syriac
“Christian” texts and genres, that is, the Book of the Laws of the Countries and the
Mesopotamian “Acts” genre. Let us first turn to the Book of the Laws of the Countries.
The Book of the Laws of the Countries purports to be a dialogue between the
second century Edessan Christian named Bardaisan and his disciples regarding free-will,
“nature,” and “fate.” 235 It was, in fact, written probably shortly after his death in the midthird century by one of his disciples. In this book, Bardaisan argues that humans are all
equally subject to “nature,” variably subject to fate, and that all possess free-will
[ ]ܚܐܪܘܬܐto do what is good and what is evil. To demonstrate that peoples are not wholly
controlled by fate, Bardaisan compiles together a dossier of various peoples, ranging
from Indians to the Brits, and shows that all peoples adhere to their particular laws
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despite astral or heavenly influences. Bardaisan concludes by finally discussing the “new
race” of Christians. He writes,

What shall we say about our new race [ ]ܫܪܒܬܐ ܚܕܬܐ, the Christians []ܕܟܪܣܛܝܢܐ, whom the
Messiah established in every place and in every direction [ ]ܕܒܟܠ ܐܬܪ ܘܒܟܠ ܦܢܝܢat his advent
[ ?]ܒܡܐܬܝܬܗFor in every place that we are present, we are called by the one name of the Messiah
– Christians…236

Baradaisan continues to argue that all Christians follow the same norms, even when they
occupy different areas of the cosmos. Thus, the brothers in Gaul [ ]ܓܠܝܐdo not marry
men, as one might expect from the Gauls, nor do those in Persia [ ]ܦܪܣmarry their
daughters. In contrast to these local customs, all Christians everywhere follow the law of
their Messiah. Bardaisan thus understands the bounded identity of various peoples and,
by extension, the unity of Christians, as ultimately based on their adherence to certain
norms. The book ends on an eschatological note, stating that though the current
cosmological system is fine-tuned to keep creation in line, a time is coming when all
commotion, evil desires, and deficiencies will cease. Important for our purposes,
however, is Bardaisan’s statement that the Christians were a “new race” who were
established only at the “advent” of Jesus the Messiah and that they are now found
throughout the entire inhabited world. The Syriac here is suggestive in so far as it
specifies Jesus as directly “establishing” Christians throughout the world [  ܐܩܝܡ...ܕܟܪܣܛܝܢܐ
]ܡܫܝܚܐ ܒܡܐܬܝܬܗ. In other words, Bardaisan simply assumes that Christians occupied the
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entire known world since the beginning of Christ’s time on earth; the universality of
Christians is simply taken for granted.
At around the same time when the Laws of Countries was written, stories about
the “conversion” [ ]ܬܘܠܡܕܐof Syria, Mesopotamia, and India were beginning to circulate
in the Roman Near East and Sasanian Mesopotamia.237 Such texts aspired to give an
account of the history of these “regional” churches as part of the “universal” church
initiated by Jesus and brought to fruition by his apostles. The Acts of Thomas, for
example, written roughly in the beginning of the third century, recounts the journey of the
Apostle Thomas to India and the subsequent conversion of that region.238 The Teachings
of Addai, datable to the late fourth or early fifth century and hence around the time when
our Kephalaia was being put into its extant form, recounts the story of the Apostle Addai
and the spread of Christian “Religion” [lit. “Fear”,  ]ܕܚܠܬܐamong Syrians and
Mesopotamians.239 The later Acts of Mar Mari the Apostle picks up where Addai left off
and describes how Christianity spread down the two rivers into the rest of Sasanian
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Mesopotamia.240 Intriguingly, the author/redactor of the Acts of Mar Mari notes that the
tradition regarding the conversion of Mesopotamia that was “repeated” [  ]ܡܬܬܢܝܐto him
was unclear and that he was compelled to write down the “old tradition” [ ܡܫܠܡܢܘܬܐ
 ]ܥܬܝܩܬܐas recorded in the books.241 This suggests that our Acts of Mar Mari the Apostle

is a “newer” edition of earlier traditions and that the author/redactor of the Acts found it
necessary to remedy what he saw as a problematic divergence between the oral and
written traditions. This hints at a more widespread and much more variegated discourse
on the origins of the Sasanian churches. Ultimately, this complex of texts seek to
demonstrate that Sasanian forms of Christianity was a seamless extension of the Church
of Christ begun in Palestine.
I suggest that Mani responds to this Syro-Mesopotamian Christian discourse of
the universality of the Christian church that Bardaisan’s followers took for granted and
that the Acts insisted on demonstrating. We know that Mani engaged directly with the
Bardaisanites in his Book of Mysteries,242 and the very fact that Bardaisanites in Edessa
could assume the universality of the Church of Jesus demonstrates how deeply
“universality” was associated with the church of Jesus by the end of the second century.
As we have seen, Mani accepts the fact that Jesus sent his apostles to every corner
of the world; in fact, he models his own success after precisely this precedent.
Nevertheless, he defangs the broader argument in the Syriac Acts literature that connects
A. Harak (ed.), The Acts of Mār Mārī the Apostle (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005). C.
Jullien and F. Jullien, “Les Actes de Mār Mārī: Une figure apocryphe au service de l’unité
communautaire,” Apocrypha 10 (1999): 177-94. ibid., Apôtres des confins: Processus missionnaires
chrétiens dans l’empire iranien. Res Orientales 15 (Bures-sur-Yvette: Groupe pour l’Étude de la
Civilisation du Moyen-Orient, 2002), 77-78.
241
Harak, Mār Mārī, 11.
242
See Reeves, “Prolegomena,”105-8. Reeves notes that Ephrem the Syrian accused Bardaisan of writing
his own “Book of Mysteries” and suggests that Mani appropriated the title in order to refute Bardaisan.
240
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Mesopotamian “Christianity” with the “Church of Christ” by arguing that the church
established by Jesus eventually perished and was replaced by a superior church, the
Church of Mani. After all, Mani was the prophet sent to Mesopotamia, not Jesus;
therefore, Jesus’ church must have perished if Mani’s church was to begin. In this view, it
is no coincidence that Mani touts his foray into India, the same region where the Apostle
Thomas was sent,243 or that he describes his travels throughout the entire Sasanian
domain, as Mar Addai and Mar Mari had done, or that, like them, Mani boasted about the
miracles he had wrought in those places through the power of God. Mesopotamia was,
after all, Mani’s allotted turf as a prophet, and he boasts that his church spilled even
beyond his allotted portion. To say that Jesus’ church persisted into the Mesopotamian
milieu, as the Acts insist on demonstrating, would thus negate Mani’s claim that he was a
prophet sent specifically to Mesopotamia. In this sense, then, we already see
“prophethood” operating as a discursive space that allow Manichaeans to suit “Christian”
claims to universality for their own purposes.

Prophethood over Prophets: The Didascalia Apostolorum and the Parable

Let us now turn to the parable of the farmer and the seasons. I argued above that the
parable is a later inclusion into the text and that it speaks to a different moment in the
redactional history of this chapter of the Kephalaia. There, I suggested that the redactors’
inclusion of the parable shifts the didactic focus of the chapter from a simple narrative on
the prophets Jesus, Mani, and their individual churches to one that prioritized concepts of
243
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prophethood and the relationship between the prophet and his church. 244 Indeed, with the
inclusion of the parable, the descent of Jesus and his church, their eventual ascension, and
the ensuing descent of Mani’s Paraclete and his church, no longer describe a unique
moment in history, but is now only a single instantiation of a cosmic cycle of descent and
ascent. More importantly, however, this cycle of descent and ascent constructs an
understanding of prophethood as inextricably tied to a prophet’s role as a church-builder,
a role that remains relatively submerged in the second half of the chapter.
If this much is granted, what does it demonstrate? For one, it signals that some
Manichaeans thought it necessary or apt to nuance Mani’s claim to superiority over the
Church of Jesus. Indeed, as would have become quickly evident to Mani’s disciples as
they fanned out towards the Roman Empire, the “Church of Jesus” was not, in fact,
eroding. From the early fourth century onward, with the legalization of Christianity, the
“conversion” of the emperor Constantine, and the influential works of Ephrem the Syrian
in Edessa radiating outwards into Syria and Mesopotamia, Mani’s argument for the
superiority of his church may not have had the same effect as it did a century earlier,
when the “church of Jesus” in Mesopotamia may very well have been on the decline. 245
Moreover, contemporary Christians living in the Roman Near East were intensifying their
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Curiously, the CMC does not preserve any indication that Mani understood his body of followers as a
“church.” It therefore seems better to say that Manichaeans appropriated the Christian understanding of a
“church” and are constructing it along their own trajectory.
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Of course, it is still important to remember Millar’s ominous words, “A social and economic history of
the Near East in the Roman period cannot be written. None of the conditions for such a history are present.”
F. Millar, The Roman Near East, 32 BC-AD 337 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 225. Also, see:
H.J. Drijvers, “Early Syriac Christianity, Some Recent Publications,” Vigiliae Christianae 50 (1996): 151.
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efforts at constructing Christian “orthodoxy” by evoking the idea of a golden “apostolic
age.”246
The Didascalia Apostolorum proves to be a provocative window into the ways
that various discourses of church order and apostleship in Syria might have affected the
ways that Manichaean missionaries thought about the relationship between apostleship
and the church.247 Organized into twenty-six chapters, the Didascalia presents itself as a
robust compendium of apostolic teachings on the proper practices of the Christian
church. Scholars have tended to date this text to the early third century, a consensus
recently, and in my view persuasively, challenged by Alistair Stewart-Sykes, who argues
that we should see the Didascalia as a “living document”248 that reached its “final” form
only in the early fourth century. If he is correct that the Didascalia’s strategy of apostolic
legitimization emerges only later in its redactional history, then it is worth attempting to
read the Didascalia alongside the Kephalaia, in so far as they coincide roughly in time
and place.
The Didascalia Apostolorum participates within the larger construction of an
“Apostolic Age,” in which late third / early fourth century “Christians” were beginning to
imagine a pristine ‘Apostolic’ past in which the boundaries of orthodoxy and heresy were
clearly and finally demarcated under the unified authority of the early apostles. For
example, in the twenty-fourth chapter of the Didascalia, the apostles gather in Jerusalem

T. Korteweg, “Origin and Early History of the Apostolic Office,” in The Apostolic Age in Patristic
Thought (ed. A. Hilhorst; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 1-10.
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For the Syriac, I rely on: A. Vööbus (ed.), The Didascalia Apostolorum in Syriac I: Chapters I-X (Louvain:
CSCO, 1979); ibid., The Didascalia Apostolorum in Syriac II: Chapter XI-XXVI (Louvain: CSCO, 1979).
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“as one” and write down “this universal Didascalia to affirm [or correct] all of you
[]ܠܡܟܬܒ ܗܕܐ ܕܝܕܣܩܠܝܐ ܩܬܘܠܝܩܐ ܠܫܘܪܪܐ ܕܟܠܟܘܢ.”249 They all ultimately agree that those
Christians who were originally of the “peoples” [ ]ܥܡܡܐshould not be circumcised, be
baptized only once, marry, not follow the “Second Law” [ ]ܬܢܝܢ ܢܡܘܣܐ,250 and, perhaps
most importantly, abstain from anything sacrificed, from blood, from any foods that are
strangled, and from fornication.251 The apostles are depicted as completely unified in
their opinions regarding these matters and their Didascalia in turn reflects their desire for
unity in belief and practice in their churches.
Having dealt with the problems of internal divisions, the apostles then turn to the
problem of false prophets living in their midst. In the twenty-fifth chapter of the
Didascalia, the apostles exhort Christians “to keep far from those who come falsely in
the name of the apostles [ ]ܒܫܡܐ ܕܫܠܝܚܐand to recognize them by the shiftiness of their
words and the manner in which they act…”252 These are, as the writer goes on to say,
those whom Jesus had forewarned as “false Christs and prophets of the lie” [ ܡܫܝܚܐ ܕܓܐܠ
]ܢܒܝܐ ܕܟܕܒܘܬܐ.253 If we follow Stewart-Sykes in locating this strata of the text to the early

fourth century, this late “redactor” may be referring to Manichaeans, among others,
whose master Mani fashioned himself as a prophet, an “Apostle” of Jesus Christ, as an
embodiment of Christ, and whose missionaries presented a radically different conception
for the functions of a “church.”
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Finally, the apostles proclaim that they had rooted out the error from the church
by accepting those who had repented from their sins, and by driving out those who were
incurably lost. They conclude by stating, “We have done this in every place, in every
city, and in every land in the world []ܒܟܠ ܐܬܪ ܘܒܟܠ ܡܕܝܢܐ ܘܒܟܠܗ ܬܒܝܠ ܕܒܥܠܡܐ, and we bear
witness [ ]ܘܐܣܗܕܢܢby leaving behind [ ]ܘܫܒܩܢܢjustly and righteously this universal
Didascalia to the universal church as remembrance [  ]ܠܕܘܟܪܢܐfor the affirmation of the
faithful.”254 They thus strongly assert the universality of the apostolic church – “in every
place, in every city, and in every land in the world” – and its abiding relevance for the
church that is to come in the post-apostolic age. Curiously, the density of terms like
“leaving behind” [ ]ܘܫܒܩܢܢa “remembrance” [ ]ܠܕܘܟܪܢܐas an act of bearing witness
[ ]ܘܐܣܗܕܢܢis strikingly reminiscent of the concept of apostleship in Baraies’ homily. As
we have already seen, Baraies had insisted that all the ancestral prophets and apostles had
“left behind”255 [καταλελοίπασιν] as a “remembrance”256 [εἰς ὑπόμνησιν] their writings
for their coming spiritual brethren. As a result, each of these ancestral apostles were
themselves a witness [αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τῆς ἀποκαλύψεως μάρτυς ἐγένετο] to their own
revelation.257 Whatever might be the cause of this uncanny coincidence, these chapters as
a whole make it clear that some Syrian Christians were constructing a vision of a unified
apostolic past in their aspiration to quell internal divisions and allay the influence of
“false Christs and prophets of the lie.”
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The Didascalia’s intense efforts at “unearthing” an apostolic past may have posed
a strong counter-narrative to Mani’s “original” argument for the superiority of his own
prophethood. After all, according to the second half of the chapter, Mani’s tenure as an
“apostle of Jesus Christ” depended on the ultimate failure of the twelve apostles and Paul
to effectively propagate the church of Jesus. In contrast, the Didascalia proclaimed that
the apostles were successful in propagating and cementing the marks of orthodox
“Christian” beliefs and practice, which were accepted in “every place, in every city, in
every land in the world.” The inclusion of the parable into the chapter may therefore be
responding to the Didascalia’s challenge. Its insertion into the beginning of the chapter is
surely intended to guide our reading of the narratival second half. It works by shifting the
reader’s focus to the macrocosmic scale, insinuating that Jesus’ church ascended not due
to the fault of any of Jesus’ apostles, but simply because this was the way that the cycle
of descent and ascend had been ordained. These were the “seasons” of ascent and
descent. The “parabolized” chapter thus sidesteps the main issue of contention – whether
the Church of Jesus did or did not continue to persist beyond Jesus’ apostles – by
rendering its failure a foregone conclusion. As a result, it relativized the Christian
construction on an “apostolic past” by asserting that there have always been “apostolic
pasts,” all of which have passed away, except, of course, Mani’s church, which will
remain until Jesus returns.

2 Ke 342: Extending Baraies’ Typology
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We turn now to discuss “prophethood” in the “other” Kephalaia (2 Ke). Before
discussing 2 Ke 342, it is necessary to state that there is currently no editio princeps of 2
Ke. Therefore, I have not had access to the entirety of the Coptic text. Giversen’s
facsimile of 2 Ke has been of some help, though I have used it only to check existing
translations.258 I therefore rely on Gardner’s recent translation of a section of 2 Ke 342 as
a starting point.259 I am aware that the publication of a scholarly edition of 2 Ke might
shed a different light on my argument here. Nevertheless, even what little is accessible
proves instrumental for thinking about the ways that early Manichaeans were negotiating
their received traditions on prophethood. Indeed, as I argue below, 2 Ke 342 aims to
articulate a coherent and comprehensive understanding of prophethood. Yet its definition
of prophethood is itself the product of multiple traditions, particularly the “chain of
prophets” found in Mani’s Shabuhragan260 and the model of prophethood in Baraies’
homily.261 Unlike the chapters discussed so far, there is no hint here of what I called
“oblique competition,” at least, not in the sections published so far. This exploration is
useful nevertheless as a “control” since it indicates that Manichaeans increasingly
systematized notions of prophethood without merely “deploying” them against
Christians; it was a “discourse” in its own right.
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2 Ke 342 purports to be a conversation between Mani and a well-born man
[ⲉⲩⲅⲉⲛⲏⲥ].262 The initial sections, as Gardner puts it, centers on “whether the apostle’s
wisdom has been revealed to him by his eyes.”263 Mani argues that all the apostles had
seen the Land of Light. The conversation then turns to the Land of Light itself and those
apostles who had seen it, culminating in Mani discussing the “chain of prophets” who
came prior to him. This extended passage has already received a fair amount scholarly
attention, albeit somewhat narrowly centered on the possible influences of Buddhism on
Mani’s thought.264 Those questions are not my focus here. Rather, I attempt to read this
section as part of an ongoing Manichaean discourse of prophethood. Let us turn to the
relevant section of the 2 Ke 342.265

a. I will [tell] you each one of the apostles by name, they who came [ⲛⲉⲧⲁⲩⲉⲓ] and appeared in this
world. Zarades was sent to Persia, to Hystaspes the king. He revealed the truly-founded law
[ⲙⲡⲛⲟⲙⲟⲥ ⲁⲛ ⲁⲃⲁⲗ ⲉⲧⲥⲙⲁⲛⲧ ⲙⲙⲏⲉ] in all of Persia. Again, Bouddas the blessed, he came to the
land of India and Kušān. He also revealed the truly-founded law in all of India and Kušān. And
after him Aurentes came with Kebellos to the east. They also revealed the truly-founded law in the

This term may not mean “aristocrat” but simply a “Manichaean man,” one who was “well-born” as a
Manichaean. See 201.7-8, where a “eugenes and the female “free ones” laugh at an old ugly man. This was
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east. (N.N.) came to Parthia. He revealed the law of truth in all of Parthia. Jesus the Christ came to
the west. He (revealed the law of) truth in all of the west.

b. (All?) these apostles … and these busy merchants … as they came from that place in …-ness …
among them: For they were seized [ⲁⲩⲧⲁⲣⲡⲟⲩ] from this place, they were [taken] up, they went,
they saw, they came (back), they bore witness (that truly?) the land of light exists and that we have
come from it. Also, hell exists, and we have seen the place where it is. They (came forth and)
dwelt (?) in the world. They made disciples of the people. They (taught them what is good?), they
… from them. They were taken to the land of light, this city of good fortune. Their witness exists
till now in their writings, in all these countries …

c. Also, Adam and Seth, Enosh and Sem and Enoch and Noah and Shem; all these men: The
angels came from the land of light and seized them. They were taken up. They were taught about
the land of light, how it is; and they were also taught about hell and the place where it exists. They
came back (?), they came to this place again. And when they came they spoke. They bore witness
about the land of light and hell, that they exist. They did that which was entrusted to them by God.
Indeed, these who became disciples of them: They did good deeds, and they came forth from their
body and they went to the land of light, the city of the well-favored. Their testimony exists till
now in their writings.

d. So, if, as I have told you, these people came from the land of light to this place, people have
also gone from this place to the land of light.

e. I, myself, whom you are looking at: I went to the land of light. Indeed, I have seen the land of
light with my eyes, the way that it is. [Again], I have seen hell with my eyes, the way that it is. I
have (been sent here) by God. I came; I have revealed this place (i.e. the land of light) [in this]
world. I preached the word of God; and I … of God in the world from the north to [the south. A]
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multitude of people have heard me. They have believed … How many among them have done
good deeds! They came forth [from their] body and they went to the land of light, they … they are
established, being there until today. Behold (?), I have told you about a multitude of witnesses
who have come forth from the land of light.

Parallels are consistently visible among sections b, c, and e, as evident by the certain
terms that reoccur throughout, such as “coming from” a heavenly place, the language of
“seizure” [ⲁⲩⲧⲁⲣⲡⲟⲩ] and being “taken up,” of knowing the existence and location of
heaven and hell, of bearing witness, doing good deeds, making disciples, and writing a
testimony. In fact, these three sections are virtually identical with one another. The point
of these passages is to demonstrate that all prophets do similar things, and since Mani
does these things, he too is a prophet.
Yet differences abound as well. These differences betray their different origins.
Section b tellingly calls its subjects “apostles,” whereas section c calls them “men.”
Furthermore, Mani uses the first-common plural “we”266 in section b to mark himself as a
prophet like Jesus and Zarathustra, whereas he only uses the third-common plural “they”
to mark the “men” in section c. Section b states that its apostles came from “that place,”
that is, from the “Greatness,” meaning they are incarnations of the “Apostle of Light,” yet
section c does not assume that the “biblical” forefathers were “incarnations” at all. We
are clearly dealing with two different sets of “apostles.” In fact, as section d
demonstrates, the redactor already assumes that he is dealing with two different sets of
apostles since it states that the some “people” descended from above whereas other
Admittedly, the perspective shifts immediately back to “they.” It is unclear whether this “we” is an
accident, a scribal gloss, or, perhaps more provocatively, it reflects an earlier edition of this passage.
266

120

“people” ascended to it. The former are prophets like Buddha, Zoroaster, and presumably
Mani himself, whereas the latter are the “biblical forefathers” like Adam, Seth, and
Enosh. Finally, it should not be forgotten that the various terms that cluster around the
different set of apostles betray differing origins. All the apostles mentioned in section b
are discussed only in reference to one another as a complete set (that is, a “biblical”
figure like Sethel never intrudes into this list) and in terms that draw attention to their
regional distribution. Furthermore, the primary function of the apostles in section a is to
reveal [ⲁϥⲟⲩⲱⲛϩ ⲁⲃⲁⲗ] the well-founded law. In contrast, the “men” mentioned in
section c are likewise only mentioned together without any further qualifications,
regional or otherwise. Unlike the “regionally-distributed” prophets associated with Mani,
these apostles do not “establish” laws.
If it is accepted that we are dealing with two different prophetological traditions,
then it is clear that the later redactors of this section are incorporating disparate traditions
in order to present a unified image of all the prophets. Yet the question remains. Where
did the redactors of this passage get their model of prophethood? Dilley argues that the
similarities between Baraies’ homily and the passage above means that both texts were
rooted in a chapter in the Shabuhragan called “On the Coming of the Prophet,” a title
amply attested in later Islamicate sources.267 I am much less willing to accept a single
source for what seems to be two radically different traditions on prophethood.268 Instead,

There are many issues with this claim. I use Reeves’ handy translation. The Shaburagan mentions
specifically only Buddha, Zarathustra, and Jesus. Mani was sent to Babylonia. [Reeves, Prolegomena,
103]. There is no evidence that the apostles included the list used by Baraies.
268
Though his argument for rooting Mani’s list of apostles (section a) in the Shabuhragan is strong, his
argument that the apostles mentioned in section c are also from the Shabuhragan is weak. This is because,
in my view, he does not give due attention to 1) the differences between the two sets of “apostles”
mentioned above and he 2) implicitly accepts Baraies’ homily as a window into Mani’s writings – in this
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it should not escape notice how closely the model of prophethood outlined above aligns
with the understanding of prophethood found in Baraies’ homily, as described in the
previous chapter. The apostles are “raptured,” “seized,” “taken up,” they see visions of
heaven and hell,269 they inscribe their texts in writings as “testimonies,” and they choose
disciples. All these points, as we have already seen, are mentioned and discussed in
Baraies’ homily and, to the best of my knowledge, nowhere else. This strongly suggests a
genetic relationship between Baraies’ homily and this section of the Kephalaion.
Furthermore, we should note that the language of seizure is already unusual in the
Manichaean corpus, as Tigchelaar already demonstrated.270 For it to be replicated here
suggests direct dependence on Baraies’ homily. Lastly, it should be noted that “wrote
down” testimonies of their revelation is in direct contradiction to introduction of the
Kephalaia, which explicitly stated that Jesus, Buddha, and Zoroaster did not write down
their revelations.
If my argument regarding the redaction history of this Kephalaia is correct, it
would demonstrate that the redactors of 2 Ke 342 attempted to frame prophethood under
a single comprehensive typology of prophethood, one that is ultimately derived from
Baraies’ writings. Tellingly, this implies that Baraies’ homily had become “naturalized”
into the larger Manichaean body of traditions, so much so that the typology that he
case the Shaburhagan – rather than attempting to situate Baraies to a particular time and place. I argued the
latter point extensively earlier, so I will dwell a bit on the first point here. Dilley is, of course, aware that
the two sets of “prophets” differ. Nevertheless, he ties Baraies’ set of prophets into the Shaburhagan by
citing the work of later Muslim historiographer ‘Abd al-Jabbar, who thought that Baraies’ prophets were
earlier than the various incarnations of Apostles of Light – Buddha, Jesus, and Zoroaster. He also mentions
a fragment preserved in Middle Persian which includes Shem, Sem, Enosh, Enoch, and, surprisingly,
Nikotheos. Dilley thus assumes that the Shahbuhragan must have included Baraies’ set of the forefathers.
269
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constructed could be attributed to Mani himself. Ultimately, then, our redactors are not
merely channeling older “Manichaean” traditions, but actively shaping them to its own
ends, whatever they were.271 One key that might help contextualize this particular section
of the kephalaion emerges when we note how strongly it emphasizes the role of
revelation as a marker of prophethood. Whereas in Baraies’ homily, the “rapture” of the
prophet was only one part of what made him a prophet, 2 Ke 342 emphasizes it as the
primary characteristic of a prophet. Dilley, for his part, contextualizes this chapter’s
emphasis on revelatory knowledge within the politics of religious competition in the
Sasanian court. He writes, “The description of the apostles and their visionary ascents in
K342 closely reflects the dynamics of religious competition within early Sasanian
courts…. The shared discourse on otherworldly realms allows for a way in which these
differences could be framed, and presented as something of consequence not only to
followers but also potential patrons.”272 Yet, as he himself makes clear, Dilley does not
read 2 Ke 342 as a redacted work in its own right, but for what it might add to an
understanding of Mani’s world in the mid/late third century.
Furthermore, despite Dilley’s argument about the competitive “discourse” of
otherworldly realms in the Sasanian courts, the literary mise-en-scène of 2 Ke 342 is not a
court competition, but a dialogue between a “well-born” disciple and Mani. Though a full
analysis of this chapter must await the publishing of an editio princeps of the Kephalaia
of the Wisdom of my Lord Mani, for now, this kephalaion again demonstrates the ongoing
The discussion of the similarities between “Eastern” kephalaia-like materials and some chapter in the 2
Ke has reopened the question of whether the Kephalaia as a genre developed within the Sasanian Empire,
or in the Roman side. The new discoveries hint at the possibility that this chapter in particular was written
within a Sasanian context, yet it remains nothing more than a hint.
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vitality and amorphous nature of the Manichaean discourse of “prophethood.” Whereas
there was distinct sense of “oblique competition” with the Church of Jesus in the other
two chapters discussed above, it is not the case here. Rather, this section aims more
narrowly to be a comprehensive exposition of prophethood. It is less concerned with
competition as more with presenting and molding different traditions of prophethood into
a single comprehensible and digestible form.

Conclusion
I have argued in this chapter that in comparison to the “early” discourse of prophethood
in Baraies’ homily, the Kephalaia expands prophethood in ways that defy any master
prophetological system. There is no single discourse of prophethood, nor does the
Kephalaia systematize a discourse of prophethood beyond the boundaries of its
individual chapters. Therefore, we cannot posit a general “Manichaean” prophetology
without reflecting on the sheer diversity of statements on prophethood in the Kephalaia
and giving due attention to the processes of selection and redaction within the Kephalaia
itself.
Perhaps more importantly, I have argued that Syro-Mesopotamian Manichaean
“prophetology” emerged as a discursive arena in which the uncomfortable tensions
between “Manichaean” and “Christian” could be articulated. Prophethood emerged as a
way of mapping the relative proximity of local Syro-Mesopotamian Christians unto a
Manichaean

framework.

This

allowed

Manichaeans

to

acknowledge

their

“uncomfortable” similarities with these other local Syrian Christians – and to be clear,
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Manichaeans understood themselves as following the same “rightly-guided Law” that
Jesus had established – but also to assert the superiority of Mani’s understanding of true
“Christianity.” For the Syro-Mesopotamian Manichaeans responsible for these particular
chapters of the Kephalaia, “Christians” were not a “heresy” of “Manichaeism,” but its
surprisingly-durable, vitiated precedent. Prophetology therefore complements other local
strategies of “Christian” differentiation offered by texts like the Didascalia Apostolorum,
which argued that “heresies” were later “innovations” of the true and original Apostolic
Christianity, and the Syriac Acts literature, which as a whole depict Syro-Mesopotamian
“Christianity” as an extension of the movement begun by the historical Jesus.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE PSEUDO-CLEMENTINE HOMILIES AS COUNTERMANICHAEAN PROPHETOLOGY

As we have seen, prophethood played a central role among Syro-Mesopotamian
Manichaeans, first as a way of constructing social and doctrinal boundaries among and
between followers of Mani (chapter one) and as way of engaging in oblique competition
with Syriac-speaking Christians (chapter two). In this chapter, I look to the other side of
the Manichaean presence in Syria and argue that the presence of Manichaean
missionaries intensified the discourse of prophethood among local followers of Jesus. I
look to the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies, an early fourth-century text written by a
“Jewish Christian” living in Syria, perhaps near Antioch or Edessa,273 and I argue that it
challenges Manichaean claims that their Apostle was a prophet. 274 More specifically, the
Homilies undermines the prophethood of Mani by attacking all forms of worship that rely
See J.M. Bremmer, “Pseudo-Clementines: Text, Dates, Places, Authors and Magic,” in The PseudoClementines (ed. J.M. Bremmer; Leuven: Peeters, 2010), 6-9. This chapter follows both early twentiethcentury and recent scholarship on the Homilies, which has pointed to the importance of the Syrian context
for the Pseudo-Clementines. See S. Pines, Points of Similarity between the Exposition of the Doctrine of the
Sefirot in the Sefer Yeẕira and a Text of the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies: The Implications of this
Resemblance (Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1989), 108-14; J. Chapman,
“On the Date of the Clementines,” Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 9 (1908): 21-34, 14759; N. Kelley, Knowledge and Religious Authority in the Pseudo-Clementines: Situating the Recognitions
in Fourth Century Syria (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 179-212; R. Boustan and A.Y. Reed, “Blood and
Atonement in the Pseudo-Clementines and the Story of the Ten Martyrs: The Problem of Selection in the
Study of Ancient Judaism and Christianity,” Henoch 30 (2008): 333-64, 348-49; A.Y. Reed, “Rethinking
‘Jewish Christian’ Evidence for Jewish Mysticism” in Hekhalot Literature in Context: From Byzantium to
Babylonia (eds. R. Boustan, M. Himmelfarb, and P. Schäfer; TSAJ 13; Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2013),
349-77; C. Clivaz, “Madness, Philosophical or Mystical Experience? A Puzzling Text: Pseudo-Clementine
Recognitiones II 61-69,” Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum 13 (2009): 475-93; D. Côté, Le thème de
l’opposition entre Pierre et Simon dans les Pseudo-Clémentines (Études Augustiniennes Série Antiquités
167; Paris: Étude augustiniennes, 2001), 109-33; idem., “Le problème de l’identité religieuse dans la Syrie
du IVe siècle. Le cas des Pseudo-Clémentines et de l’Adversus Judaeos de S. Jean Chrysostome,” in La
croisée des chemins revisitée: quand l'“Eglise” et la “Synagogue” se sont-elles distinguées?: Actes du
colloque de Tours 18-19 Juin 2010, 2012 (ed. S. Mimoni and B. Pouderon; Paris: Cerf, 2012), 339-70.
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on visual means of gaining revelatory knowledge, which from the “Jewish Christian”
vantage point of the fourth-century Syrians responsible for the Homilies, encompassed all
Pauline forms of Christianity, including the emergent “Catholic” Church, and
Manichaeans. Interestingly, the Homilies constructs its unique system of revelatory
knowledge by wedding late antique Greek embryological discourse – especially on
semen and blood – with a dualistic prophetological system.
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I turn to the Homilies’
construction of prophethood and prophecy, demonstrating how it uses contemporary
discourses of blood and semen to undergird a broader model for the acquisition of
revelatory knowledge. This model ultimately privileges “vivid encounter” (ἐνάργεια),
which is further nuanced here to mean the oral-aural encounter between truly existing
persons, as the only legitimate means of securing revelatory knowledge. In fact, the
Homilies contrasts ἐνάργεια over and against revelatory systems based on the faculty of
vision, i.e., those that require the visualization of apparitions, whether awake or in
dreams. As I show in second section, this contrast between the oral-aural and the visual
buttresses a crucial debate between Peter the Apostle and the representative of the false
prophetess, Simon Magus, who is here explicitly portrayed in the image of Paul, the
Apostle of Jesus Christ (Hom. 17). I argue that the Homilies’ portrayal of the false
prophet Simon Magus qua Paul participates in a broader Syrian discourse on
prophethood, a discourse that had been become increasingly urgent due to the
proclamations of Manichaean missionaries whose prophet had portrayed himself as Paul
redivivus, an “Apostle of Jesus Christ.” In the third and final section, I turn to a key
passage in the Homilies often employed by scholars of Manichaeism, Islam, and
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Gnosticism to connect these various “religions” to a shared “Jewish Christian”
prophetological core. This passage equates Adam with Jesus and posits that Adam-Jesus
changed his form and names throughout history, appearing to select people along the
way, before God granted him eternal rest. Again, I argue that this passage reflects the
contested nature of the late antique Syrian discourse of prophethood, especially as it
seeks to displace claims that anyone other than Adam-Jesus could possibly be the True
Prophet.
Seminal fluids and Blood: Embryology in the service of Epistemology

Blood and semen play enormously important roles in the Homilies. The Homilies
discusses blood in the context of sacrifices, wars, pre-diluvium cannibalism, sexual
pleasure, demons, impurity, and the false prophetess, who, “as a female in her menses is
stained with blood at the offering of sacrifices and pollutes those who touch her” (Hom.
3.24).275 It is no accident that the Homilies describes her blood here as menstrual blood or
that the Apostle Peter describes her as “giving birth” to temporary kings (Hom. 3.24). In
keeping with the earlier works of Aristotle and Hippocrates, late antique physicians also
saw menstrual blood as nutriment for the development of the fetus. This is no less the
case in the Homilies. Yet, though the importance of blood and semen in the Homilies
reflects, in part, regional discourses of the same among both Palestinian rabbinic
communities and Syrian Christian communities, only the Homilies uses embryological

For a fuller discussion on the role of blood, see A.Y. Reed, “Parting Ways over Blood and Water?
Beyond ‘Judaism’ and ‘Christianity’ in the Roman Near East,” in La croisée des Chemins revisitée: Quand
l’Église et la Synagogue se sont-elles distinguées? (eds. S.C. Mimouni and B. Pouderon; Paris: Cerf, 2012),
227-5l; B. Leyerle, “Blood is Seed” JR 81 (2001): 26-48.
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concepts and terms to articulate a distinctive “prophetic” epistemology.276 As we will see,
the false prophetess’ menstrual blood links her to the corporeal composition of the human
body, and this corporeal “root” subtly perverts human attempts at reasoning, seducing
humans away from proper worship of God. As a result, humans cannot attain truth
through their own means, thus necessitating the appearance of a True Prophet, the arbiter
of truth. There is comparatively less overt discussion regarding seminal fluids, yet this
does not detract from their importance in the Homilies. As we will see, the Homilies
consistently describes “words” either as the masculine seminal fluids of the True Prophet
or arising through the illicit commingling of masculine and feminine seminal fluids. The
Homilies thus articulates a theory of prophetic knowledge, its source, mode of
transmission, and nature, by leaning on embryological discussions regarding the nature of
semen and blood.
Peter’s first lengthy discussion with Clement centers on the two types of prophets
that God had appointed over this world and the next. Whereas he describes the True
Prophet Jesus in overwhelmingly masculine and paternal tones, he depicts the false
prophetess in conspiratorial tones, a sinister queen directing this world behind the scenes
to its destruction. Yet, despite her evil nature, according to Peter, God appointed her to
rule over this present cosmos because she resembles the cosmos in her ability to produce
and generate offspring. In other words, her body and the body of the cosmos are sites of
generation and coming-into-being. Peter says, “She as a female ruling the present world
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as her like [ὡς θήλεια ὁμοίου], was entrusted to be the first prophetess, announcing
prophecy with all amongst those born of woman [ἐν γεννητοῖς γυναικῶν]” (Hom. 3.22).
Elsewhere, Peter says, “For since the present world is female, as a mother bringing forth
souls of her children [ὁ παρὼν κόσμος θῆλύς ἐστιν, ὡς μήτηρ τέκνων τίκτων ψυχάς], but
the world to come is male, as a father receiving his children from their mother” (Hom.
2.15). Again, Peter says, “The cosmos is an instrument created artfully, the female
eternally bears righteous eternal sons for the sake of the masculine [cosmos] to come”
[ἵνα τῷ ἐσομένῳ ἄρρενι αἰωνίως ἡ θήλεια τίκτῃ δικαίους αἰωνίους υἱούς]” (Hom. 19.23).
Such statements make it clear that the female prophetess and the present cosmos share a
critical role: they bear “sons” for the masculine True Prophet and his eternal cosmos to
come.277
Given that the Homilies’ male gaze sees the prophetess and the cosmos primarily as
sites of fetal generation, it is not surprising that Peter would mention her uterine fluids,
that is, both blood and seminal fluids, in his initial discussion on the two prophets. He
introduces these prophets by saying,
Therefore, there are two classes of prophets for us. The male prophet, who is considered
the first, even though the male is ranked below the female in the order of advent. But the
second-ranked one, who is female has been appointed to come first in the advent of pairs.
The second, who is among those born of woman, as the female appointed over this
current world wishes to be thought as a male. By stealing the seminal fluids of the male
and covering over them with her seminal fluids of the flesh, she bears forth generated
things as wholly her own, that is, spoken words. And she promises that she will give the
Intriguingly, the early Neoplatonist Porphyry also compared cosmogony to a woman’s womb. The
overlap in time and place may call for further attention. See J. Wilberding, Forms, Souls, and Embryos:
Neoplatonists on Human Reproduction (New York: Routledge, 2017), 33-57.
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present earthly riches as a dowry, thereby exchanging the slow for the swift, the small for
the greater (Hom. 3.23).
δύο οὖν ἡμῖν γενικαὶ ἔστωσαν προφητεῖαι· ἡ μὲν ἀρσενική (καὶ διωρίσθω ὅτι ἡ μὲν
πρώτη ἄρσην οὖσα δευτέρα τοῦ λοιποῦ τέτακται κατὰ τὸν τῆς προόδου λόγον, ἡ δὲ
δευτέρα θῆλυς οὖσα πρώτη ὡρίσθη ἔρχεσθαι ἐν τῇ τῶν συζυγιῶν προελεύσει) — ἡ μὲν
οὖν ἐν γεννητοῖς γυναικῶν οὖσα, ὡς θήλεια τοῦ νῦν κόσμου ἐπαγγελλομένη, ἀρσενικὴ
εἶναι πιστεύεσθαι θέλει. διὸ κλέπτουσα τὰ τοῦ ἄρσενος σπέρματα καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις τῆς
σαρκὸς σπέρμασιν ἐπισκέπουσα ὡς ὅλα ἴδια συνεκφέρει τὰ γεννήματα, τουτέστιν τὰ
ῥήματα. καὶ τὸν παρόντα ἐπίγειον πλοῦτον ὡς προῖκα δώσειν ἐπαγγέλλεται, τῷ ταχεῖ τὸ
βραδύ, τὸ βραχὺ τῷ μείζονι.

Though the true male prophet ranks above the female, the false female prophetess
precedes his coming. The prophetess exploits this situation by masquerading as the male
prophet. To do so, she steals and “covers over” the masculine seed of the True Prophet,
which is presumably spiritual in nature, with her own “seeds of the flesh.” This
commingling of male and female seminal fluids results in the birth of seductive
utterances, which she passes off as her own. She seduces unsuspecting people through
such utterances, and by accepting her dowry of temporary riches, they “marry” her and
this present world, thereby losing their status as brides of the True Prophet and hope for
eternal life in the next.
Strecker notes that the “impact” of Gnosticism on the passage above was
“unübersehbar.”278 He finds in it the dim outline of the gnostic concept of a masculine,
divine seed stuck in matter and in need of redemption. He does admit, however, that this
“gnostic cosmology” does not match our passage exactly. A closer parallel might be
278
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found in roughly contemporaneous discussions regarding the existence and function of
male and female seminal fluids. For example, the passage above assumes that female
seminal fluid exists when, in fact, late antique intellectuals were divided on this very
issue. Aristotelians, for example, claimed that women do not secrete semen while
physicians like Galen defended the existence of female semen. 279 More intriguingly, the
passage assumes that both the male and female seminal fluids contribute to the generation
of offspring, in this case, “spoken words.” This interpretation is supported by the verb of
“bearing forth together” – συνεκφέρει – which suggests that both male and female semen
contribute to the act of generation. Furthermore, the false prophetess wants to portray her
“children” – the “spoken words” – as “wholly her own,” which implies that in actuality,
they were the product of both male and female seminal fluids. This resonates with
roughly contemporaneous debates regarding the function of these seminal fluids,
exemplified best by Galen’s controversial position that both male and female semen, as
well as the female’s menstrual blood, contributed to the actual production of offspring.280
This was again in opposition to contemporaneous Aristotelians, who claimed that only
the male seed provided the necessary “movements” to the female blood to provoke the
generation of a fetus, after which the material body of the male semen would dissipate.

Wilberding notes “Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, Aristotle, and the Stoics” as among those who
followed a one, masculine seed theory and “Alcmaeon, Hippon, and other Pythagoreans, Parmenides,
Empedocles, Democritus, Epicurus – and especially among ancient physicians: the Hippocratics, Diocles,
Herophilus, Soranus, and Galen” as following a two-seed theory in which the female also produced seminal
fluids. See Wilberding, Forms, Souls, and Embryos, 14. For a recent challenge to this “well-worn
narrative,” see S.M. Connell, Aristotle on Female Animals: A Study of the Generation of Animals
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 93-120. Connell argues that Aristotle believed that female
also secreted seminal fluids. Whatever Aristotle “truly” believed, my argument takes its place from how
Galen and others understood Aristotle – namely, as a “one-seed” theorist.
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Nevertheless, this is not an exact parallel, in so far as Galen argues that it is the female’s
menstrual blood, and not her semen, that is responsible for the production of flesh itself
(On Semen, I.16.33-35).
Unlike Galen, however, the Homilies contends that the intermingling of the male
and female seminal fluids has deep epistemological and soteriological consequences.
Their union produces bastard utterances that illicitly impregnate the souls of human
beings, ultimately leading the person to damnation. This is why the Homilies is peculiarly
concerned with making sure that others do not even hear blasphemous words.281 The
person who hears the utterances of the false prophetess are thereby “sown by another
word [ὁ παρ᾿ ἑτέρου σπαρεὶς λόγῳ], and therefore receives the charge of fornication, and
is cast out by the Bridegroom from his kingdom” (Hom. 3.28). By daring to hear these
bastard utterances, the spiritually adulterous person imitates the False Prophetess, who
“dares both to say and hear that many gods exist [πολλοὺς μέντοι θεοὺς λέγειν καὶ
ἀκούειν οὐ μόνον τολμῶσα]” (Hom. 3.24). As will become clear in the following section,
one should only attend to the words of the True Prophet, or to put it in the Homilies’
terms, one should only become pregnant through the words (=pure spiritual masculine
semen) of the True Prophet.
Peter’s denunciation of the false prophetess’ seminally-commingled utterances
doubles back on the epistemological deficiency of Greek oracular sites, which he attacks
as woefully ambiguous and whose words ultimately lead to damnation. Indeed, it is not
difficult to discern the figure of the famous Oracle at Delphi, celebrated both for her
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divine wisdom and cryptic words, behind his description of the “utterances” of the false
prophetess. He says, “As for those who desire to learn truth from her, she keeps them
always seeking and finding nothing, even until death, by telling them all things contrary
and by presenting many and various services… Prophesying deceit and ambiguities and
obliquities, she deceives those who believe her” (Hom. 3.24). Elsewhere, Peter contrasts
the prophetic utterances of the false prophetess, who “speaks the first things last, the last
first, speaks of past events as future, and future as already past, and without sequence, or
things borrowed from others and altered, some lessened, unformed, foolish, ambiguous,
unseemly, obscure, proclaiming all unconscientiousness” (Hom. 3.14), with the words of
the True Prophet, whose utterances “need nothing for its interpretation, not prophesying
darkly or ambiguously, so that one would need another prophet to interpret the spoken
words, but clearly and simply” (Hom. 3.12, 15).
We have so far discussed how the female prophetess produces “words” through
the illicit commingling of seminal fluids. Let us now turn to examine the masculine seeds
of the True Prophet. There is less explicit theorization of the masculine semen.
Nevertheless, like the female seminal fluids, the masculine semen produces or is identical
to the “words” spoken by the True Prophet. As Peter says,

For every person is a bride, whenever they are sown with the white word of the True
Prophet, their mind is enlightened (Hom. 3.27).
νύμφη γάρ ἐστιν ὁ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος, ὁπόταν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς προφήτου λευκῷ λόγῳ ἀληθείας
σπειρόμενος φωτίζηται τὸν νοῦν.
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It is no accident that Peter couples the “white” word of the Prophet with the participle
“being sown.” He conceptualizes the True Prophet’s logos as “white” semen that
impregnates the mind of a person. Peter invokes similar terminology in a later discussion
on the characteristics of a “chaste woman.” He describes her one “adorned with the Son
of God as with a bridegroom [ἡ σώφρων γυνὴ ὡς νυμφίῳ τῷ υἱῷ τοῦ θεοῦ κοσμεῖτα],”282
and as a result, “She is white, whenever her mind is enlightened [λευκὴ δὲ τυγχάνει, ὅταν
τὰς φρένας ᾖ λελαμπρυμένη].”283 These passages demonstrate the intermingling of
prophethood and embryology: “words,” whether utterances or logoi, are produced by
masculine and/or feminine seminal fluids.
Whereas the Homilies aligns seminal fluids, both male and female, rather narrowly
with the production of words, it has a wildly expansive view of blood. It connects blood
with menstrual impurity, sacrifices, demons, and the present cosmos itself. What has
gone unnoticed, however, is the role of blood as nutriment for the production of human
bodies and its consequences on the human ability to discern truth. In short, the Homilies
appropriates widespread conceptions of menstrual blood as fetal nutriment, as well as
proximate discussions relating to sexual pleasure, to fashion a unique account of human
composition. Whereas the menstrual blood from the false prophetess nourishes the fleshy
aspects of the human body, the pneuma responsible for thought and reasoning derives
from the seminal logos of the True Prophet. These two “roots” oppose one another within
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each human being, so that humans are not capable of sound reasoning and attaining truth.
To explore this in full, let us turn first to the Homilies’ discourse regarding the interaction
between menstrual blood and the True Prophet’s semen. In Hom. 3. 27, Peter concludes
his private discourse with Clement by saying,
What more needs to be said? The male is wholly truth, and the female wholly error. But
he who is born from both male and female at times lies, and at other times, tells the truth.
For by surrounding the white sperm of the male with her own blood, like a red fire, she
braces the weakness of her bones through foreign supports, and taking pleasure in the
temporary bloom of flesh and by secretly sapping the strength of reasoning through
temporary pleasures, she leads many into adultery, and thus deprives them of the
beautiful bridegroom to come.
καὶ τί δεῖ λέγειν; ὁ ἄρσην ὅλος ἀλήθεια. ἡ θήλεια ὅλη πλάνη, ὁ δὲ ἐξ ἄρσενος καὶ θηλείας
γεγονὼς ἃ μὲν ψεύδεται, ἃ δὲ ἀληθεύει. ἡ γὰρ θήλεια ἰδίῳ αἵματι ὥσπερ ἐρυθρῷ πυρὶ
περιβάλλουσα τὸ τοῦ ἄρσενος λευκὸν σπέρμα, ἀλλοτρίοις ἐρείσμασιν ὀστέων τὸ ἀσθενὲς
αὐτῆς συνίστησιν καὶ τῷ τῆς σαρκὸς προσκαίρῳ ἄνθει τέρπουσα καὶ βραχείαις ἡδοναῖς
τοῦ λογισμοῦ τὴν ἰσχὺν ὑποσυλῶσα τοὺς πλείονας εἰς μοιχείαν ἄγει καὶ οὕτως τοῦ
μέλλοντος καλοῦ στερίσκει νυμφίου.

This passage converts the act of coitus into a prophetological idiom. Peter roots
humankind’s propensity to both tell the truth and to lie in its dual heritage, a topic that he
will fully describe in the last chapter of the Homilies. He states that the False Prophetess
saps the “strength of reasoning” from humankind through the pleasure of conception and
sexual pleasure. Humans are therefore hard-wired to be incapable of ascertaining truth on
their own.
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In keeping with the Homilies’ focus on embryology as a mode of articulating
epistemology, this passage employs terms and concepts sources from ambient
embryological discourses on the uterine fluids. First, the “white-ness” of the male sperm
is contrasted with the “red fire” of the female blood. On the one hand, if interpreted
minimally, the invocation of these colors need not signify anything.284 On the other hand,
given the density of other embryological terms, we might be justified in reading these
chromatic descriptions of reproductive fluids as evoking embryological tropes regarding
the production of blood and semen. As we have already seen, the Homilies marks the
True Prophet’s logos as seminal fluid by drawing attention to its whiteness. This may
draw from parallel discussions where the whiteness of male sperm, at least according to
Aristotle, results from a concentration of pneuma, an ether-like substance akin to the
substance of the stars (De Generatione Animalium 737a1), which is compounded with
water to form a frothy substance (De Generatione Animalium 736a1-3, 13). Galen, for his
part, also seems to agree with Aristotle that the whiteness of masculine sperm is due to
the concentration of “vital pneuma” [τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ζωτικοῦ] (On Semen I.5.18), and
that its “whiteness” is crucial for its role as the substance from which arteries, veins, and
nerves are created (On Semen I.5.4, 12-17). From Galen’s perspective, then, the
“whiteness” of semen is not a mere cosmetic accident, but an essential characteristic of
masculine semen.
Second, after ejaculation, the blood of the female prophetess swallows up the white
sperm of the true prophet, through which the prophetess supports [συνίστησιν] the

There are interesting rabbinic parallels on the “color” of semen and blood. See Kessler, Conceiving
Israel, 106.
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“weakness of her bones.”285 Apparently, the false prophet’s skeletal frame requires
“foreign” contributions –presumably the male semen– in order to support her body. The
mechanics of this are far from clear, though it strongly resonates with Aristotelian claims
that the process of ossification requires the heat emitted by semen to cook, harden, and
dry the corporeal materials needed for creating bones (De Generatione Animalium
743a19-21). Galen, for his part, accepts Aristotle’s argument that bones are “cooked,” but
develops it in his own way. First, he argues that Aristotle’s broader claim that women are
constitutionally colder and wetter than men means that their seminal fluids are too cold
and wet to activate their generative potential (On Semen 2.4.23-30). This necessitates
contact with masculine semen, which, as it is hotter and drier than its feminine
counterpart, imparts the heat necessary to activate the generative powers of the female
seminal fluids (On Semen 2.4.31). Together, both the feminine and masculine semen turn
into veins, nerves, and arteries of the fetus. Nature then sucks out the “thicker” and “more
earthy” and “less ductile” parts of semen (On Semen 1.10.10), and cooks this seminal
detritus with internal heat until it hardens, thus “setting” the bones (On Semen 1.10.1416). Therefore, both Aristotle and Galen seem to posit that masculine semen – more
specifically, the heat emitted from the masculine semen, which is filled with hot pneuma
– is required for bones to set. The Homilies seems to draw on such discussions in its
claim that the masculine semen somehow “braces” the bones of the false prophetess,

Peck notes that the verb Συνιστάναι, Συνίστασθαι has an almost technical characteristic in Aristotle’s
corpus. He writes that it refers to the “beginning of the process” of generation, and that it “denotes the first
impact of Form upon Matter, the first step in the process of actualizing the potentiality of Matter.” See A.L.
Peck (trans.), Aristotle: Generation of Animals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943), lxi-lxii. The
verb does not have the same technical sense here; nevertheless, its employment here suggests that the
Homilies is gesturing towards this embryological background.
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despite the fact that it would have been more appropriate to signal the “white fire” of the
masculine semen rather than the “red fire” of the false prophetess’ menstrual blood.
Nevertheless, we should not expect identical parallels, in so far as the Homilies does not
demonstrate deep knowledge of Galenic embryology or physiognomy. Ultimately, the
passage above resonates with Aristotelian ideas regarding the structural inferiority of the
woman’s body and, in keeping with Galen, suggests that the female corporeal structure
requires the energizing power of semen to fully actualize the material potential of her
bones.
Finally, the passage describes the false prophetess as taking pleasure in the
“temporary bloom of flesh” and “secretly sapping the strength of reasoning” (Hom. 3.27).
Physicians and philosophers too discussed sexual pleasure as part of their broader
embryological conversations on the character and purpose of semen. Hippocrates argued
that women have less intense and a more prolonged experience of pleasure since they
discharge their semen slower than men.286 Aristotle too states that the extreme pleasure
that arises through sexual intercourse is a result of its “strong movements,” referring to
the act of coitus itself (De Generatione Animalium 723b34-35). According to Aristotle,
however, men differ from women in the cause for their pleasure; for men, pleasure comes
most powerfully from the expulsion of concentrated pneuma in their semen, which
women cannot have because they do not secrete semen (De Generatione Animalium
728a10-18).287 Furthermore, these thinkers agree that the act of coitus leaves the human
body debilitated. Hippocrates writes, for example, that semen is in fact the most potent
See I.M. Lonie, The Hippocratic Treatises “On Generation,” “On the Nature of the Child,” “Diseases
IV”: A Commentary (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1981), 119-21.
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distillation of the fluids secreted by each member of the body, citing as proof that “The
discharge of such a small quantity (of semen) in intercourse makes us weak” (On
Generation 1.1). Galen also states “So it is not at all surprising that those who are less
moderate sexually turn out to be weaker, since the whole body loses the purest part of
both substances; and there is besides an accession of pleasure, which by itself is enough
to dissolve the vital tone, so that before now some persons have died from excess of
pleasure” (On Semen 1.16.31). He notes with displeasure that “they,” presumably
Aristotelians, always ask why “sexual intercourse is especially debilitating” and states
that they cannot know the real answer since they are ignorant of the first principles. In so
doing, he hints that philosophers and physicians alike constructed serious accounts for the
debilitating effects of over vigorous sexual appetite as an important topic of their craft.
As we had already seen with the case of semen, the Homilies uses embryological
concepts as a way of articulating concepts related to epistemological certainty. It is no
less the case in the passage above, where Peter argues that the female prophetess dilutes
and saps the epistemological potency of the masculine sperm by offering in its stead
temporary carnal pleasures. As a result, “He who is born from both male and female at
times lies, and at other times, tells the truth” (Hom. 3.27). It follows that humans, then,
cannot discern truth on their own accord due to their mixed heritage. Peter later expands
on the epistemological consequences of humankind’s unique composition. Peter says,
Humans, therefore, He [God] created with free-will, and possessing the capability of
inclining toward whatever deeds he wishes. And his body consists of three parts because
it has its generation from the female, namely, lust, anger, and grief, and those things that
follow from these three. But the spirit (which does not have three sources of origination,
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but merely consists of three parts) has its generation from the male. And it is capable of
reasoning, knowledge, and fear, and those things that follow these three. And each of
these triads has one root, so that a human is a compound of two mixtures, the female and
the male. Therefore, two paths have been laid before him – one lawful and the other
unlawful, along with two kingdoms, one called the kingdom of heaven and the other the
kingdom of those who currently rule over the earth (Hom. 20.2).
τὸν οὖν ἄνθρωπον αὐτεξούσιον ἐποίησεν, ἐπιτηδειότητα ἔχοντα νεύειν πρὸς ἃς βούλεται
πράξεις. καὶ τὸ μὲν σῶμα αὐτοῦ ἐστι τριμερές, ἐκ θηλείας ἔχον τὴν γένεσιν· ἔχει γὰρ
ἐπιθυμίαν, ὀργήν, λύπην καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἑπόμενα—τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα (καὶ αὐτὸ οὐ τριτογενὲς
ὄν, ἀλλὰ τριμερές) ἐκ τοῦ ἄρρενος ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν καὶ δεκτικόν ἐστι λογισμοῦ,
γνώσεως, φόβου καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἑπομένων. ἑκατέρα δὲ τῶν τριάδων μίαν ἔχει τὴν ῥίζαν,
ὡς εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ φυραμάτων δύο, θηλείας τε καὶ ἄρρενος. διὸ δὴ καὶ δύο αὐτῷ
ὁδοὶ προετέθησαν, νόμου τε καὶ ἀνομίας—δύο τε βασιλεῖαι ὡρίσθησαν, <ἡ μὲν τῶν>
οὐρανῶν λεγομένη, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς νῦν βασιλευόντων.

According to Peter, humankind’s unique ability to exercise free-will results from their
particular corporeal and pneumatic composition.288 From the female, they receive their
corporeal frame, as well as those emotions associated with carnality, “lust [ἐπιθυμίαν],
anger, and grief.” From the male, they receive their spirit, which furnishes humans with
reasoning [λογισμοῦ], knowledge, and “fear.” Such an arrangement is necessary if
humans are to have free-will, since one can only possess “free-will” if they have (at least)
two options available to them. Not surprisingly, even here, the human body and spirit are
characterized through embryological terminologies, e.g., “parts” [τριμερές]. In any case,
Peter’s exposition on human composition in turn helps us understand what he meant
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when he said that “pleasure” saps the “strength of reasoning [τοῦ λογισμοῦ τὴν ἰσχὺν].”
The female root, which ties the human body to the uterine fluids of the false prophetess,
infects and saps the ability of the masculine spirit within each person to reason properly.
Enargeia, Noetic Insemination, and anti-Paulinism

I have argued above that the Homilies deploys embryological terminology and concepts
to articulate an epistemological system that necessitates the need for a True Prophet as an
arbiter of truth. Within this framework, “words” are the products or expressions of
seminal discharge – either in its pure masculine form as logos or in its bastard form as
utterances, which arise from the illicit commingling of masculine and feminine seminal
fluids. Furthermore, these “words” qua seminal fluids “impregnate” the soul of the
person. Building on these observations, in this section, I first demonstrate how this
seminal understanding of words undergirds the Homilies’ privileging of “vivid
perceptibility” (ἐνάργεια), which is further nuanced as the oral and aural encounter
between two truly existent being, over visionary experiences of the divine. In short,
ἐνάργεια stands in contrast to visual means of receiving revelatory information,
something the Homilies characterizes as beset with epistemological uncertainty and
related to the demonic. Strikingly, the Homilies’ critique of visionary apperception strikes
at the very basis of Pauline Christianity, as other scholars have convincingly
demonstrated.289 Unlike those scholars, who seek to situate the Homilies’ anti-Pauline
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sentiments among “Jewish Christian” communities back to the “Basic Source” in the
early third century, I argue that the Homilies, as a late fourth century text, participates in
a broader Syrian discourse on prophethood, made recently urgent by the diffusion of
Manichaeism, a neo-Pauline form of Christianity based on the prophetic status and
visionary revelations of its putative “founder,” Mani.
The Homilies first broaches the idea of orality and aurality as the privileged means of
transmitting knowledge early in the text, right after Clement’s first meeting with Peter.
Clement says,
And at the same time, he put me to rest by expounding to me who he [the True Prophet
Jesus] is, and how he is found, and holding him forth to me as truly discoverable, and
demonstrated that the truth is more manifest to the ear by homilies concerning the
prophet than things that are seen with the eye, so that I was astonished and wondered that
no one sees those things which are sought after by all, though they lie before him (Hom.
1.20).
καὶ ὁμῶς ἀνέπαυσέν με, ἐκθέμενός μοι τίς ἐστιν καὶ πῶς εὑρίσκεται, καὶ ἀληθῶς εὑρετόν
μοι παρασχὼν αὐτόν, τῶν παρὰ ὀφθαλμοῖς ὁρωμένων ἐμφανεστέραν τῆς <περὶ> τοῦ
προφήτου ὁμιλίας τοῖς ὠσὶν δείξας τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὡς ἐκπλαγέντα με θαυμάζειν πῶς τῶν
πᾶσι ζητουμένων ἔμπροσθεν κειμένων οὐδεὶς ἐνορᾷ.

Clement notes, perhaps not without a bit of irony, that no one “sees” [ἐνορᾷ] those things
that are laid out before them, precisely because they believe that truth is “more manifest”
by “things seen with the eyes” rather than through conversations regarding the prophet.
Supernatural Religion (2 vols.; London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1874), 33-37; J. Bourgel, “The
Holders of the ‘Word of Truth’: The Pharisees in Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions 1.27-71,” JECS 25.2.
(2017): 171-200, 185-88. Annette Yoshiko Reed pivots the discussion from a focus on Paul to broader
questions of secrecy and transmission in, “Secrecy, Suppression, and the Jewishness of the Origins of
Christianity,” in Jewish-Christianity and the History of Judaism (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, forthcoming).
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As such, this passage is not about the True Prophet himself or his teachings, but centers
squarely on the superior manner in which Peter presented the true prophet Jesus, that is,
through “homilies.” Within the narrow context of this chapter, this passage legitimizes
the Homilies as the inscribed words uttered by Peter himself. Clement writes that he had
been ordered by Peter to write Peter’s homilies and to dispatch the volume to an
unknown “you” (Hom. 1.20). At the same time, the importance of the oral-aural
encounter as the sole legitimate means of truth is soon transformed into a major point of
contention between Peter and Simon Magus, who insists on the priority of visionary
experience for furnishing sure knowledge. In fact, the passages above already hints in
that direction, since it is not clear why Clement valorizes the “oral-aural” encounter at the
expense of visual means of perceiving the truth. There had been no discussion regarding
the visual means of perceiving truth up to that point, which makes its appearance here
suspicious. In my view, the creator of this passage presages the debate between Paul and
Peter in Hom. 17.13-19, where the debate between aural-orality and visions will be on
full display.
Before turning to that debate, however, we need to explore briefly one of its most
important facets, namely, its explicit anti-Paulinism. As scholars have already noted,
Hom. 17 casts Simon in Pauline form; he masquerades as an “Apostle of Jesus Christ,” he
is characterized as Peter’s enemy, and he relies on visions of Jesus Christ as a mode of
legitimizing his own station.290 Surprisingly, however, the most vociferous anti-Pauline
statements are not found in the Homilies itself but in the Epistle of Peter to James, whose
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function is to “frame, authorize, and introduce” the Homilies.291 For our purposes, the
differences between the two proves instrumental in thinking again about how the
Homilies conceptualizes orality-aurality and visuality as mediums for revelatory
knowledge. As in the Homilies, Peter in the Epistle hones in on the difficulties of
attaining sure knowledge. This is best expressed in Peter’s characterization of “his
enemy,” Paul, as perverting the message of the Gospel among the Gentiles. He says,
For some among the peoples have rejected my preaching concern the law and instead
attach themselves to the certain lawless and foolish teachings of the man who is my
enemy. And they even attempt such things while I am present, transforming my words
through various interpretations with the aim of dissolving the law, as if I myself thought
as they did, only that I did not proclaim it frankly. God forbid! For such oppose the law
of God uttered by Moses, and our Lord bore witness to its eternal applicability. Thus, he
said, “The heavens and the earth shall pass away, but not one jot or tittle shall pass from
the Law.” And this he said so “that all things might come to pass.” But these men profess
to know my mind, though I do not know how, and attempt to interpret those words which
they have heard from me, more intelligently than I who spoke them, telling their
catechumens that that which I had never pondered was, in fact, the meaning in my mind.
But if, while I am still present, they dare to spin lies concerning such things, how much
more will those who come after me dare to do so (Epistle 2)!
τινὲς γὰρ τῶν ἀπὸ ἐθνῶν τὸ δι’ ἐμοῦ νόμιμον ἀπεδοκίμασαν κήρυγμα, τοῦ ἐχθροῦ
ἀνθρώπου ἄνομόν τινα καὶ φλυαρώδη προσηκάμενοι διδασκαλίαν. καὶ ταῦτα ἔτι μου
περιόντος

ἐπεχείρησάν

τινες

ποικίλαις

τισὶν

ἑρμηνείαις

τοὺς

ἐμοὺς

λόγους

μετασχηματίζειν εἰς τὴν τοῦ νόμου κατάλυσιν, ὡς καὶ ἐμοῦ αὐτοῦ οὕτω μὲν φρονοῦντος,
μὴ ἐκ παρρησίας δὲ κηρύσσοντος. ὅπερ ἀπείη. τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτο ἀντιπράσσειν ἐστὶ τῷ τοῦ
See Reed, “Secrecy.” I echo Reed’s skepticism to the claim that the Epistle was meant to introduce the
third-century Basic Source.
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θεοῦ νόμῳ τῷ διὰ Μωυσέως ῥηθέντι καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν μαρτυρηθέντι περὶ τῆς
ἀιδίου αὐτοῦ διαμονῆς. ἐπεὶ οὕτως εἶπεν· «Ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ παρελεύσονται, ἰῶτα ἓν ἢ
μία κεραία οὐ μὴ παρέλθῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου». τοῦτο δὲ εἴρηκεν, «ἵνα τὰ πάντα γίνηται». οἱ
δὲ οὐκ οἶδα πῶς τὸν ἐμὸν νοῦν ἐπαγγελλόμενοι, οὓς ἤκουσαν ἐξ ἐμοῦ λόγους, ἐμοῦ τοῦ
εἰπόντος αὐτοὺς φρονιμώτερον ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἑρμηνεύειν, λέγοντες τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν
κατηχουμένοις τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἐμὸν φρόνημα, ὃ ἐγὼ οὐδὲ ἐνεθυμήθην. εἰ δὲ ἐμοῦ ἔτι
περιόντος τοιαῦτα τολμῶσιν καταψεύδεσθαι, πόσῳ γε μᾶλλον μετ’ ἐμὲ ποιεῖν οἱ μετ’ ἐμὲ
τολμήσουσιν;

Peter calls Paul “his enemy” and his followers masters of the interpretative spin. In so
doing, he highlights the dangers of interpretation, a theme he expands on in the
Homilies.292 More specifically, Peter accuses Paul of feigning to know what Peter truly
meant and of interpreting his words in an overly intellectual manner. In so doing, he
draws attention to the ungrounded nature of “meaning” and the ease with which it is
hijacked for ulterior purposes. As a way of preventing such outcomes, which Peter wisely
foresees as only getting worse, Peter recommends rigorous screening before transmitting
the Homilies to other parties.293
Paul stands guilty of interpreting that which needed no interpretation and of
pretending to know the mind of Peter. Nevertheless, the Letter does not present a rigorous
epistemological apology for how one might apprehend truth. What remains rather
inchoate in the Letter, however, Peter expands in the Homilies. Here, the debate centers
squarely on how one can better apprehend truth. Here, Peter argues against Paul-Simon,
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who claims that visionary experience of the divine present a stronger basis for the
acquisition of truth than through oral-aural exchange. Simon says,
Someone who listens “in a vivid manner” is not fully convinced by that which is said, for
his mind has to consider whether the speaker is lying since the speaker appears as a
human being. But a vision not merely presents an object to view, but furnishes faith in the
one who sees that that which is seen is divine (Hom. 17.13).
ὁ ἐναργῶς ἀκούων τινὸς οὐ πάνυ πληροφορεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις. ἔχει γὰρ ὁ νοῦς
αὐτοῦ λογίσασθαι μὴ ἄρα ψεύδεται ἄνθρωπος ὢν τὸ φαινόμενον. ἡ δὲ ὀπτασία ἅμα τῷ
ὀφθῆναι πίστιν παρέχει τῷ ὁρῶντι ὅτι θειότης ἐστίν.

Simon argues that one can trust apparitions and visions because they do not appear as
mere humans, but as divine. He thus shows his hand and the source of his false teachings:
visionary experiences of the divine. Not surprisingly, Peter calls Simon’s gospel as the
work of a deceiver and a false prophet. He says, “And thus, as the true Prophet told us, a
false prophet must first come from some deceiver; and then, in like manner, after the
removal of the holy place, the true Gospel must be secretly sent abroad for the
rectification of the heresies that shall be” (Hom. 2.17). Despite the initial spread of the
false gospel, spread here by Paul-Simon, the true gospel, as propagated by Peter in a
“secret” manner, will come to extinguish the “heresies” that inevitably spring from Paul’s
gospel.
Peter’s riposte to Simon’s unexamined reliance on visionary phenomena strikes at
the heart of Simon’s argument: if one merely relies on apparitions, visions, dreams, and
the like, then one does not have the opportunity to cross-examine the spirit to verify its
identity. These apparitions may be nothing more than demons and or deceptive spirits
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masquerading as divine beings. Thus, Peter argues that apparitions do not stay around
long enough to answer questions, but instead they “gleam forth like an evil one, and
remaining as long as he likes, he is at length extinguished, not remaining with the
questioner so long as he wished to do for the purpose of consulting him” (Hom. 17.14).294
Dreams too are unreliable in so far as one is unable to think discursively when sleeping,
and hence they could not cross-examine apparitions who appear in dreams. Such would
be the case even with “God-sent” dreams since there would be no way of distinguishing
between “normal” dreams and divine dreams. Furthermore, human eyes – as globs of
flesh – cannot bear the sight of God or his son, the True Prophet, since the light that emits
from them would dissolve human flesh. Therefore, the apparition that appeared to SimonPaul could only have been a demon.
Instead, Peter argues, true revelatory knowledge does not come through visions or
dreams, but through the discourses of the True Prophet who reveals knowledge already
implanted in the human soul. According to Peter, revelation emerged within a pious
person “by gushing forth [ἀναβλύζει] to the innate and pure mind [τῷ νῷ], not worked up
through dreams, but granted to good people through their intelligence” (Hom. 17.17). As
an example, Peter recounts his own experience of revelatory knowledge. When Jesus asks
his disciples what others say about him, Peter states, “It came into my heart to say,
though I do not know how, ‘You are the Son of the Living God.’” From this, Peter
concludes,
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I learned that revelation is learning that is untaught, without vision nor dreams. For this is
truly the case. For entirety of Truth is…. placed in us from God “spermatically,” but it is
covered and revealed by the hand of God, according to the merit of the knowledge
operating within each person (Hom. 17.18).
ἐμὲ δὲ ἔκτοτε μαθεῖν ὅτι τὸ ἀδιδάκτως, ἄνευ ὀπτασίας καὶ ὀνείρων, μαθεῖν ἀποκάλυψίς
ἐστιν. καὶ ἀληθῶς οὕτως ἔχει. ἐν γὰρ τῇ ἐν ἡμῖν ἐκ θεοῦ τεθείσῃ σπερματικῶς ... πᾶσα
ἔνεστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια, θεοῦ δὲ χειρὶ σκέπεται καὶ ἀποκαλύπτεται, τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος τὸ κατ’
ἀξίαν ἑκάστου εἰδότος.

Though the meaning of the term σπερματικῶς is not entirely clear, it clearly evokes the
embryological-epistemological nexus discussed above. The passage depicts God
implanting the “entire truth” within humans as an act of noetic insemination. This may
refer to the idea discussed above in which “every person is a bride” when they are
inseminated by the “white logos” of the True Prophet. One might even speculate that the
verb “gushing forth” [ἀναβλύζει] to describe how Peter gained revelatory knowledge is
meant to evoke the idea of seminal ejaculation. More importantly, the passage
demonstrates that the Homilies’ broader embryological and prophetological apparatus
undergirds Peter’s argument against Paul. Peter’s characterization of “words” as “seminal
fluids” and his insistence here on the priority of discourse come to a head in his argument
against Pauline forms of Christianity.
The Homilies’ most stringently anti-Pauline statement follows the passage above. As
Peter says, Jesus only appears to people as an apparition if he is angry with them.
If our Jesus made himself known to you by appearing in a vision and discoursed with
you, it was as one who enraged with an opponent. And this is the reason why he spoke
through visions and dreams, or through revelations from without. But can anyone become
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fit for teaching through visions? And if you say, it is possible, then why did our teacher
abide and discourse a whole year to those who were awake (Hom. 17.19)?
εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ σοὶ ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἡμῶν δι’ ὁράματος ὀφθεὶς ἐγνώσθη καὶ ὡμίλησεν ὡς
ἀντικειμένῳ ὀργιζόμενος, διὸ δι’ ὁραμάτων καὶ ἐνυπνίων ἢ καὶ δι’ ἀποκαλύψεων ἔξωθεν
οὐσῶν ἐλάλησεν. εἴ τις δὲ δι’ ὀπτασίαν πρὸς διδασκαλίαν σοφισθῆναι δύναται; καὶ εἰ μὲν
ἐρεῖς· Δυνατόν ἐστιν, διὰ τί ὅλῳ ἐνιαυτῷ ἐγρηγορόσιν παραμένων ὡμίλησεν ὁ
διδάσκαλος;

This passage polemicizes against Paul’s claim to be an Apostle of Jesus Christ by
arguing that visions do not make one an apostle. This refutes Paul’s statement in 1 Cor.
15:8, where he wrote “And last among all [the rest of the apostles], He [Jesus] appeared
to me, as to one untimely born.” Coupled with the Homilies’ claim that a false gospel
must first be spread among the Gentiles before the true one is promulgated, and the fact
that Simon Magus opposes Peter just as Paul confronted Peter in Antioch in Galatians
2.11, as well as the stringent anti-Pauline sentiment in the Letter, there is little doubt that
the Simon Magus of chapter 17 is none other than the Apostle Paul.
Do such vigorously anti-Pauline passages merely channel earlier anti-Pauline
sentiment? Most scholars have attempted to assess the historicity of the Homilies’ antiPauline statements and concluded that such statements reflect an ancient “Jewish
Christian” theologoumenon, dating at least to the time of “Basic Source” in the early third
century.295 However one understands the ancient roots of the Homilies’ anti-Paulinism,
the fact remains that the Homilies is an early fourth-century text and reflect the concerns
of a community from that time and place; the processes of redaction, expansion, and
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excision so visible to twentieth-century source scholars bear witness to the heavy-handed
editorial practices and attendant processes of interpretation and meaning-making that
went into the production of the Homilies. In other words, scholars must contextualize the
Homilies’ anti-Paulinism not only in its (possible) earlier contexts, but also within an
early fourth century, Syrian context. Seen from this vantage point, Simon Magus operates
as a sort of baggy symbol for all “Christianities” aligned with the figure of Paul. 296 After
all, Peter attributes the emergence of future heresies to Paul’s false gospel. If so, the
Homilies’ understanding of “Pauline” Christianity must be capacious enough to include
not only the “Orthodox” or “Proto-orthodox” Church, which sought to forge a unified if
not irenic apostolic past, but also its opponents who also championed Paul as their
touchstone to Christianity, including Marcionites297 and, I argue here, Manichaeans.
Though I have already discussed the figure of Paul in Mani’s self-presentation in
the previous chapters, it is worthwhile to expand on the more relevant sections here. Even
prior to the discovery of the CMC, scholars of Manichaeism had known about the
distinctly Pauline locutions that Mani adopted for himself, namely, an “Apostle of Jesus
Christ.”298 Yet the CMC demonstrates that Mani’s appropriation of Paul went beyond
mere locutions; it frames his journeys throughout the Sasanian Empire as missions to the
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“Gentiles,” in conscious imitation of Paul’s self-proclaimed status as the “Apostle to the
Gentiles.” For example, Mani’s Divine Twin declares to Mani,
You are not only sent out into this sect (εἰς τοῦτο μόνον τὸ δόγμα), but to every People
(ἔθνος) and Teaching (διδασκαλίαν) and into every city (πᾶσαν πόλιν) and place (τόπον),
the Hope will be made clear and declared through you in every region (πάντα κλίματα)
and section of the cosmos (περιοχὰς τοῦ κόσμου) (CMC 104.12-22).

This echoes Paul’s announcement in the book of Acts that he will no longer preach to the
Jews on account of their unworthiness but to the Gentiles [εἰς τὰ ἔθνη] (Acts 13:46) as
well as the claims made by Mani’s opponents that “He (Mani) wants to go to the Gentiles
and eat Greek bread” (CMC 87.18-24). Nevertheless, the creators of the CMC may even
be trying to present Mani as superior to Paul, in so far as Mani is called not only to a
certain ethnos, but to spread his teaching in each city, place, region, and section of the
cosmos!
The CMC and the Clementine complex also share a somewhat similar understanding
of Paul as a “nullifier of laws,” differing only in their evaluation of this image. As Betz
says, “In general, the Baptists are classified under νόμος just like Paul does with his
opponents in Galatians.”299 As we have seen, the Epistle of Peter to James called Paul his
“enemy” who spouted nonsense that Peter had declared the Jewish law null and void. The
Homilies expanded this idea by saying that Paul could not have possibly known Jesus’
minds because he had only encountered “Jesus” as an apparition, and not in a face-to-face
conversation. Thus, for the Clementines, Paul is an anti-Law, false prophet. In contrast,
the CMC’s positive depiction of Mani as “overturning” the Law of the Baptists
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appropriates and valorizes the image of Paul as a destroyer of false laws. The Baptists
accuse Mani of “disturbing” their “Law” on multiple occasions, and just as Peter in the
Letter calls Paul his “enemy” for his lawless preaching, the Baptists call Mani the
“enemy of our Law” (CMC 87.16-18). Mani, for his part, accepts that he is “destroying
their arguments and mysteries” but denies that he is destroying the “commandments of
the Savior,” which is the true law that the Baptists had once followed.
Finally, in contrast to the Homilies’ vigorous argument against the role of “visions”
as a means of securing apostolic legitimacy, the CMC consistently relies on visions to
legitimize Mani as an “Apostle of Jesus Christ,” again, in imitation of Paul. Indeed, Mani
describes his youth as one punctuated by a series of visions. He says, “… and they [the
angels] nourished me with visions and signs [δι’ ὀπτασιαν καὶ σημείων] which they made
known to me, slight and quite brief, as far as I was able to bear... Now very many are the
visions [Πλεῖσται... ὀπτασίαι] and exceedingly great are the sights [τὰ θεάματα] he
showed me during that time of my youth” (CMC 3.8-12, 4.7-12). These visions
culminated in the appearance of Mani’s “Divine Twin,” who revealed to him the deep
secrets of the cosmos, its purpose, origins, and the “secrets and visions [τὰ ἀπόρρητα καὶ
τὰ θεάματα] and the perfections of my Father” (CMC 23.1-2). In his Gospel, Mani writes,
“These things which he revealed, I have shown to those who live from the truest vision,
which I have beheld, and the most glorious revelation revealed to me” (CMC 67.24-68.5).
As we saw in the previous chapter with the examples of the Kephalaias, the importance
of visions in legitimizing the prophethood of Mani continued unabated into the Roman
territories. Baraies’ homily too demonstrated the important role that revelatory visions
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played in legitimizing the prophethood of Mani. It is no coincidence that he links Mani
into a “chain of prophets” that frames Paul as Mani’s immediate predecessor.
To sum up, early Manichaean texts present Mani as a Pauline figure and relies
heavily on his visions to legitimize his status as prophet. The presence of Manichaeans in
Syria can be securely attested within Mani’s lifetime, as evidenced by his letter to Edessa,
where the Homilies may have been written. In contrast, the Homilies attacks a Pauline
figure as a false prophet by undermining the reliability of visions as a means of acquiring
revelatory information. Given the regional and temporal overlap with the spread of
Manichaeism and the publication of the Homilies, as well as the specificity with which
the Homilies attacks Paul as a visionary false prophet, I argue that the Homilies responds
to Mani’s self-identification as a prophet in the image of Paul. The Homilies construct a
counter-prophetology that appropriates late antique embryological discourses to articulate
a robust revelatory system based on the oral-aural encounter.
The Homilies and Counter-Prophetologies

In this section, I turn to another key passage that fits within the larger pattern of late
antique Syrian “prophetologies” – Hom. 3.20. Scholars of Manichaeism, early Islam, and
“Gnosticism” are drawn to this passage’s striking description of a Prophet “impregnated
by God” who “changes his form together with his names.”300 Nevertheless, they have
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tended to read it in isolation from the rest of the corpus. Indeed, scholars often read this
passage as preserving an early third-century Jewish-Christian prophetological core, rather
than reading it within its early fourth century context.301 Not surprisingly, a strong
impulse towards harmonization dominates this line of research. This harmonized “Jewish
Christian” prophetology is a scholarly construct and ultimately fails to adequately engage
with its particularities. Partially as a result of this harmonizing trend, scholars have
neglected to engage this passage within the broader Homilies corpus and its fourth
century Syrian context. In contrast, I argue that this passage presents less evidence for the
essential harmony of Jewish Christian concepts of prophethood, but more for the
emergence of “prophethood” as a contested subject of discourse. Indeed, when one reads
Hom. 3.20 alongside the rest of the Homilies, this passage surgically rejects the
“incarnational” model of prophetology found among Manichaeans and Elchasaites. It
does so first by denying the possibility that a person born by normal human means could
be a True Prophet, and second, by stating that the Spirit of Christ could only ever subsist
within a single person, rather than in multiple individuals pace Manichaeism.
Let us first turn to the passage itself. Here, Peter says,
Allow me to return to the initial discourse of truth. If someone does not allow the man
who had been impregnated through the hands of God to have the holy spirit of Christ,
how would he not be guilty of the greatest impiety if he allows another one born from a
stinking drop to have it? But he would act most piously should he say that he [Adam]
Apocalypse of the Alien God: Platonism and the Exile of Sethian Gnosticism (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 154-59.
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alone has the holy spirit of Christ, who from the beginning of this eon, changing his
forms together with his names, traversed the [present] eon until he reached his own times,
and having been anointed by God for his toils, God showed him mercy so that he might
enjoy eternal rest. It is his honor to rule over everything in the air, earth, and water. He
received the breath of that one who had created man, that is, the indescribable garment of
the soul, so that he might be immortal (Hom. 3.20).
Πλὴν ἐπὶ τὸν πρῶτον τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπάνειμι λόγον. ἐὰν τῷ ὑπὸ χειρῶν θεοῦ
κυοφορηθέντι ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἅγιον Χριστοῦ μὴ δῷ τις ἔχειν πνεῦμα, πῶς ἑτέρῳ τινὶ ἐκ
μυσαρᾶς σταγόνος γεγενημένῳ διδοὺς ἔχειν οὐ τὰ μέγιστα ἀσεβεῖ; τὰ δὲ μέγιστα εὐσεβεῖ,
ἐὰν ἑτέρῳ μὲν μὴ δῷ ἔχειν, ἐκεῖνον δὲ μόνον ἔχειν λέγῃ ὃς ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς αἰῶνος ἅμα τοῖς
ὀνόμασιν μορφὰς ἀλλάσσων τὸν αἰῶνα τρέχει μέχρις ὅτε ἰδίων χρόνων τυχών, διὰ τοὺς
καμάτους θεοῦ ἐλέει χρισθείς, εἰς ἀεὶ ἕξει τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν. οὗτος ἄρχειν τε καὶ κυριεύειν
πάντων τῶν ἐν ἀέρι καὶ γῇ καὶ ὕδασιν τετίμηται· πρὸς τούτοις δὲ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πεποιηκότος
τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὴν πνοὴν ἔσχεν, ψυχῆς ἄρρηκτον περιβολήν, ὅπως ἀθάνατος εἶναι
δυνηθῇ.

What does it mean the true Prophet is one “impregnated by the hands of God,” in contrast
to one who was born from a “stinking drop” and how does this relate to his “changing
forms?” The Homilies is quite clear that the one “impregnated by the hands of God” is
none other than Adam, the first man.302 Therefore, according to this passage, Jesus is
Adam, just in a different form and with a different name. In fact, the Homilies uses the
phrase “one impregnated by the hands of God” and contrasts it with “another born from a
stinking drop” a few chapters earlier, where Peter says, “Since God made all things, how
would one not err greatly if they do not a man who had been impregnated by his [God’s]
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hands to possess his great and holy spirit of foreknowledge, and yet attribute it to another
born from a stinking drop” (Hom. 3.17)? There, he uses this locution to argue that AdamJesus always had the spirit of God coursing within him and that this must be the case,
since the alternative – that Adam-Jesus only sometimes had the Spirit of God – would
make it impossible to know for certain whether he was the True Prophet or not. Taken
together, these passages articulate a rather simple prophetological concept: Adam-Jesus is
the one true Prophet, who was begotten through divine means and not through normal
modes of reproduction, and who always possess the divine spirit of foreknowledge, the
spirit of Christ. As Adam, the True Prophet traversed this eon and appeared to his
disciples under the name of Jesus, and following his crucifixion, he was granted eternal
rest.
This does not answer, however, what “changing forms and names” has to do with
his status as True Prophet. Without due methodological caution, scholars have generally
understood this phrase to refer to the idea that the Spirit of Christ “incarnated” into many
different bodies, as found in the Book of Elchasai and in Manichaean writings. In contrast
to such decontextualized readings of this passage, I argue that Peter’s rather cryptic
utterance that the True Prophet changes “forms” hints at an idea he will explain only fully
in the conclusion of the Homilies, namely, that the True Prophet’s ability to change forms
means that he is truly and uniquely “begotten of God,” and thus, the Son of God. This
reading of the passage fits securely within the third homily as a whole, which, as we saw,
is pregnant with embryological terminologies.
The Pseudo-Clementine Homilies discusses and employs “form” in many different
ways. At times, it serves a narratological purpose. In the conclusion of the Homilies, for
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example, Simon Magus magically exchanges the form of Clement’s father Faustus for his
own. Though his family recoils in disgust, the representative of the True Prophet, Peter,
uses this to his own advantage and sends Faustus/Simon to Antioch, where he delivers a
speech denouncing everything that the real Simon Magus had done. At other times, the
Homilies discusses the mutability of form as an indication of one’s status as an immortal
being. In one instance, Peter discusses how demons “exploit the shape [τῇ μορφῇ
ἀπεχρήσατο]” of the idols (Hom. 9.15), and thereby deceive gullible worshippers into
thinking that these idols are truly gods. Likewise, angels are able to transform into
precious jewels, stones, and the like, on account of their “more-divine substance” (Hom.
8.12). God too is said to have the most beautiful “form,” replete with eyes, heart, hands,
and other limbs, which he stamped upon the human body and soul (Hom. 17.7). If
someone should sin, that divine spirit leaves the body, which ultimately leads to death
and the dissipation of the divine form on the human body through decomposition (Hom.
16.19). This parallelization of divine substance and the mutability of form proves crucial
for our understanding of the Hom. 3.20, in so far as it already hints that the True Prophet
is of “divine substance” himself and thus capable of “changing forms.”
We gain further insight into the nature of the True Prophet when we turn to the
final chapter of the Homilies. In a series of densely argued passages, Peter gratifies his
disciples by clearly expounding on the origins of the false prophetess, who is also the
devil. He stresses that the body of the devil emerged under God’s command through a
combination of the four primary elements, and in that sense, God is the creator of the
devil. The devil’s evil disposition, however, arose as result of its particular somatic
composition and arrangement of these four elements. Indeed, Peter states that the devil
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could potentially become good if his composite elements were rearranged! Therefore,
though God is the source of all substances, and the creator of all things, he was not the
“cause” of evil itself.
Peter’s emphasis on the “external” creation of the devil through the arrangement
of the four elements sets the stage for his explanation on how God “begets.” This
conversation begins with a question by a certain Sophonias, who argues that humans
“beget” children who are different in disposition from them because the human body is
subject to alteration. God, Sophonias says, is not subject to the same sort of alterations as
humans, therefore God cannot beget something that is different from him in substance
and disposition. Sophonias thus implies that God could not have produced the devil, who
is of a different substance and disposition. Peter accepts Sophonias’ description of human
changeability, yet disagrees with his assessment of God’s mutability. He states,
Therefore, since men do not have bodies that are “turnable,” they are not turned. Instead,
they have a nature that allows alteration through time through the seasons. But this is not
the case with God, for through his innate pneuma he becomes whatever body he likes,
through a power that admits no explanation (Hom. 20.6).
αὐτίκα γοῦν οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐκ ἔχοντες τὰ σώματα τρεπτὰ οὐ τρέπονται, ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ ὑπὸ
τῶν τροπῶν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι φύσιν ἔχουσιν. ὁ δὲ θεὸς οὐχ οὕτως· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ ἐμφύτου
πνεύματος αὐτοῦ ἀπορρήτῳ δυνάμει ὁποῖον ἂν βούληται, γίνεται τὸ σῶμα.

Peter prefers to use the verb “to turn” [τρέπονται] both here and throughout, to mark the
change from one substance and form to another. He differentiates it from the verb “being
changed [ἀλλοιοῦσθαι],” which carries an idea of being subject to change. The question
that animates the following passages centers on the former idea of “turning” rather than
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“changing.” Thus, Peter cites a number of passages from Scripture that describe instances
of such God-induced “turning”: God turned Moses’ rod into a snake, the Nile into blood,
the dust-made human into flesh, Moses into light. Thus, Peter argues, if God could turn
the substance and form of such things into something else, then he must have the power
to also “turn” himself! Strikingly, he attributes this power to the “innate pneuma,” which
is none other than the same “spirit of foreknowledge” that the True Prophet always
possesses.
Peter then focuses specifically on the case of divine beings, whom Sophonias
implied are not subject to somatic alteration. Here, Peter distinguishes between mortal
human beings – who must grow old and eventually die according to their nature – and
immortal beings. As in the previous case, Peter cites passages from scripture that
demonstrate that immortal beings have the power to change the substance of their bodies.
Therefore, Peter argues, their bodies are capable of transmuting their essence and
changing their form into other things. Again, Peter argues, if these angels are capable of
transforming their own bodies, then how much more would God himself who gave that
power, have that power! It is in this context that Peter discusses the nature of the True
Prophet. He says,
Therefore, how much more is the power of God capable of turning the substance of the
body into whatever he wishes, whenever he wishes! And he sends forth, through a
present “turn,” something of the same substance, though it is not equal in power. The one
who sent forth is capable of being “turned” again into a different substance, but the one
who is sent forth as a result of this turn is not capable of becoming something else, since
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he is a child, without the consent of the one who sent forth, unless he desires it (Hom.
20.7).
ὅθεν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ δύναμις ὅτε θέλει τοῦ σώματος τὴν οὐσίαν εἰς ὃ θέλει
μετατρέπει, καὶ ὁμοούσιον τῇ παρούσῃ τροπῇ προβάλλει, ἰσοδύναμον δὲ οὔ. ὅτι ὁ μὲν
προβάλλων καὶ εἰς ἑτέραν πάλιν οὐσίαν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ τραπέντος δύναται, ὁ δὲ προβληθεὶς
τῆς ἐξ ἐκείνου τροπῆς τε καὶ τέκνον ὑπάρχων ἄνευ τοῦ προβαλόντος βουλῆς ἄλλο τι
γενέσθαι οὐ δύναται, εἰ μὴ ἐκεῖνος θέλει.

Though the passage is a bit corrupt, the meaning is clear. The one who sends forth and
the one who is sent forth, the begetter and the begotten, are united in substance but
differing in power. The child, an obvious reference to Jesus (=the True Prophet), is
unable to change his form and essence without his father’s consent. To be clear, the
substance of the True Prophet allows for “turning,” since it is of the same substance. It is
only because he is weaker and a child that he is unable to metamorphize at will. Finally,
as if we were not absolutely clear on the identity of the True Prophet, Peter says,
But the Good One having been begotten from the most beautiful turn of God, and not as
one emerging accidentally through an external mixture, is truly His Son. Yet such things
are unwritten, and since we believe them only by conjecture, let it not be trusted as
absolutely certain (Hom. 20.8).
ὁ δὲ ἀγαθὸς ἐκ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ καλλίστης τροπῆς γεννηθεὶς καὶ οὐκ ἔξω κράσει
συμβεβηκὼς τῷ ὄντι υἱός ἐστι. πλὴν ἐπεὶ ταῦτα ἄγραφα τυγχάνει καὶ στοχασμοῖς
πεπιστωμένα, μὴ πάντως ἡ <ἀλήθεια> οὕτως ἔχειν βεβαιούσθω.

This series of passages illustrates the True Prophet’s unique relationship to God as
the “child” of God by drawing attention to the mutability of his body. As we saw, God
“turns” his body through the mysterious power of his “innate pneuma,” and through “this
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most beautiful turn,” he “begets” the True Prophet. Nevertheless, the Prophet’s unique
status as a “child” renders him less powerful than God and subservient to God’s will.
After all, though his body allows for “turning,” since it sourced directly from the divine
essence, he cannot manipulate his body without the consent of parent.
What does this ultimately mean for our reading of Hom. 3.20? Above all, the
passage’s description of the True Prophet as “changing forms” hints at his true identity as
the Son of God. This jives well with the initial contrast between the one “impregnated by
the hands of God” and the one from a “stinking drop,” in so far as the former implies a
divine form of generation, and the latter a human mode of reproduction. The
embryological terminology also fits well within Hom. 3 as a whole as well. Furthermore,
Hom. 3.20 concludes by stating that the True Prophet received the “ineffable garment of
the soul, so that he might be immortal,” as if to preemptively answer how a “human”
could traverse the entire era without becoming subject to mortal decay. These points
converge to demonstrate that the True Prophet Adam-Jesus has always ever been a single
being, truly begotten by God the Father.
How does this point compare with Manichaean concepts of prophethood? Are they
in essential agreement, as scholars are wont to argue? I have already discussed at length
through the example of the Kephalaias some of the ways that Manichaeans in the Roman
Near East articulated concepts of prophethood. We noted that there was no single
understanding of prophethood, despite the fact that they tended towards systematization
and elaboration, at least in the Kephalaias. Nevertheless, one of the more persistent
models of prophethood was the idea that Mani himself was a living embodiment of the
Spirit of the Paraclete, who is at once his Divine Twin and an emanation of Christ.
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Perhaps the most poignant expression of this crucial tenet is found in CMC 24.6-15,
where Mani recites,
I believed that he belongs to me and is mine and is a good and excellent counselor. I
recognized him and understood that I am that one from whom I was separated. I bore
witness that I myself am that one who is unshakable.
καὶ ἐκτησάμην ὡς ἴδιον κτῆμα· ἐπίστευσα δ᾿ αὐτὸν ἐμὸν ὑπάρχοντά τε καὶ ὄντα καὶ
σύμβουλον ἀγαθὸν καὶ χρηστὸν ὄντα· ἐπέγνων μὲν αὐτὸν καὶ συνῆκα ὅτι ἐκεῖνος ἐγώ
εἰμι ἐξ οὗ διεκρίθην· ἐπεμαρτύρησα δὲ ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνος αὐτός εἰμι ἀκλόνητος ὑπάρχων.

In this poem, Mani recognizes that he himself is the Apostle of Light in incarnate
form. He also recognizes that his Divine Twin is in fact a reflection of his pre-incarnate
self, from whom he had separated when he entered into this cosmos, thus positing the
ultimate unity of the Apostle and the Divine Twin. However, as a result of his incarnation
into a fleshly body, Mani forgot his true identity as the Apostle of Light. This
necessitated the descent of the Divine Twin, who not only reminded Mani about his true
identity. Mani thus learns,
Who I am, what my body is, in what way I have come, how my arrival into this world
took place… how I was begotten into this fleshly body, by what woman I was delivered
and born according to the flesh, and by whose passion I was engendered… came into
being… what sort of commission and counsel has given to me before I was led astray in
this detestable flesh, and before I clothed myself with its drunkenness and habits (CMC
21.2-22.15).
τίς εἰμι καὶ τοὐμὸν σῶμα καὶ ποίωι τρόπωι ἐλήλυθα καὶ ὡς γέγονεν ἡ ἄφιξίς μου εἰς
τόνδε τὸν κόσμον... καὶ ὡς ἐγεννήθην εἰς τὸ σαρκῶδες τοῦτο σῶμα ἢ διὰ ποίαν μαιευθεὶς
ἐλοχεύθην κατὰ τὴν σάρκα ταύτην καὶ ἀπὸ τίνος ἔρωτι κατεσπάρην... γεγένηται... ἢ
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ποίωι τρόπωι διαστὰς αὐτοῦ ἀπεστάλην κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην καὶ ποίαν ἐντολήν τε καὶ
ὑποθήκην δεδώρηταί μοι πρὶν ἐνδύσωμαι τὸ ὄργανον τόδε καὶ πρὶν πλανηθῶ ἐν τῆι σαρκὶ
ταύτηι τῆι βδελυρώδει καὶ πρὶν ἐνδῦναί με τήν τε μέθην αὐτῆς καὶ τὸν τρόπον...

This passage demonstrates that Mani was, indeed, born into a fleshly human body. The
importance of this passage is substantiated by the running title of the CMC itself:
“Concerning the creation of his body” [περὶ τῆς γέννης τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ]!303 As this
passage makes clear, Mani’s incarnation occurred through the “natural” means of human
reproduction, a process that seemed to have lingering amnesic effects. Given Mani’s
“Elchasaite background,” it is not too surprising that Mani’s understanding of
“incarnational prophethood” resonates strongly with select passages from the Book of
Elchasai.304 For example, Hippolytus writes regarding the Elchasaites,
[Alcibiades] asserts that Christ was born (γεγονέναι) a man in the same way common to
all, and that he was not at this time born for the first time of a virgin but having been
previously born and being reborn, he both appeared and is born (πεφηνέναι καὶ φύεσθαι),
L. Koenen, “Das Datum der Offenbarung und Geburt Manis” ZPE 8 (1971): 247-50; idem., “Augustine
and Manichaeism in Light of the Cologne Mani Codex,” Illinois Classical Studies 3 (1978): 154-95, 16466. Koenen holds that the “body” can be understood on multiple levels, including the generation of Mani’s
physical body, extending all the way to the “Manichaean Church” as referring to “his” body.
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Spirit. In fact, if we incorporate the passages on Elchasai from the CMC, then Christ himself entered the
cosmos as water, earth, and plants, as well as in Mani. In this light, the “transmigration” of the spirit of
Christ resonates less with Manichaean “prophetology” as much as it does with Manichaean concepts of
transmigration of souls, as found in 1 Ke 249.31-251.25, for example. See L. Cirillo, “From Elchasaite
Christology,” 47-54; Reeves, Heralds, 5-30.
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undergoing alterations at birth (ἀλλάσσοντα γενέσεις) and moving from body to body
(μετενσωματούμενον) (Refutation 9.14.1).

Again,
[The Elchasaites] do not confess that there is one Christ, but that there is one above who
transmigrates many times into many bodies (αὐτὸν δὲ μεταγγιζόμενον ἐν σώμασι πολλοῖς
πολλάκις) and now is in Jesus. Similarly, at one time he was born of God (ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ
γεγενῆσθαι), at another time he became a spirit, at one time from a virgin, and at another
time not. And afterwards, he continually transmigrates in bodies and is made known in
many at various points in time (ἐν σώμασι μεταγγίζεσθαι καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς κατὰ καιροὺς
δείκνυσθαι) (Refutation 10.29.1-3).

Epiphanius, too, largely agree with Hippolytus’ assessment. He writes,
For some of them [the Ebionites] say that Christ is Adam and the first one formed and
breathed by the inspiration of God. Others among them say that he is from above and was
created before all things, being a spirit and is above angels, and ruling over all, that he is
called Christ, and that he was appointed to rule the age. But he comes here when he
wishes, as he came in Adam and appeared to the patriarchs clothed with a body. He is the
same one who went to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and who came at the end of the days
and clothed himself with the body of Adam, appeared to humans, was crucified, rose, and
ascended. Next, as they wish, they say: this is not true but the Spirit who is Christ came
upon him and took the boy called Jesus. For great is the darkness among them since they
suppose him to be sometimes this way and then again that way (ἄλλοτε ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως
αὔτον ὑποτιθεμένοις) (Panarion 30.3.3-6).

That these heresiologists independently agree on key doctrinal elements in the Book of
Elchasai furnishes strong evidence that the Elchasaites did, indeed, hold unto an
“incarnational” understanding of Christology in which the Spirit of Christ incarnated
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himself into the world at various times in the world and in many different ways.305
Structurally-speaking, at least, it aligns with Mani’s self-proclamation as the final
incarnation of the Apostle of Light in a chain of prophets that included Jesus, Zoroaster,
and Buddha. Like Mani, these too were incarnations of the Apostle of Light.
At first blush, the similarities between Manichaeism, Elchasaite prophetology,
and the Homilies are impressive. All seem to agree that a “prophet” appears in the world
as an “incarnation” of the Spirit of Christ. Nevertheless, I argue that the Homilies rejects
Elchasaite/Manichaean system of incarnation, and it does so with a precision that can
hardly be coincidental. The Homilies’ rejection of Elchasaite/Manichaean prophetology
results from its overwhelming interest in making truth particular to the somatic
constitution of Adam-Jesus. As we had seen above in his comparison between “one
impregnated by the hands of Christ” and one “born from a stinking drop,” Peter precludes
the possibility that those born through sexual reproduction can be “True Prophets.” In
order for a True Prophet to be the constant source of revelatory knowledge, his corporeal
constitution cannot be tainted by the blood and seminal fluids of the false prophetess.
Therefore, a True Prophet requires a divine mode of coming-into-being. Peter’s rhetoric
works precisely by denying that the True Prophet can become a human “in a manner
common to all,” to quote Hippolytus. This therefore refutes Mani’s claim to prophethood,
since Mani incarnated into this world through sexual “passion” into a “fleshy body.”
Likewise, Peter had also argued that the spirit of foreknowledge always flows within the
body of the True Prophet. After all, if the “Spirit of Christ” ever abandoned the True

As Luttikhuizen states, “Epiphanius deviates so strikingly from Hippolytus’ account of the heresy of
Alcibiades that we cannot possibly assume that he is dependent on the Refutation” (Book of Elchasai, 174).
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Prophet, then one could never truly know the identity of the True Prophet. As before, the
Homilies’ claim that the Spirit of Christ never leaves the True Prophet contests Elchasaite
/ Manichaean claims that the Spirit of Christ leaves a particular person and become
manifest in another. Indeed, Hom. 3.20 concludes by saying that Jesus received the
“indescribable garment of the soul, so that he might be immortal,” as if to preemptively
answer how a person could persist within a long span of time without becoming to mortal
decay. Therefore, this passage refutes, or at the very least displaces, the idea of multiple
incarnations of a preexistent Prophet figure as found in multiple Manichaean texts and
the Book of Elchasai.
Conclusions

In this chapter I argued that the conception of prophethood and prophecy found in the
Pseudo-Clementine Homilies counters Manichaean systems of prophethood. The
Homilies relied on contemporary embryological concepts to argue that auditory contact
with the true Prophet are the only legitimate means of salvation. Yet the Homilies does
not direct its attack against Mani or Elchasai alone, but all forms of worship dependent
upon visions and apparitions of beings. This broad attack against theoretical forms of
knowledge, intriguingly, also resonates with contemporary developments among Syrian
Neoplatonists like Iamblichus, who was also theorizing anew the relationship between the
human and the divine. Indeed, as I argue in the following chapter, despite their
differences, Syrians like the creators of the Homilies, Iamblichus, and Manichaeans were
all theorizing revelatory knowledge along similar lines.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE PROGNOSTIC TURN: SYRIAN THEORIZATIONS OF
PROPHECY
At the same time that Syrian Manichaeans and “Jewish Christians” were theorizing
concepts of prophethood (chapters 1-3), they also grappled with the concept of prophecy
itself. This comes as little surprise, as Syria had long been marked by a peculiar density
of peoples experimenting with conceptualizations of how the gods know what they know
and how humans might access that divine knowledge. The second century creators of the
Chaldean Oracles, for example, devised theurgic practices of ascent with the goal of
uniting themselves with the gods.306 Others like Numenius of Apamea, who is most
famous for his quip that Plato was nothing more than an “atticizing” Moses, dipped into
the same set of literature and practices as the Chaldean Oracles,307 ultimately concluding
that revelation and reason were identical paths to truth.308 At the same time, Hermetic
literature traveled out of Egypt through Syria and into Persia, where interest in Hermes as
a prophet would blossom.309 Still others like the creators of the Odes of Solomon wove
narratives of “mystical” ascent into their communal liturgy. 310 Yet perhaps no other
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group of Syrians thought about prophecy with the same intensity as those whom scholars
now call “Neoplatonists.” Indeed, both Iamblichus (Aramaic: Yamlikhu) and Porphyry
(Aramaic: Malkhos), the two most important students of Plotinus, hailed from the Syrian
borderlands: Iamblichus from Chalcis and Porphyry from Tyre. Porphyry himself was
known for his keen interest in oracular literature, which is evident not only in his reverent
attitude towards the Chaldean Oracles and in his book Philosophy from the Oracles, but
also his critical attitude to the “Biblical” book of Daniel.311 Yet it is the charged exchange
between Porphyry and Iamblichus, preserved in a text now known as the Mysteries of the
Egyptians (De Mysteriis Aegyptiorum),312 that best highlights the intensity with which
Syrians debated the contours and content of divine knowledge and how humans might
access it.
At least from the Iamblichus’ perspective, his debate with Porphyry revolved
around differing notions of prognosis (ἡ πρόγνωσις) and the proper mode of accessing
this prognosis. In the course of his argument, Iamblichus ends up distinguishing true
prognosis from both human modes of discursive reasoning and from earthly attempts at
divination, calling it nothing more than educated guesswork. 313 In so doing, he creates a
separate category of knowledge: divine prognosis, which is completely set apart from
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human modes of knowing.314 Yet, as I argue in this chapter, Iamblichus’ recasting of
prognosis as this revelatory form of divine prognosis coheres with broader theorizations
of prognosis among his Syrian neighbors, especially the “Jewish Christians” responsible
for the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies and the Manichaeans. Indeed, when these texts are
viewed through the prism of Iamblichus’ innovative recasting of prognosis, we can
situate the emergence of divine prognosis as a distinctly late antique Syrian phenomenon.
At the same time, we gain an alternative vantage point to view those proximate
communities – especially the Syriac-speaking Christians and the rabbis – who polemicize
against human attempts at grasping the divine. My argument here focuses on the Greek
word prognosis and its Coptic cognate (ⲛⲟⲩⲡⲣⲟⲅⲛⲱⲥⲧⲏⲥ), reading it as emblematic of
deeper epistemic shifts centered on prophecy in the late antique Syrian world.
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section I trace the shifting
contours of prognosis in Galen’s On Prognosis, Philostratus’ Life of Apollonius, and
Origen’s Contra Celsum. I show how prognosis in these texts preempt the recasting of
medical and divinatory prognosis as divine prognosis at the hands of Iamblichus, the
Pseudo-Clementine Homilies, and to a lesser extent, the Manichaeans. In the second
section, I turn to focus on the literature of the early Syriac-speaking Christians and the
rabbis. In contrast to Iamblichus, the Homilies, and the Manichaeans, all of who
conceived of revelatory knowledge along a vertical axis linking humans to the God(s),
these two groups studied the divine horizontally through God(s)’ creations – be they the
two Torot, the two Testaments, or Nature. At the same time, they accused the Greek
philosophers of attempting to go beyond the appropriate limits of human ken, and
314

Struck, Divination, 243-49.

170

dismissed it as either incapable of achieving accurate knowledge of God’s will or
impugning on God’s honor by encroaching on his particular domain.
In the final section, I turn to Iamblichus, the Homilies, and the Manichaeans. Like
the rabbis and the Syriac-speaking Christians, they argued that Greek philosophy was
incapable of grasping divine knowledge. In contrast to the rabbis and Christians,
however, these Syrians entertained the possibility that direct revelatory knowledge was
not only possible, but the only source of truth. They began to conceptualize prognosis
along three converging points: 1) Prognosis as panoptic knowledge, total knowledge of
all things at all times; 2) Prognosis as the particular domain of the divine and thus utterly
distinct from human modes of discursive reasoning, especially philosophy, and human
attempts at prognosis, especially medicine and divination; 3) Prognosis as a nexus point
between divine ontology and divine epistemology. Putting these three points together,
one can only possess divine prognosis if one is ontologically linked with the divine and
such prognosis cannot be produced through human means, but only possessed through
divine agency. Of course, Iamblichus, the Homilies, and the Manichaeans articulated
prognosis in their own ways and through the constraints of their own set of texts,
traditions, and practices. Nevertheless, I argue that these late antique Syrians began to
understand prognosis along a converging horizon, away from earlier usages of the term in
the medical and mantic realms and fashioning it instead as total revelatory knowledge – a
divine mode of knowing.

Medical and Mantic Prognosis: From Mere Prognosis to Divine Prognosis
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In this section, I trace the broadening meaning of prognosis as it shifted from a word
meaning “incremental insight” to include an expansive sense of “revelatory vision.315
This broadening understanding of prognosis can be sharpened by comparing it to medical
or divinatory conceptions of prognosis as “incremental knowledge.”316 That is, whereas
the Greeks had hitherto understood prognosis as “incremental knowledge of a discrete
event in the future,” e.g., a quickened pulse indicates the onset of an illness or erratic bird
flight patterns signal bad luck in the future, it began to also mean panoptic knowledge –
total knowledge of all things at all times – among some late antique Syrians. In this
section, I look at three texts from the second and third century to help contextualize the
shifting contours of prognosis: Galen’s On Prognosis, Philostratus’ Life of Apollonius,
and Origen’s Contra Celsum. I do not pretend to provide an exhaustive account for this
shift, but only to highlight examples representative of this shift.317
Galen’s oeuvre furnishes evidence that the word prognosis was already tinged
with divinatory overtones by the second century.318 At times, Galen fought against these
associations, especially when they detracted from what he considered to be appropriate
praise of his superior medical skills. Charges of divination and sorcery plagued Galen
throughout his career.319 Indeed, upon curing Eudemus the Peripatetic philosopher,
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Galen’s enemies accused him of speaking through the power of divination [ἐκ μαντικῆς]
rather than from the medical arts (On Prognosis 3.7, p. 85). Though Galen expresses
annoyance at being compared to a diviner when it detracts from his skill as a medical
professional, he does not shy away from seizing upon such associations when they
enhance his reputation among the Roman elite. Indeed, Eudemus, a grateful philosopher
cured by Galen, compared him to the Pythian oracle who prophesies [θεσπίζειν] to those
who are sick (On Prognosis, 3.17, p. 89). Elsewhere, in an incident featuring a certain
young man named Cyrillus, Galen correctly deduces the problem through the “prophecies
of a diviner” [τὸ τοῦ μάντεως θέσπισμα], for which he is explicitly called a diviner [ὁ
μάντις] (On Prognosis 7.10, p.109). Galen himself ironically attributes this skill to the
power of divination [τὴν μαντικὴν], and though he repeatedly demonstrates that
philosophy, not divination, lay at the core of his medical method, he nonetheless states
that these arts are worthy of Apollo and Asclepius, tying together the gods of both
divination and medicine.320 In any case, it is clear that Galen’s particular conception of
prognosis is limited to knowledge of a single event in the future. His training as a
physician allows him to interpret through philosophy the irregularities of the human body
in order to render an accurate diagnosis of the illness and furnish a fitting prognosis of its
future effects.
Evidence of a shift from mantic and medical conceptions of prognosis to panoptic
knowledge can be found in Philostratus’ (3rd century) narratives of the wandering

diviner and other such names [γόητά τε καὶ μάντιν ἕτερά τε κατ᾿ ἐμοῦ τοιαῦτα]” (On Prognosis 10.15, pg.
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thaumaturge Apollonius of Tyana.321 Philostratus goes much further than Galen by
claiming that the person who divines becomes divine himself, thereby associating the
possession of prognosis with the divine. He writes,

A discussion concerning prognosis (Περὶ δὲ προγνώσεως λόγου) once arose among them, because
Apollonius was both dedicated to this wisdom (προσκειμένου τῇ σοφίᾳ ταύτῃ) and turned the
majority of their discussions to this topic. Praising him [Apollonius], he [Iarchas] said, “Those
delighting in divination (οἱ μαντικῇ… χαίροντες), my good Apollonius, both become divine by it
and work towards the salvation of humankind (θεῖοί τε ὑπ᾿ αὐτῆς γίγνονται καὶ πρὸς σωτηρίαν
ἀνθρώπων πράττουσι). For there is that, which requires going to the [temple] of the God to make a
discovery. On the other hand, my good man, these things – to foresee by oneself and to foretell to
others those things which they do not yet know (ἐφ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ προιδέσθαι, προειπεῖν τε ἑτέροις ἃ
μήπω ἴσασι) – I consider to belong to a thoroughly blessed person, equaling himself to the Delphic
Apollo. Since the art commands those resorting to the temple of the God for an oracular response
to enter walking in purified, or they will be told, “Leave the temple,” it thus seems to me that even
the man who will prognosticate (τὸν προγνωσόμενον) be pure himself and neither have a single
stain assault his soul nor the scars of sin be imprinted in his thought. And this man will interpret
his own prophecies (προφητεύειν) purely, hearing himself and the tripod within his breast. He will
thus pronounce his oracles more clearly and truthfully. Wherefore, it is unnecessary that you be
amazed even if you comprehend this skill so well, as you have so much ether in your soul (VA
3.42).

As we will also see in the case of Iamblichus, prognosis not only renders someone divine
but it also confers innumerable benefits to humankind. Curiously, Philostratus
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distinguishes between localized sources of prognosis – like the Delphic Oracle – and the
man who possesses the unblemished interiority necessary for a superior form of
prognosis. As Roshan Abraham notes, this passage assumes that the foreknower is
superior to Greek oracles, which are fixed in certain locations.322 The foreknower, after
all, needs no other person to interpret his prophecies, but interprets them “more clearly
and truthfully,” presumably in comparison to fixed local oracles.
As a conduit to the gods, Apollonius transmits various arts and skills that humans
would never have discovered on their own. Not surprisingly, given the associations
between prognosis and medicine, Apollonius singles out the art of medicine as a prime
example of the benefits of prognosis. He writes,

He said that it [divination] provides men many good things, but the greatest is the gift of medicine.
The wise sons of Asclepius would never have attained their knowledge of this unless Asclepius
had been born the son of Apollo, and by following his father’s sayings and prophecies had
inferred [κατὰ τὰς ἐκείνου φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας ξυνθεὶς] the remedies appropriate to each
disease… Without the wisdom of prognosis I do not think mankind would ever have ventured to
compound the most deadly of drugs with the healing ones (VA 3.44).

As we had seen with Galen, divination and medicine are strongly associated with one
another. Here, however, medicine itself derives from the gods. This points to the
expanding reach of prognosis – it is not simply the art of properly foreseeing the future
state of an ill patient, but the source of the art itself. Even so, we are not quite at the

R. Abraham, “Magic and Religious Authority in Philostratus’ Life of Apollonius of Tyana.” Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2009.
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understanding of “panoptic knowledge” that we have with Iamblichus, the Homilies, and
the Manichaeans. After all, there is still an element of human reasoning involved in
Asclepius’ interpretation of Apollo’s utterances and prophecies; Asclepius does not
“download” the medical arts directly from Apollo nor does he “upload” himself through a
mode of ascent to Apollo, but he infers [ξυνθεὶς] these solutions, presumably through
human forms of discursive reasoning, in order to devise the appropriate medicines.
In fact, the closest we approach Iamblichus and company’s conceptions of
prognosis comes from the Christian Origen’s work, Contra Celsus.323 This may be no
accident, in so far as Origen was taught by Ammonius Saccas, the teacher of Plotinus,
and thus related to Iamblichus and Porphyry along a common intellectual pedigree. 324 As
Struck notes, “In the case of the Christians and Iamblichus, while the theos is different,
the theological structure is similar.”325 Similar to the Homilies, Origen characterizes Jesus
as possessing absolute prognosis and thus foreknowing all the events of his life. This line
of thinking leads him to conclude that prognosis of an event cannot alter the event itself,
since then it would no longer be prognosis (Contr. Cel. 2.20). More specifically, Origen
argues that the cause of prognosis and the cause of the predicted event differ.326 Origen
further contrasts this mode of grasping at future events with that of the diviners, a
rhetorical strategy that we will see again in Iamblichus’ De Mysteriis, the Homilies, and
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with the Manichaeans. These diviners, Origen says, sometimes gain a semblance of
prognosis by interpreting the behaviors of daemonically-possessed animals (Contr. Cel.
4.92). At the same time, Origen mocks Celsus’ belief in divination, arguing that if birds
possess prognosis, then they knew more about divinity than even Plato (Contr. Cel. 4.90).
Origen ultimately grants that God is the source of prognosis and that the Hebrew
prophets possessed pure souls that drew them closer to God, rendering them superior
conduits for prognosis (Contr. Cel. 5.42; 7.4). He contrasts this with the example of the
Pythian Oracle (Contr. Cel. 7.3), who is possessed by evil demons that enter her body
through her orifices.
These three examples demonstrate something of the shifting contours of
prognosis in the first few centuries of the Common Era. They help us appreciate the
radical shift in understanding of prognosis at the hands of some late antique Syrian
intellectuals. Nevertheless, this diachronic outline needs to be supplemented by a
synchronic analysis of other Syrian communities. As I demonstrate below, both rabbinic
Jews and Syriac-speaking Christians in late antique Syria shared a deep skepticism in the
human ability to penetrate the divine mind. Instead, they devoted their intellectual powers
not to the study of God himself but God as mediated through his creation(s). Intriguingly,
these two communities came to police the boundaries of proper inquiry into the divine by
framing the study of God’s signs and mysteries as superior alternatives to Greek
philosophy. As we will see, even “pagans” like Iamblichus and the “Jewish Christian”
creators of the Homilies agreed in the futility of Greek philosophy to attain to divine
truth; unlike the Christians and rabbis, however, they found a way forward.
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Syrian Critiques of Greek Philosophy: Bardaisan, the Letter of Mara bar Sarapion, and
Ephrem’s “Poison of the Greeks”

In the section above, I traced the contours of prognosis as it shifted from a word
signifying incremental knowledge of a future event to a word that approached divine
panoptic knowledge. This shift will make a decisive turn among the Neoplatonists, the
Homilies, and the Manichaeans. It is therefore striking that other proximate and
contemporaneous communities – especially the Syriac Christians327 and the Amoraic-era
rabbis – begin to resist claims that one could know God in some essential sense through
Greek philosophy. Unlike Iamblichus, the Homilies, and the Manichaeans, all of who
developed ways of conceptualizing and accessing divine prognosis, the Christians and
rabbis eschewed such attempts, framing it instead as encroaching on God’s particular
territory. On the one hand, these Christians and rabbis might simply gesture towards the
paths-not-taken by Iamblichus, the Homilies, and the Manichaeans. On the other hand,
the fact that they do so at this time and in this place may not be coincidental; indeed, with
the spread of Iamblichean forms of “Neoplatonism” throughout late antique Syria,
Syriac-speaking Christians and rabbis may have begun seeing “philosophy” 328 as
encroaching not only on God’s secrets, but more importantly, challenging their own
pedagogical practices and modes of understanding God through their respective divinelysanctioned objects of study.

I do not assume that there was a monolithic “Syriac” Christian Church and merely use this term as a
shorthand for those variegated communities that produced texts that were written in Syriac from the first to
the fourth century.
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In this section, I will focus on the Syriac Christians, specifically Bardaisan’s Laws
of the Various Countries (3rd century),329 the Letter of Mara bar Sarapion (3rd
century?),330 the Odes of Solomon (2nd century?),331 and Ephrem the Syrian (4th Century).
I argue that while the Christians prior to the fourth century had a generally dismissive
attitude towards Greek philosophy, it is only with Ephrem – a late contemporary of
Iamblichus, the Homilies, and the Manichaeans – that we get our first explicit critique of
Greek philosophy as encroaching on God’s secrets and territory. True, Ephrem
specifically targets “Arian” claims that the Son was subordinate to the Father. Yet the
fact that he frames their arguments as philosophical hubris and as utterly incapable of
“grasping” God coheres well within the broader Syrian intellectual landscape. 332 In this
sense, we can begin to position Ephrem not only as part and parcel of the intellectual
currents within the Church, but more broadly in Syria itself.
We possess none of Bardaisan’s (2nd century, Edessa) actual writings.
Nevertheless, the book Laws of the Various Countries, which features Bardaisan as a
For an outdated yet still insightful overview of Bardaisan’s philosophy, see: H.R.J. Drijvers, Bardaiṣan
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Socrates-like philosopher, probably reflects his philosophy. As a whole, this book argues
that human beings possess free-will [ ]ܚܐܪܘܬܐas a gift from God through which they are
able to do either good or evil. The astral powers like the planets and stars might influence
some factors of one’s life, whether one is born tall or short, for example, but they do not
detract from humankind’s potential to act as a free moral agent. As proof, Bardaisan
concludes by demonstrating that the varieties of human namose (Greek: nomos) furnish
evidence that stars and planets do not totally overwhelm human agency. After all, if such
powers did have complete control over humankind, then one would expect all human
laws to be uniform in each section of the cosmos.
More instrumental for our purposes, however, is the short introduction between
Avida, presumably a “pagan,” and Bardaisan. Avida declares that he is not able to
become a Christian unless he is first persuaded to become one [ ܘܐܢܐ ܐܠ ܡܫܟܚ ܐܢܐ
]ܠܡܗܝܡܢܘ ܐܐܠ ܐܢ ܐܬܛܦܝܣܬ. Bardaisan responds by saying that because Avida and
“many others” are not willing to believe, they are utterly destitute of “Knowledge of
Truth” []ܝܕܥܬܐ ܕܫܪܪܐ. As a result, they are “always tearing down and building up” their
arguments [ ]ܒܟܠܙܒܢ ܣܬܪܝܢ ܘܒܢܝܢand lack the firm foundation of faith upon which they
might build the edifice of truth []ܐܠ ܓܪ ܫܬ ܐܣܬܐ ܕܗܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܐܝܬ ܠܗܘܢ ܢܒܢܘܢ ܥܠܝܗ.
Bardaisan’s language of “building and tearing down” echoes widespread critiques against
Greek philosophy as particularly deficient as a path to knowledge of the divine. Tatian,
for example a contemporary of Bardaisan and a fellow Syrian, caricaturizes Greek
philosophers as those who “express views that contradict one another, and each says
whatever comes into his head. And there are many causes of friction between them, for
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each one hates his fellow and they hold different views, each taking up an exaggerated
position out of self-importance.”333
Of course, at the same time that Bardaisan and Tatian argue against the Greeks,
they themselves perform “Greek-ness.” In fact, the Laws is written in the form of a
Socratic dialogue and Bardaisan employs terminology lifted from Greek. Ephrem would
later mock him as the “Aramean philosopher.”334 Adler too reminds us that Bardaisan
makes better sense alongside other Greeks like Lucian, and we might add, Tatian, than
alongside Christian martyrs and saints.335 Tatian, too, acknowledges the superiority of his
“barbarian” philosophy by demonstrating his mastery of Greek knowledge. Yet, as Laura
Nasrallah puts it, “We have also seen that Justin, Tatian, and Lucian teach us about one
use of the sign ‘barbarian’ under this Roman Empire: the person who has mastered
Greekness and yet is ambivalent about that mastery.”336 The same might be said
regarding Bardaisan, even if he did not speak or write in Greek. In fact, as Nathanael
Andrade has demonstrated, Syrians were continually reformulating native Greek and
Syrian idioms in ways that aligned with and resisted Roman power.337
In contrast to Bardaisan and Tatian, the Letter of Mara bar Sarapion is quite
positive about Greek philosophy. To be sure, scholars are not quite sure what to make of
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this text and date it anywhere from the first to the third century. 338 The Letter adopts the
perspective of a Samosatene father urging his son to continue in his studies and to live a
wise life. By wisdom, the father refers to the “teachings of Greekness (yewanayuta)” [ ܡܢ
]ܝܘܠܦܢܐ ܗܘ ܕܝܘܢܝܘܬܐ ܐܫܟܚܬ ܐܢܝܢ. The –uta of yewanay-uta signifies an abstraction of
“Greek-ness” in a way that encapsulates the transformative cultural cache of Greek
paideia. In the father’s estimation, paideia transcends mere cultural capital and offers
consolation for the toils of life. As he tells his son, “those who engage themselves with
philosophy (filasafuta) [ ]ܐܝܠܝܢ ܕܒܦܝܠܣܦܘܬܐ ܡܬܥܢܝܢseek to escape the troubles of the
world.” He describes Philosophy positively as a pursuit of “wisdom” [ ]ܚܟܝܡܘܬܐand
“truth” []ܫܪܪܐ. At the same time, by marking “Greekness” as a discrete cultural
abstraction, the writer also marks his and his son’s “native” distance from “Greekness.”
Greekness is a thing that one learns to be, not something they already are. One cannot
help but be reminded of Lucian of Samosata. In any case, this letter’s characteristic mishmash of Greek philosophy highlights the complicated ways that “philosophy” persisted as
a form of ethnically-coded Greek knowledge within the Syrian world. Furthermore, if the
Letter was indeed written by a “Christian,” its praise of Greek knowledge prove to be a
valuable counterpoint to Ephrem’s explicitly anti-Greek approach to God.
Ephrem the Syrian (4th century) was the preeminent champion of Nicene
Christianity in the Syrian borderlands. Long thought to be representative of a sort of
“Semitic” Christianity uncontaminated by “Hellenism,” recent scholarship has
demonstrated that he was integrated within the larger intellectual currents within the
A. Merz and T. Tieleman, Letter of Mara bar Sarapion, 1-9. I find Chin’s arguments for a later dating
for the Letter more convincing in C.M. Chin, “Rhetorical Practice in the Chreia Elaboration of Mara bar
Serapion,” Hugoye 9.2 (2006):145-71.
338
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Church in the late antique Roman Empire.339 Yet it would be a bit odd to consider
Ephrem only in the context of a Syriac Church, especially if, as Griffith notes, “more and
more studies of his writings reveal his awareness of the intellectual developments in the
Greek-speaking parts of the empire.”340 In fact, Ephrem’s distaste for Greek forms of
logic-chopping resonates strongly with Iamblichus and the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies
disavowal of “Greek” logic as a way of accessing divine knowledge. As Griffith states,
Ephrem sought to “cultivate among the faithful a profound distaste for dialectics in
religion, or indeed for any sort of philosophical inquiry governed by academic logic
rather than by a fundamental faith in the Scriptures.”341 In his Hymns of Faith, Ephrem
writes, “Blessed is the one who has not tasted the poison of the wisdom of the Greeks!
()ܕܐܠ ܛܥܡܗ ܠܡܐܪܬܐ ܕܚܟܡܬ ܝܘܢܝܐ,”342 thus polemicizing against the “Arian” use of Greek
logic-chopping to argue their case that God the Son was somehow subservient to the
Father. Ephrem writes, “If you ask, “Is there a son?” / You may learn that answer in an
instant. / If you ask, “How?” / The question will remain until he comes again.”343
Elsewhere, he praises the Apostle Paul, who went into the “the mother city of the
Greeks,” that is, Athens, disarmed their “weapons” ( )ܠܙܝܢܗܘܢof Greek logic by using
their own weapons against them, and then discarded their weapons as useless when he
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left that city. In another poem, Ephrem praises the Magi for not subjecting the divine to
“inquiry.” He writes,

Come, let us marvel at the men / who saw the king here below / They did not conduct an
investigation, nor did they engage in research ( )ܥܩܒܘ ܐܘ ܒܥܘ/ not one of them opened a debate
( )ܕܪܫ/ There shone there in silence, a pure act of faith / When he was here below, the Magi / did
not venture to examine him ( )ܐܠ ܐܡܪܚܘ ܒܨܐܘܗܝ/ How can we then venture to examine him ( ܡܢ
 )ܢܡܪܚ ܢܒܨܝܘܗܝ/ Now that he has gone up and taken his seat / at the right hand on high? 344

Unlike the Homilies, which finds epistemological certainty guaranteed in the
constitutional makeup of the True Prophet, and Iamblichus, who accesses the divine
causes of all events through theurgic modes of ascent, Ephrem simply states that God
cannot be essentially known. The crucial point, however, is that he does not deny that
God as knowable Essence exists; he merely argues that humans do not have the
epistemological potential of ever attaining knowledge of that essence. Like the others,
then, Ephrem recognizes that Greek philosophy cannot approach the divine, yet he is
content to stay on the “this side of the world.” For him, humans can only understand God
indirectly through the mysteries and symbols he implanted in scripture and nature.345 This
idea is portrayed best, perhaps, in his madrasha called “He Wore the Names.” He writes,

Let us give thanks to the One is clothed with the names [ ]ܫܡܗܐof the bodily limbs / its name,
“ears,” to teach that he hears us / its nickname, “eyes,” to inform that he sees us / it was only the
Beck, Hymnen de Fide, 33; Griffith, “Deacon of Edessa,” 43.
S. Griffith, Faith Adoring the Mystery: Reading the Bible with St. Ephraem the Syrian (Milwaukee:
Marquette University Press, 1997), 19-21.
344
345
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names of these things he wore / and though there is no wrath or regret within his Essence
[ ]ܒܐܝܬܘܬܗ/ he clothes himself with these names because of our weakness.346

As Ephrem goes on to say, God does not actually possess limbs, but he “wears” the name
of the limbs for the sake of humankind – “His Essence remains hidden [ ܕܟܣܝܐ ܗܝ
]ܐܝܬܘܬܗ, but he depicts through things that are visible.” Again, Ephrem says, “He is an
Essence ( )ܐܝܬܝܐwhose greatness we are not capable of grasping – no, not even in his
smallness.”347 Just as God put on “names” for the sake of humanity, he also sowed
mysteries in both Testaments and in Nature so as to point towards the crucifixion of
Jesus, who reveals the true meaning of each mystery.348 This economy of salvation
remains strictly within this world; there is no moment in which the human mind directly
grasps divine mind or participates in his divinity. Rather, the mind, scripture, and nature
are compared to mirrors that collectively point towards the truth of Jesus’ crucifixion.349
These symbols are simultaneously “types” of Christ found in the Old Testament, Nature,
and Christian liturgy, and their truth is demonstrated by the coming of Christ as found in
the New Testament.350 Therefore, while Ephrem agrees with Iamblichus and the Homilies
that humans are not able to grasp the divine through human means, he is content to
remain in this realm, in so far as God himself had sown “mysteries” into the world that,
through proper Christian training, one might uncover their “true” meaning in Christ.
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We turn finally to a set of enigmatic texts known as the Odes of Solomon (2nd
century?). This set of liturgical texts were clearly meant to be sung by a congregation.
The Odes’ understanding of “Error” coheres well with what we have seen so far. In Ode
38 (cf., Ode 31), for example, the Odist follows “Truth” across treacherous lands,
chasms, gulfs, valleys, and cliffs. This topographical imagery maps unto the Odist’s
conception of “Error” ()ܛܥܝܘܬܐ. He depicts Error as the “Poisons of Error” ( ܣܡܡܢܐ
)ܕܛܥܝܘܬܐ, recalling Ephrem’s imagery of the “Poison of the Wisdom of the Greeks.”
Error and Deceit imitate the pure relationship between the “Beloved and the Bride.”
When Error and Deceit invite people to their unholy feast, they cause the attendees to
“vomit up their wisdom and their knowledge ( )ܚܟܡܬܗܘܢ ܘܡܕܥܝܗܘܢand prepare for them
instead ‘nonsense’ ()ܕܐܠ ܪܥܝܢܐ.” In Ode 18, moreover, the Odist distinguishes those “vain
people reasoned that Error ( )ܣܒܪܘ ܥܠܝܗ ܣܪܝܩܐwas great, and became similar to it ( ܐܝܟ
 )ܕܡܘܬܗand became vain” from “those-who-know knew and reasoned ( ܘܝܕܥ ܐܝܠܝܢ ܕܝܕܥܝܢ
 )ܘܐܬܚܫܒܘ/ and were not polluted by their [the vain peoples’] thoughts ()ܒܡܚܫܒܬܗܘܢ.”
Of course, this is not proof that the Odist is explicitly or only targeting Greek philosophy,
yet its characterization of error and deceit resonates strongly with Ephrem’s and
Bardaiasan’s caricaturization of Greek philosophy. Furthermore, the Odist uses imagery
that recalls broader Syriac tropes. In Ode 13, for example, he compares the Lord to a
mirror ()ܡܚܙܝܬܐ, through whom one can recognize their true nature, recalling Ephrem’s
deployment of mirrors as a human mode of recognizing God. Ode 7 too notes that God
“became like me ()ܗܘܐ ܐܟܘܬܝ, that I might receive him… / Like my nature ( ܐܝܟ ܟܝܢܝ
 )ܗܘܐHe became, that I might understand Him. / Like my form ()ܐܝܟ ܨܘܪܬܝ, that I might
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not

turn

away

from

Him.”

Examples

of

God’s

utter

transcendence

and

incomprehensibility are strewn throughout the Odes as well, again in striking similarity to
Ephrem’s madrasha discussed above; though God is so utterly transcendent so as to be
completely unknowable, he became human so that humans might understand him as a
human.
Ultimately, Ephrem acknowledged the utter transcendence of the divine at a time
when other Syrians were adopting Greek philosophy in their futile attempts to grasp the
divine. He argued that one could only understand God in mediation through the Godstrewn symbols that remained firmly entrenched within scripture and nature. He
foreclosed all direct modes of ascent and denied any ontological connections between
these symbols and God. The only way that humans could approach the divine was
through the infinitely-deep data set that God had allowed humans to understand. In the
following section, I highlight a similar move made by the Palestinian rabbis. Like
Ephrem, these Amoraic rabbis responded to what they saw as the philosophical
encroachment into God’s divine territory. They did so by highlighting the superiority of
Torah over and against philosopher’s claims to know God’s cosmogonic secrets.

The Rabbis: The Torah as Mediated Knowledge of God
The rabbis not only echo Syriac Christian attitudes towards “revelatory” knowledge but,
like them, also fixed the boundaries of what was available for study, their “data set.”351

I do not mean to fault the rabbis for not employing Greek concepts such as “presence” or “prognosis.” I
only want to make the claim that, like the Syriac-speaking Christians, the rabbis too were wary of
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After all, for the rabbis, careful attention to the Torah explained everything that can or
should be known. They decreed that other domains of inquiry, especially those that
sought to delve into God’s exclusive domains of cosmology, cosmogony, and
eschatology, were to be approached with extreme caution, if at all. Indeed, the earliest
rabbis had already placed boundaries regarding which subjects must be approached with
extreme caution.352 In m.Hagigah 2:1, for example, the rabbis declare,

One may not expound the laws of forbidden sexual relations before three people, nor the account
of creation [ ]במעשה בראשיתbefore two,353 nor the divine chariot [ ]במרכבהbefore one, unless he is
wise and understands through his own. It would be fitting for anyone who gazes into []המסתכל
these four things to not come into this world: what is above, what is below, what is before, and
what is after. Anyone who has no consideration for the honor of his creator would be better off if
he had not come into the world.

I follow Schäfer and Halperin in their interpretation that this passage (and others)
describe the extreme danger of expounding on the subject of creation and God’s Divine
Chariot.354 This passage is not referring to a mystical practice of acquiring a vision of the
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Chariot or even ascending to God, as we will see in chapter five with the Hekhalot
literature. Rather, as Schäfer writes, “the rabbis are solely, and quite consciously,
occupied with textual exegeses, not with visionary experiences.”355 These subjects are
dangerous, then, not because of some mystical ascent but because “… improper,
unbridled exegesis of Gen. 1 and Ezek. 1 may infringe on God’s privacy, so to speak,
God’s own sovereign realm, spatially and temporally, and that such an exegesis might
being one too close to God, in any event, too close to accommodate the rabbis’ sense of
decency.”356 In contrast to our Syriac texts, then, the rabbis in the mishnah above and its
related passages in the Tosefta and Yerushalmi357 do not contrast their approach to divine
topics against Greek modes of philosophical inquiry, but instead signal broader attempts
at forming a distinctly rabbinic communal identity. 358
Nevertheless, philosophers begin to pop up in the later rabbinic sources stemming
from the Amoraic era, clustering heavily in the fifth-century midrashic compilation
Bereshit Rabbah and in the Yerushalmi.359 Let us briefly turn to the opening passages of
Bereshit Rabbah.360 This midrashic anthology speaks from within a rapidly
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Christianizing Roman Empire. I will not engage in a full literary analysis of these famous
petihtaot here,361 but highlight some of its more salient aspects.
The ultimate goal of the opening parashah of Bereshit Rabbah is to claim that
God is the sole creator of the cosmos; there were no other gods, angels, or beings that
helped him in this endeavor. Nevertheless, God did consult something in his construction
of the cosmos: the Torah.362 In the opening petihta, R. Oshaya compares God’s act of
creation to an architect consulting his diagrams and charts to build a palace. In like
manner, God looked into [ ]מביטthe Torah to create the cosmos. On the one hand, this
demonstrates that the Torah contains the very blueprint of the cosmos, and, as R.
Yehudah b. Simon demonstrates (BerR 1.6), creative exegesis of the Torah has the
potential to uncover how God created the cosmos. On the other hand, the comparison
between the Torah and an architect’s diagrams demonstrates that the Torah is merely a
tool for creation. It is not an emanation, spark, or ontologically divine.363 True, the Torah
is the first and most important of God’s creations, yet it is still created and merely
consulted; God does all the heavy work of actual creation.
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In keeping with the Mishnah, R. Yosi b. Haninah states that inquiry into the
cosmological aspects of the world ultimately dishonors God as creator (BerR 1.5). After
all, the cosmos was created through tohu ve-vohu, which are comparable to trash and
dung. It is not polite to bring up such matters before God. Nevertheless, as R. Huna in the
name of Bar Qappara correctly mentions, the Torah itself describes God creating the
cosmos through the filth of unformed matter – tohu ve-vohu. As such, R. Huna claims
that discussion of the preexistent filth is fair game for discussion. R. Yosi, R. Huna, and
Bar Qappara thus seem to adhere to an understanding of creatio ex hylis. By the fifth
century, however, this rather conservative position bordered on the scandalous. Indeed,
the parashah goes on to depict a pitched argument between a philosopher [  ]פילוסופוסand
Rabban Gamliel in what is undoubtedly the climax of this parashah. The philosopher
opens by praising God as a great painter [ ]ציר גדולwho used the “beautiful paints” [ סממנים
 ]טוביםat his disposal to create the world. He thus praises the God of the Jews not only as

an excellent “creator” God, but also goes so far as to transform the pre-existent filth tohu
ve-vohu into “beautiful paints.” No rabbi can fault him, therefore, for impugning on
God’s honor. His mistake, however, lies in his assumption that God used preexistent
materials – “beautiful paints” – at all to create the world. In response, Rabban Gamliel
tells the philosopher to drop dead and argues that God created the “paints” – tohu vevohu
– he had used to create the world. He thus posits that God created everything ex nihilo.364
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How much Rabban Gamliel knew about Greek philosophical arguments is not
clear from this passage, if at all. After all, he does not respond to the philosopher on the
philosopher’s terms, but through his exegesis of the Torah. More significantly, the
passage demonstrates that rabbis were aware of the converging rabbinic claims about
creation with those made by Greek philosophers. Indeed, even when the preexistent
materials tohu ve-vohu are interpreted positively as beautiful paints and even when Greek
philosophers recognize the God of Israel as a creator God, they still completely fail to
give God his due honor. As Rabban Gamliel demonstrates, this is because they
understood the world through their own philosophical training, not through proper
attention to the Torah. Significantly, from the perspective of the fifth century redactor of
these passages, both Bar Qappara’s and the philosopher’s statements about creation
converge, suggesting that the rejection of Bar Qappara’s position of creatio ex hylis –
which was argued from the Torah no less! – became scandalous due to its similarity with
what the rabbis associated with Greek philosophy.365
The following passage presents further evidence for an increased concern with
guarding against rabbinic inquiries into subjects dealing with eschatology, cosmology,
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As David Stern mentioned to me, it is not clear whether we should see the problem as creatio ex nihilo
at all, but as a sticky problem regarding the multiplicity of gods. According to this line of reasoning, R.
Gamaliel interprets the philosopher’s words to mean that tohu ve-vohu were created by other gods, which
implies that creation was the result of multiple gods, not just the God of Israel. This suggestion is certainly
intriguing and demands more thought. At the very least, Stern’s suggestion is valuable in that it compels us
to rethink whether the rabbis “took” the idea of creatio ex nihilo / hylis “from” the Christians or
philosophers, which seems to be how Schäfer, and Niehoff understand the issue. In this sense, I suggest that
we can still use the term creatio ex nihilo, since God does create the very materials for creation and
therefore creates out of “nothing,” but only as a heuristic and not as a “rabbinic” version of a Christian idea.
Furthermore, the role of the philosopher here needs to be explored a bit further. Though it is likely that he
is simply a stock-character for the midrashic mill, it may still be worth asking why “philosophers” pop up
most densely in the Amoraic materials, especially in Bereshit Rabbah. By doing so, we may begin to work
out how “philosophers” figure into the Amoraic rabbinic imagination and literary creation, thereby
bypassing the question of whether the rabbis truly “knew” this or that philosophic doctrine.
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and cosmogony. Whereas the Mishnah prohibited the study of divine matters because it
impugned on God’s honor, this passage goes beyond the prohibition by predicating the
permitted domains of inquiry on the very structure of the world.366

R. Yona [said] in the name of R. Levi, “Why was the world created with the letter bet? Just as the
letter bet is closed off on its sides and opens up in the front []ב, so you have no permission to
expound [ ]לדרושon what is above, what is below, what is before and what is after.” Bar Qappara
said, “Ask about the first days that were before you from the day that God created humans upon
the earth, and from one end of heaven to the other” (Deut. 4:32)… “From the day” that they were
created, you may expound []דורש, but you may not expound what came prior. “From one end of
heaven to the other,” you may investigate []חוקר, but beyond that, you may not investigate.

Riffing on the idea that the Torah was the blueprint for creation, R. Yona asks why the
world was created with the letter bet, that is, the first letter of the first word of the Torah
()בראשית. He answers by incorporating the Mishnaic prohibition against studying what is
above, below, before, and after. Bar Qappara deduces support for this prohibition from
the Torah; one can only study that which is visible. Interestingly, he uses the verb “to
investigate” []חוקר, suggesting that the ban is not so much on public exposition []דורש, but
on research into these matters. Both R. Yona and Bar Qappara reinterprets the Mishnaic
ban; it is no longer only about God’s honor, but the proper domains of inquiry are already
woven into the structure of the cosmos and into the Torah. This is remarkably similar to
366

In true rabbinic fashion, however, the rabbis did not always follow their own injunctions. As Stern
mentioned to me, in Bereshit Rabbah 8.2, despite R. Elazar’s transmitting a tradition in the name of Ben
Sira (!) that one should not delve into mysteries that are too great for them, the entire chapter is replete with
such speculations. Such caution against delving into the mysteries of creation, and the prompt dismissal of
that caution, may be seen as part and parcel of rabbinic literature. Indeed, perhaps such prohibitions were
meant to be broken, not followed!
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Ephrem’s position discussed above; the only “data” for analysis are the secrets and
mysteries that God had implanted into nature and the two testaments. This and the
previous passage describing the debate between philosopher and Rabban Gamliel
suggests that cosmological, eschatological, and cosmogonic issues were becoming a
matter of increasing concern for rabbis in the fifth century, not only from rabbis within
who favored a creatio ex hylis approach based on the Torah itself, but from philosophers
without.
I suggest that such an attitude towards God’s exclusive domain of inquiry mirrors
Syriac Christian discomfort with the application of Greek philosophy to divine matters.
Though they had differing scholastic habits and objects of inquiry, both rabbis and
Christians held a healthy suspicion against Greek philosophy as a mode of approaching
the divine. Indeed, as Hayes has demonstrated recently in her study of rabbinic law, the
rabbis articulated an understanding of the “divinity” of the Torah in studied opposition to
Greco-Roman conceptions of “divine” law.367 For the rabbis, then, the Torah contained
all the knowledge that humans could and should know. God has provided humans with an
infinitely deep “data set” that contains everything that the rabbis and Christians can and
should know about him. Both the rabbis and the Syriac Christians were on earth “looking
up” at the heavens and “looking down” at their books and nature; they both eschewed
more direct methods for approaching God.

C. Hayes, What’s Divine about Divine Law? Early Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2015).
367
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Beyond Knowledge: Prognosis as Divine and Revelatory Knowing
As we had seen with Philostratus’ Apollonius of Tyana and Origen’s Contra Celsus, the
Greek word prognosis expanded to include something like panoptic divine knowledge. At
the same time, local Syrian communities like the Syriac-speaking Christians and the
rabbis reacted negatively to the encroachment of “Greek philosophy” in the study of
divine matters, choosing instead to study aspects of the divine through the things he had
arrayed as available for study – be they the two Testaments, the two Torot, or the various
signs and mysteries he had sown in Nature.
Yet not all Syrian communities were content on remaining on “this side” or in
deciphering God’s signs. At the same time that rabbinic and Syriac Christian rejection of
philosophical approaches to God were hardening, other Syrians began to entertain the
possibility of direct unmediated knowledge of God, that is, to know like God. In this
section, I examine the converging theorizations of prognosis among three Syrian
communities: the Neoplatonists, “Jewish Christians,” and the Manichaeans. Though each
did so in their own ways, these communities began to understand prognosis as
unmediated divine knowledge along similar trajectories. More specifically, they
understood prognosis in three interrelated ways: 1) as total panoptic knowledge; 2) as
something possessed by the gods rather than produced by humans; 3) as an articulation of
the unity of divine ontology and divine epistemology.

Iamblichean Conceptions of Prognosis
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Iamblichus’ conception of prognosis rehearses an age old problem regarding the
relationship between reality and the perception of that reality. In short, humans need to
transcend their perception of reality if they are to truly understand “reality.” In Rappe’s
words, “conceptual activity, far from observing the nature of things as they are in
themselves, actually obstructs our view. It prevents us from seeing things as they are in
themselves.”368 Prognosis, for Iamblichus, short-circuits this problem by positing a
divine mode of knowing, one that bypasses “conceptual activity” entirely. For him,
prognosis does not mark prior knowledge in the temporal sense, but the divine priority of
all things that “happen” in this world.369 Through various “theurgic” practices, the human
soul links up with its divine priority, and thus gains “knowledge” of all things at all times
prior to their actual “happening” in the temporal world; that is, the human soul “thinks”
like and as a god.370 As I will argue in the following two sections, this particular
understanding of prognosis coheres well with developing notions of prophecy among
proximate communities, including the “Jewish-Christians” responsible for the Homilies
and the Manichaeans.
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S. Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism: Non-discursive Thinking in the Texts of Plotinus, Proclus, and
Damascius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 30.
369
I largely agree with Gregory Shaw’s analysis, that “True divination, according to Iamblichus, was
equivalent to divinization, making the soul divine, and knowledge of the future was merely a secondary
consequence of ascending to the archē of temporal events.” See: G. Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul: The
Neoplatonism of Iamblichus (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press,
1995), 232. Nevertheless, his claim that Iamblichus “platonized” popular “religion” needs to be reassessed.
Rather, as I argue here, it seems more likely that Iamblichus was already participating in broader
theorizations of prognosis; in this sense, it would be the “prognosticization” of “Platonism.”
370
For more on the theurgy in the Neoplatonic tradition, see: C. Addey, Divination and Theurgy in
Neoplatonism: Oracles of the Gods (Dorchester: Ashgate, 2014), 215-82. Nevertheless, recent scholarship
by Ilinca Tanaseanu-Döbler has historicized the category of “theurgy” and argued that it was not a stable
set of rituals or even concepts. See I. Taneseanu-Döbler, Theurgy in Late Antiquity. The Invention of a
Ritual Tradition (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2013).

196

Iamblichus’ notion of prognosis builds upon Plotinus’ tripartite system of the
One, the Intellect, and the Soul.371 The One is the cause and source of all existence,
therefore, “it” is superior to “existence.” As such, “it” cannot “be” any “thing,” since it is
superior and prior to “being” itself. The least egregious way to articulate this concept,
according to Plotinus, is to call it the “One.” The One emanates forth “existence” as an
expression of its perfection, thus issuing forth the realm of the Intellect. This is the realm
in which Plato’s “ideas” exist and the realm of the intellectual gods. Yet there is no
“division” in this realm; the knowledge of an object, the act of knowing, and the object
itself are entirely united. Furthermore, there is no “time” as the sort of plodding
movement that humans experience. Instead, “eternity” is the temporal context for the
divine, in which all the intellectual gods are bound up all together at once. As an
emanation of the One, the Intellect strives to return to the One and, in participation with
the One, emanates forth the lower hypostatic realm of the Soul. This is the realm in which
the divine meets the material, where time begins to tick, where unified intellectual
knowledge fragment into multiple discursive elements. The human soul occupies the
lowest rung in this ladder of existence, and at least according to Iamblichus, it is
completely descended into matter and incapable of ascent without tapping into the
presence and power of the intellectual gods.
Iamblichus’ understanding of prognosis builds on this Plotinian tripartite division.
It is the “knowledge” that the intellectual gods possess. This form of knowledge is not
“processable” in the way that humans might conclude 1 and 1 makes 2. Such processes
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For an accessible approach to Neoplatonic philosophy, see: A. Smith, Philosophy in Late Antiquity
(New York: Routledge, 2004).
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require the fracturing of a transcendental idea into component parts (input, function, and
output) and their placement onto a temporal axis.372 In the intellectual realm, there is no
fracturing of the idea; it is completely, fully, and instantaneously known, it is unitive in
the sense that the knower, knowing, and known are completely unified. In Iamblichus’
words, “The former (the superior class of divine beings), in a single swift moment,
comprehends the supreme ends of all activities and essences, while the latter (lower
divine beings, including the human soul) passes from some things to others, and proceeds
from the incomplete to the complete” (De. Myst. 1.7).373
Prognosis, then, is precisely this instantaneous comprehension of all things; it is a
divine mode of thinking. It is not the type of “knowledge” that humans possess, that is,
discrete bytes of information, but a divine mode of “cognition.” At one level, prognosis is
“knowledge” of the transcendental causes for all events that occur within our humanly
experienced history.374 Iamblichus writes,

If, however, it refers accounts of things happening to their causes, that is, to the gods, it receives
from them a power and knowledge that reckons things that were and will be, and take a view of all
time, and surveys events happening in time, and it participates in their order, care, and
improvement. Further, it heals sick bodies, and re-arranges many things that were discordant and
disorderly among human beings, and also it often transmits the discoveries of human skills, legal
regulations, and the establishment of customs (De Myst. 3.3).
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Plotinus himself was deeply suspicious of the power of discursive reasoning to approach the divine. See
Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 25-44.
373
Καὶ τὸ μὲν κατὰ μίαν ὀξεῖαν ἀκμὴν τὰ τέλη τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ὅλων καὶ οὐσιῶν συνείληφε, τὸ δ’ ἀπ’ ἄλλων
εἰς ἄλλα μεταβαίνει, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀτελοῦς προχωρεῖ εἰς τὸ τέλειον.
374
Iamblichus builds upon insights by Plotinus, though he seems to reject Plotinus’ views that “true
divination” or “divination” itself is incumbent upon sympathetic bonds (Enn. III.3.6). For its relationship to
Iamblichean theurgy, see: Addey, Divination, 173-89.
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Ἐὰν δὲ τοὺς λόγους τῶν γιγνομένων ἀνάγῃ πρὸς τοὺς αἰτίους αὐτῶν θεούς, δύναμιν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν
προσλαμβάνει καὶ γνῶσιν ἀναλογιζομένην ὅσα τε ἦν καὶ ὅσα ἔσται, θεωρίαν τε παντὸς χρόνου
ποιεῖται καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ συμβαινόντων ἐπισκοπεῖ τὰ ἔργα, τάξιν τε αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ
ἐπανόρθωσιν τὴν προσήκουσαν μεταλαγχάνει· καὶ τὰ μὲν κεκμηκότα σώματα θεραπεύει, τὰ δὲ
πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως ἔχοντα παρ’ ἀνθρώποις εὖ διατίθησι, τεχνῶν τε εὑρέσεις πολλάκις καὶ
διανομὰς τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν νομίμων θέσεις παραδίδωσιν.

Divine prognosis thus spans the entire breadth of time. The one who ascends acquires
this perspective when they participate with the gods’ presence at the highest level, and
thus they discern the transcendent causes for all events that play out in the course of
history. It is the gods who possess prognosis, not human beings. Indeed, Iamblichus sums
up the general rule of prognosis in this manner: “Never derive divination of the future
from those things that have no prognosis as such, but derive it from the gods who in
themselves possess the limits of all knowledge of existing things, from whom the mantic
power is distributed throughout the whole cosmos, and among all the different natures
found there” (De. Myst. 3.1).375 In other words, because the gods themselves are
omnipresent and beyond “time,” so is the potential for true divination at every place and
at any time. Nevertheless, some places, like various oracular sites, are suffused with a
greater concentration of their divine presence than others and are particularly potent sites
for contact with the divine (De Myst. 3.1, 12).

Ἀλλ’ εἷς ὅρος ὀρθὸς καὶ μία ἀρχὴ περὶ πάντων τοιούτων, μηδαμῶς ἀναιτίως παράγειν τὴν τοῦ
μέλλοντος μαντείαν ἀπὸ τῶν μηδεμίαν ἐχόντων πρόγνωσιν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν θεῶν τῶν συνεχόντων ἐν
αὑτοῖς τὰ πέρατα τῆς ὅλης εἰδήσεως τῶν ὄντων, ἀπὸ τούτων θεωρεῖν μεριζομένην τὴν μαντικὴν περὶ πάντα
τὸν κόσμον καὶ περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν αὐτῷ διῃρημένας φύσεις.
375
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Curiously, Iamblichus’ discussion of prognosis soon enters other domains; it not
only confers absolute and total “knowledge,” it also heals broken bodies, rearranges
disorderly phenomena, and transmits useful knowledge, among others. Prognosis, then, is
not mere knowledge but an expansive form of divine blessing that elevates the conditions
of humankind to a more divine level. How does this happen? At least to modern minds,
which separates ontology and epistemology into two distinct fields, this might seem odd.
Yet we must recall that, at least for Iamblichus, prognosis and divine being –
epistemology and ontology – are one and the same in the realm of the intellect; the
prognosis that the gods possess are united with their essence and their activity. Therefore,
when one participates in the gods’ prognosis, they also participate in its perfect goodness,
thus conferring the benefits mentions above. Iamblichus encapsulates this idea in his
initial response to Porphyry, saying,

Indeed, to tell the truth, the contact with the divinity is not to be taken as knowledge. Knowledge,
after all, is separated (from its object) by some degree of otherness. But prior to that which knows
another as an “other”, is the unified intertwining, which is suspended from the gods, 376 that is selfsufficient and of single form. We should not accept, then, that this is something that we can either
accede or deny, nor admit to it as ambiguous (for it remains always in a single form in accordance
with its activity), nor should we examine the question as though we were in a position either to
judge its veracity or to reject it. For it is rather the case that we are enveloped by the divine
presence, and we are filled with it, and we are ourselves by virtue of our knowledge of the gods
(De Myst. 1.3).

376

P. Struck, Birth of the Symbol: Ancient Readers at the Limits of their Texts (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2004), 218-24.
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Εἰ δὲ δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ γνῶσίς ἐστιν ἡ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον συναφή. Διείργεται γὰρ αὕτη πως
ἑτερότητι. Πρὸ δὲ τῆς ὡς ἑτέρας ἕτερον γιγνωσκούσης αὐτοφυής ἐστιν ... ἡ τῶν θεῶν ἐξηρτημένη
μονοειδὴς συμπλοκή. Οὐκ ἄρα συγχωρεῖν χρὴ ὡς δυναμένους αὐτὴν καὶ διδόναι καὶ μὴ διδόναι,
οὐδ’ ὡς ἀμφίβολον τίθεσθαι (ἕστηκε γὰρ ἀεὶ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἑνοειδῶς), οὐδ’ ὡς κυρίους ὄντας τοῦ
κρίνειν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνειν οὕτως αὐτὴν δοκιμάζειν ἄξιον· περιεχόμεθα γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ μᾶλλον ἡμεῖς
καὶ πληρούμεθα ὑπ’ αὐτῆς, καὶ αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐσμὲν ἐν τῷ τοὺς θεοὺς εἰδέναι ἔχομεν.

According to Iamblichus, knowledge of the gods is not a matter of consent or dissent; it is
the very grounding for human existence.377 Indeed, to deny that the gods are is to deny
the very ground for one’s own existence. Iamblichus’ conception of knowledge thus goes
far beyond the simple stringing together of prepositions. Rather, the knowledge of the
gods presents the ontological preconditions necessary for the human soul to ascend to the
gods, to reconnect the circuit that links the soul to the gods in the realm of the intellect.
Once reconnected, then, prognosis smuggles the human soul back to its original
epistemological and ontological “home.”
As a result of Iamblichus’ definition of prognosis as part and parcel of the divine
realm, true divination – that is, the type of divination that furnishes true and sure
knowledge – lies entirely within the domain of the gods. It is “something divine,
supernatural, sent from heaven above; both unbegotten and eternal, it takes priority by its
own nature” (De Myster. 3.1).378 Since it operates at a higher realm than the realm of the
soul, nothing within the realm of the soul – including the visible cosmic world that
Indeed, as Iamblichus goes on to say, “The knowledge of the gods is of a quite different nature, and is
far removed from all antithetical procedure (ἀντιθέσεώς τε πάσης κεχώρισται), and does not consist in the
assent to some proposition now, nor yet at the moment of one’s birth, but from all eternity it coexisted in
the soul in complete uniformity (ἀλλ’ ἦν ἐξ ἀιδίου μονοειδὴς ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ συνυπάρχουσα)” (De Myst. 1.3).
378
… θεῖον δὲ καὶ ὑπερφυὲς ἄνωθέν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταπεμπόμενον, ἀγέννητόν τε καὶ ἀίδιον
αὐτοφυῶς προηγεῖται.
377
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humans inhabit – can possess divine prognosis. As Iamblichus says, “There is no seed,
implanted by nature in us, for divine divination” (De Myst. 3.27; 3.18).379 Indeed, any
human contribution to the ascent of the soul towards the Intellect will only pervert the
ascent itself, since by asserting itself, it disturbs the perfect control of the intellectual
gods (De Myst. 2.11; 3.7; 3.22-25). Naturally, this means that human reasoning cannot
attain prognosis (De Myst. 3.15; 6.4; 10.3). Iamblichus writes,

So then, to the eternal companions of the gods, let there correspond also the innate cognition of
them. Even as they themselves possess a being of eternal identity, so too let the human soul join
itself to them in knowledge on the same terms, not employing conjecture or opinion or some form
of syllogistic reasoning, all of which takes it start from plane of temporal reality, to purse that
essence which is beyond all these things, but rather connecting itself to the gods with pure and
blameless reasonings, which it has received from all eternity from those same gods (De Myst. 1.3).

Ἐοικέτω δὴ οὖν τοῖς ἀιδίοις τῶν θεῶν συνοπαδοῖς καὶ ἡ σύμφυτος αὐτῶν κατανόησις· ὥσπερ οὖν
αὐτοὶ τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσιν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τῇ γνώσει πρὸς
αὐτοὺς συναπτέσθω, εἰκασίᾳ μὲν ἢ δόξῃ ἢ συλλογισμῷ τινι, ἀρχομένοις ποτὲ ἀπὸ χρόνου,
μηδαμῶς τὴν ὑπὲρ ταῦτα πάντα οὐσίαν μεταδιώκουσα, ταῖς δὲ καθαραῖς καὶ ἀμέμπτοις νοήσεσιν
αἷς εἴληφεν ἐξ ἀιδίου παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, ταύταις αὐτοῖς συνηρτημένη.

We should be careful to note, however, that Iamblichus does not think that “philosophy”
or syllogistic logic-chopping is entirely useless. Rather, he delimits the boundaries of
philosophy by framing it as a human endeavor, and thus incapable of causing ascent, but
still viable as a practice of enhancing human intellectual capabilities. Thus, he says that
379

θείας ἄρα μαντικῆς οὐδέν ἐστι σπέρμα ἐν ἡμῖν ἐκ φύσεως…
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the “speculations of the philosophers need to be answered on that basis” (De Myst.
1.1),380 that is, they must be answered according to the practices attributed to philosophy.
Indeed, he discusses dialectical inquiry in two of his letters. In his Letter to Dexippus, he
calls the dialectical process a “gift of the gods” (Dexippus, 15), sent down by Hermes,
whom Iamblichus calls the “God of rational discourse (ὁ λόγιος ῾Ερμῆς)” both in the
letter and in the opening line of his response to Porphyry (Θεὸς ὁ τῶν λόγων ἡγεμών,
Ἑρμῆς).381 In another letter address to Sopater, he calls dialectic the process through
which one’s intellect becomes further refined, or, “these are the purifications of one’s
discursive faculty through the practice of refutations” (Sopater, 39).382 Philosophy
therefore has a time and place, but precisely because there is a “time” and “place,” it is
useless for ascent to the gods, who are the transcendentally prior to both.
The same might be said for divination.383 Iamblichus admits that humans might be
able to cultivate a sort of prognostic skill that resembles true prognosis. The cultivation
of these skills may even make them better suited for ascent. Nevertheless, human modes
of divination furnish only an inkling of the future. After all, they “calculate the future
probabilities and estimates by certain signs, and are not trustworthy” (De Myst. 3.26).384
As such, human divination is an interpretation of things that exist within the visible
cosmos, which themselves are the effects of the transcendent causes, not the causes
themselves. In contrast, “Divine foreknowledge of future events is directed by a firm

… ἔνια δὲ καὶ τῆς τῶν φιλοσόφων θεωρίας ἐχόμενα τὰς ἐρωτήσεις ἑπομένως αὐτοῖς ποιεῖται.
See now, J.M. Dillon (ed.) and W. Polleichtner (trans.), Iamblichus of Chalcis: The Letters (Atlanta:
Society of Biblical Literature, 2009). The number following the name of the address refers to the page
numbers in this book. My translations are based on Dillon’s and Polleichtner’s.
382
ἐπειδὴ αὗταί εἰσιν αἱ διὰ τῶν ἐλέγχων καθάρσεις τῆς διανοίας.
383
See Addey, Divination, 171-213; Struck, Divination, 235-50.
384
ἐξ εἰκότων γὰρ ἀναλογίζεται τὸ μέλλον καὶ σημείοις τισὶ τεκμηριοῦται καὶ τούτοις οὐκ ἀεὶ πιστοῖς…
380
381
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knowledge, and an unshakeable assurance deriving from the causes, an indissoluble
comprehension connecting all things to all, and in the same manner, a power of an always
abiding discernment of all things as present and determinate” (De Myster. 3.26).385
Iamblichus thus reiterates his opening response to Porphyry: true prognosis proceeds
from the source of the causes – the gods inhabiting the realm of the Intellect.
To conclude, Iamblichus argues that prognosis is an utterly transcendent form of
“knowing.” As such, it is not even “knowledge” at all, at least not in the sense that
moderns today understand knowledge as discrete pieces of data or as separable from
divine beings. It is utterly different from human modes of knowing and encompasses all
knowledge at all times. In the following two sections, I use Iamblichus’ conception of
prognosis as a prism to assess theorizations of prognosis developing in two other
proximate communities, the “Jewish Christians” responsible for the Pseudo-Clementine
Homilies and the Manichaeans. I therefore seek to historicize and regionalize this aspect
of Iamblichean with recourse to proximate and contemporary communities.

The Pseudo-Clementine Homilies

The Pseudo-Clementine Homilies shapes prognosis along similar lines, namely, as
panoptic knowledge distinct from human intellection and belonging entirely to the
divine.386 Like Iamblichus, the ideas regarding prognosis constellate around words like

Τῆς δὲ θείας προνοίας τῶν ἐσομένων βέβαιος ἡ εἴδησις προηγεῖται, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰτίων ἀμετάπτωτος ἡ
πίστωσις, συνηρτημένη τε πάντων πρὸς ἅπαντα ἀδιαλύτως κατάληψις, καὶ ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ μένουσα τῶν ὅλων
ὥσπερ παρόντων καὶ ὡρισμένων διάγνωσις.
386
Dominique Côté and Annette Yoshiko Reed have already drawn attention to the Iamblichean overtones
in the Homilies and how it might fit within broader philosophical context in late antique Syria. See: D.
385
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prophecy (ἡ προφητεία) and like the Manichaeans, around revelation (ἡ ἀποκάλυψις).
Nevertheless, the purpose of prognosis differs; whereas in De Mysteriis, the gods furnish
prognosis as part-and-parcel of one’s ascent and unification with the Intellect, in the
Homilies, the prognosis of the True Prophet leads humans to recognize that True
Prophet’s words are true. The ultimate goal of the True Prophet is to return humankind to
the original worship of God, which was entirely rational and without any sacrifices.387
Humans had wandered from this original worship due to their carnal nature, a nature
rooted in the feminine principle. As a result, humans need someone from the “outside”
and untouched by this female principle to guide them out of this morass; human gnosis
requires divine prognosis to recognize truth. To make this distinction, the creators of the
Homilies must both posit a difference between mere gnosis and divine prognosis.
Curiously, as I argue here, the Homilies makes use of the same strategies that Iamblichus
deploys in his construction of true and false divination.

Côté, “Sacrifice et théurgie dans les Pseudo-Clémentines,” forthcoming(?); idem, Le thème de l’opposition
entre Pierre et Simon dans les Pseudo-Clémentines (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 2001), 10933; idem, “Orphic Theogony and the Context of the Clementines,” Christian Apocryphal Texts for the New
Millennium (forthcoming); R. Boustan and A.Y. Reed, “Blood and Atonement in the Pseudo-Clementines
and the Story of the Ten Martyrs: The Problem of Selectivity in the study of ‘Judaism’ and ‘Christianity,”
Henoch 30 (2008): 333-64, 348-49. For more on the Recognitions, the sister text of the Homilies, and true
knowledge, see: N. Kelley, Knowledge and Religious Authority in the Pseudo-Clementines: Situating the
Recognitions in Fourth Century Syria (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2006).
387
In Hom. 9.19, Peter states that those who listen to the words of the Prophet will return to the “original
saving worship that was committed to humanity” (τὴν πρώτην τῇ ἀνθρωπότητι παραδοθεῖσαν σωτήριον
θρησκείαν), which did not involve sacrifices of any sort (Hom. 8.9-22). Certain passages within the
Homilies hint at the possibility that this “original saving worship” was entirely rational. For example, the
Homilies depicts the “Golden Rule” as eminently “rational” (Hom 2.6). The rite of baptism is depicted as
somehow coded into the very nature and origin of things (Hom. 11.24-26). Abstaining from engaging in
sexual contact with a menstruating woman is seen as even “divinely” reasonable, with Peter urging the
crowd to “purify your hearts from evil through heavenly reasoning (τὴν μὲν καρδίαν τῶν κακῶν οὐρανίῳ
καθάρατε λογισμῷ; Hom. 11.28-29)!” For further, see: A.Y. Reed, “Parting Ways over Blood and Water?
Beyond ‘Judaism’ and ‘Christianity’ in the Roman Near East,” in La croisée des chemins revisitée: Quand
l’Église et la Synagoguese sont-elles distinguées? (eds. S.C. Mimouni and B. Pouderon; Paris: Cerf, 2012),
227–59.
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First, like Iamblichus’ understanding of prognosis, the Syrian “Jewish Christians”
responsible for the Homilies defined prognosis as complete knowledge of all matters at
all times. It far exceeds the minimal definition of incremental knowledge of discrete
events in the future. For example, Peter says,

If he is a prophet, and is able to know how the world came into being, and the things that are in it,
and the things that shall be to the end, if he has foretold us anything, and we have ascertained that
it has been perfectly accomplished, we easily believe that the things shall be which He says are to
be, from the things that have been already; we believe him, I say, as not only knowing, but
foreknowing (Hom. 2.10).

εἰ προφήτης ἐστὶν καὶ δύναται εἰδέναι ὡς ἐγένετο ὁ κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ εἰς
τέλος ἐσόμενα, ἐὰν ἡμῖν ᾖ τι προειρηκὼς ὃ εἰς τέλος ἐγνώκαμεν γεγενημένον, καλῶς αὐτῷ ἐκ τῶν
ἤδη γεγενημένων καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα ἔσεσθαι πιστεύομεν, οὐ μόνον ὡς γινώσκοντι, ἀλλὰ καὶ
προγινώσκοντι.

Jesus does not merely “know,” he “foreknows.” The objects of his prognosis includes the
mysteries of cosmogony, historical events, and the eschaton. Elsewhere, Peter is more
explicit about the all-encompassing range of prognosis. He says, “The prognosis of the
one true prophet comprehends not only the present, but stretches out prophecy without
limits as far as the eon to come (Hom. 3.12)…”388 Furthermore, the True Prophet’s
prognosis is not limited only to events in history, but penetrates into the secret things of
the world. As a true prophet, “he always knows all things, and even the thoughts of all
ἡ δὲ τοῦ μόνου καὶ ἀληθοῦς πρόγνωσις οὐ μόνον τὰ παρόντα ἐπίσταται, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέχρις αὐτοῦ <τοῦ>
μέλλοντος αἰῶνος ἀπέραντον ἐκτείνει τὴν προφητείαν...
388
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(Hom. 3.11)…”389 As Peter goes on to say, “As an infallible prophet, he investigates
everything through the boundless eye of the soul and knows those things escape notice
(Hom. 3.13).”390 As such, the prognosis of the True Prophet is nothing short of the
panoptic knowledge that Iamblichus describes in his construction of true prognosis.
Second, the Homilies shares Iamblichus’ doubts regarding the ability of the
human intellect to attain knowledge of the divine; humans are simply too polluted by the
carnal pleasures of the false prophetess to be able to understand “God.” Prognosis must
therefore be an entirely divine mode of knowing, distinct from both human modes of
knowledge production and attempts at prognosis. Intriguingly, in order to distinguish
mere human gnosis from divine prognosis, the Homilies uses the same strategies for
articulating difference that Iamblichus deploys, namely, contrasting it with philosophy
and against medical and divinatory forms of knowledge acquisition. In the passage
below, for example, Peter demonstrates how ill-suited philosophy is for the attainment of
truth. He writes,

Everyone, in so far as they sought the truth, they trusted themselves to be capable of finding it and
thus fell into a snare. Both the philosophers of the Greeks and the more zealous among the
barbarians have suffered such an end. For they declare their opinions concerning those things that
are not apparent by engaging things that are visible through conjectures, considering those things
to be true whenever they appear to them as such. As people who supposedly know the truth, they
still seek the truth, rejecting some suppositions that are presented to them, and laying hold of
others, as if they knew, though they do not know which things are true and which are false. And

389
390

… προφήτης δὲ ἀληθής ἐστιν ὁ πάντα πάντοτε εἰδώς, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς πάντων ἐννοίας…
προφήτης γὰρ ὢν ἄπταιστος, ἀπείρῳ ψυχῆς ὀφθαλμῷ πάντα κατοπτεύων ἐπίσταται λανθάνων.
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they lay down their opinions concerning truth, even though they seek the truth, not knowing that
he who seeks truth cannot learn it from his own error. For not even, as I said, can he recognize her
when she stand by him, since he is unacquainted with her… The lovers of words among the
Greeks– rather than the philosophers – engage such matters through conjectures, have laid down
their opinions regarding truth often and in many different ways, supposing that the apt sequence of
hypotheses is truth, not knowing that when they have decreed for themselves false beginningprinciples, then their conclusion correspond with the beginning, namely, false (Hom. 2.7-8).

πάντες μὲν οὖν ὅσοι ποτὲ ἐζήτησαν τὸ ἀληθές, τὸ δύνασθαι εὑρεῖν ἑαυτοῖς πιστεύσαντες
ἐνηδρεύθησαν. τοῦτο ὅπερ πεπόνθασιν καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων φιλόσοφοι καὶ βαρβάρων οἱ
σπουδαιότεροι· ἐκ στοχασμῶν γὰρ ἐπιβάλλοντες τοῖς ὁρατοῖς περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀπεφήναντο, τὸ
ὁπώσποτε παραστὰν αὐτοῖς, τοῦτο ἀληθὲς εἶναι νομίσαντες. ὡς γὰρ εἰδότες ἀλήθειαν οἱ ἀλήθειαν
ἔτι ζητοῦντες τῶν παρισταμένων αὐτοῖς ὑπολήψεων ἃ μὲν ἀποδοκιμάζουσιν, ἃ δὲ κρατύνουσιν
ὥσπερ εἰδότες, μὴ εἰδότες ποῖα μέν ἐστιν ἀληθῆ, ποῖα δὲ ψευδῆ. καὶ δογματίζουσιν περὶ ἀληθείας
οἱ ἀλήθειαν ἐπιζητοῦντες, οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι ὁ ἀλήθειαν ζητῶν παρὰ τῆς αὑτοῦ πλάνης μαθεῖν αὐτὴν
οὐ δύναται. οὔτε γάρ (ὡς ἔφην) παρεστηκυῖαν αὐτὴν ἐπιγνῶναι δύναται, ἣν ἀγνοεῖ… διὰ τοῦτο
καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων φιλόλογοι (οὐ φιλόσοφοι) διὰ στοχασμῶν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπιβάλλοντες
πολλὰ καὶ διάφορα ἐδογμάτισαν, τὴν οἰκείαν τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀκολουθίαν ἀλήθειαν εἶναι
νομίσαντες, οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι αὐτῶν ψευδεῖς ἀρχὰς ἑαυτοῖς ὁρισαμένων, τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτῶν τὸ τέλος
συμφωνίαν εἴληφεν.

In this dense passage, we see Peter participating in a broad critique of Greek philosophy
echoed by others like Ephrem, the rabbis, and Iamblichus himself. He recognizes that
Greek philosophy is utterly incapable of attaining truth. Indeed, those who seek truth
cannot possess truth, for how can one seek that which they possess? He points out the
logical fallacies that the philosophers and philologers, and not a few of the more
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intelligent barbarians commit, namely, thinking that a sequence of hypotheses is identical
with “truth.” Rather, Peter points out that such sequences are merely equations, the
conclusion of which would differ depending on its particular input and the function. This
is structurally similar to Iamblichus’ argument that the “soul” can ever attain to “truths”
borne of logical necessity, never to the intellectual “Truth” that undergirds such
“truths.”391 Yet “truth” operates a level removed from these functions. Indeed, even if
these philosophers attained the “truth,” they would have no objective basis for
recognizing it as such, given that their epistemological limits remain hemmed in by the
very parameters they set out. Furthermore, these philosophers can only begin with the
things that are visible to men as their starting point, which means that they are trying to
back-engineer their way to truth, a perilous task indeed.
Furthermore, prognosis stands in stark contrast to philosophy, which is mocked as
nothing more than the balancing act of “conjectures” (ὁ στοχασμός). As Peter elsewhere
argues, philosophers are not driven by a desire for truth, but by pleasure; it is what is
most pleasing to each philosopher that he holds up as truth.392 In a discussion between
Clement and his father, for example, Clement says, “There is a great difference, father,
between the words of true worship and those of philosophy (μεταξὺ τῶν θεοσεβείας
λόγων καὶ τῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας). For the demonstration of truth comes from prophecy (ἐκ
προφητείας), while philosophy, though it furnishes beautiful words, seems to offer
possibilities based on conjectures (καλλιλογίας παρέχων ἐκ στοχασμῶν)” (Hom. 15.5). It
is no accident that Clement depicts philosophy as furnishing “beautiful” arguments in so

391
392

De Myst. 1.3.
Homs. 2.8.
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far as this (false) beauty seduces philosophers into thinking that they know the truth.
Clement signals a difference between pleasure and truth, philosophy and prophecy, the
false prophetess and the True Prophet Jesus, recalling the broader epistemological system
described in chapter three.
The Homilies presents another approach of prognosis by relating it with the
concept of revelation. While it is true that the word prognosis does not explicitly show up
in this chapter, its description of the revelation coheres well with the definition of
prognosis mentioned above. In the following scene, Peter recounts how he knew that
Jesus was the “Son of the Living God.”393 He struggles to come up with an answer and
concedes that he did not know how he came to know Jesus’ identity. He writes,

Thus the Son was revealed to me by the Father. For I know the power of revelation, having
learned it on my own. For when the Lord said, ‘Who do they say that I am,’ and when I heard
someone saying one thing about him and another something else, it rose up into my heart to say,
and I know not how I said it, ‘You are the Son of the Living God.’ He (Jesus), having declared me
blessed, disclosed to me that it was the Father who had revealed this to me. I learned that
revelation is learning that is untaught, without vision nor dreams. For this is truly the case. For the
entirety of Truth is…. placed in us from God spermatically, but it is covered and revealed by the
hand of God, according to the merit of the knowledge operating within each person. (Hom. 17.18).

οὕτως γὰρ κἀμοὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀπεκαλύφθη ὁ υἱός. διὸ οἶδα τίς δύναμις ἀποκαλύψεως, ἀφ’
ἑαυτοῦ μαθών. ἅμα γὰρ τῷ τὸν κύριον εἰπεῖν τίνα αὐτὸν λέγουσιν, καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλο τι λέγοντας
αὐτὸν ἀκηκοότος ἐμοῦ, ἐπὶ τῆς καρδίας ἀνέβη· οὐκ οἶδα οὖν πῶς εἶπον· «Σὺ εἶ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ζῶντος
θεοῦ». τὸν δὲ μακαρίσαντά με μηνῦσαί μοι τὸν ἀποκαλύψαντα πατέρα εἶναι, ἐμὲ δὲ ἔκτοτε μαθεῖν
393

Matthew 12:12.
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ὅτι τὸ ἀδιδάκτως, ἄνευ ὀπτασίας καὶ ὀνείρων, μαθεῖν ἀποκάλυψίς ἐστιν. καὶ ἀληθῶς οὕτως ἔχει.
ἐν γὰρ τῇ ἐν ἡμῖν ἐκ θεοῦ τεθείσῃ σπερματικῶς ... πᾶσα ἔνεστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια, θεοῦ δὲ χειρὶ σκέπεται
καὶ ἀποκαλύπτεται, τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἑκάστου εἰδότος.

This passage is embedded within a larger argument that visions and apparitions do not
furnish the proper means for instruction. Peter here, however, sweeps the rug underneath
the argument; in fact, revelatory knowledge is fundamentally untransmittable, and as
Peter’s difficulty in explaining how he knew Jesus’s identity suggests, completely beyond
discursive formulation. It is “learning that is entirely untaught.” Instead, “truth” bubbles
up from within one’s very being, where it already resides. This conception of revelatory
knowledge makes sense within the ontological makeup of the human body, which is
composed by the mixture of the female principle of carnality and male principle of reason
and truth.394 This passage riffs on the idea particular to the Homilies that humans are
ontologically capable of “knowing all things,” but due to the polluting effects of the false
prophetess in their bodies, humans are unable to do so apart from the intervention of God
the Father, the masculine “root” of human existence, who “reveals” the truth already
within one’s soul. Ultimately, at least in my argument, the idea that “revelation” is
unlearned knowledge again echoes Iamblichus own argument that divine prognosis
cannot be taught, cultivated, or transmitted; it belongs entirely in the domain of the gods.
The Homilies also distinguishes true prognosis from medical and divinatory
prognosis. Peter says,

394

Hom. 20.2.

211

We should not simply accept his prognosis as such, but only if it can stand apart from some other
pretext. For physicians predict certain things through underlying pulses, and some predict through
birds, and some through sacrifices, and others through all sorts of different object. Yet they are not
prophets. If anyone should say that such predictions are similar to truly innate prognosis, he
would be much deceived. For even when a predictor is correct, he only declares things pertaining
to the present. Nevertheless, even these things are useful to me, for they establish that there is such
a thing as prognosis… (Hom. 3.11-12)

διὸ ἡμεῖς ὀφείλομεν περὶ τῆς προγνώσεως αὐτοῦ μὴ ἁπλῶς διαλαμβάνειν, ἀλλ’ εἰ δύναται ἄνευ
ἑτέρας προφάσεως συνεστάναι αὐτοῦ ἡ πρόγνωσις. ἃ γὰρ οἱ ἰατροὶ προλέγουσιν, ὑποβεβλημένην
ὕλην ἔχοντες τοῦ νοσοῦντος τὸν σφυγμόν (καὶ οἱ μὲν πτηνά, οἱ δὲ θύματα, καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλας ὕλας
πολλὰς διαφόρους ὑποβεβλημένας ἔχοντες) προλέγουσιν, καὶ προφῆται οὐκ εἰσίν. εἰ δὲ βουληθείη
τις λέγειν τὴν διὰ τῶν τοιούτων πρόρρησιν τῇ ὄντως ἐνφύτῳ προγνώσει ὁμοίαν εἶναι, πολὺ
ἠπάτηται. τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα παρόντα μηνύει μόνον, καὶ ταῦτα εἰ ἀληθεύει (ἄλλως δέ μοι καὶ αὐτὰ
εὐχρηστεῖ· πρόγνωσιν γὰρ εἶναι συνίστησιν)

Though Peter acknowledges that physicians like Galen and various oracles might offer
something that resembles prognosis, he states that such practices only grasp at
incremental knowledge of immediate events. This is in contrast to true prognosis, which
as we saw, “stretches out prophecy without limits as far as the eon to come (Hom.
3.12)…” We are therefore dealing with two different kinds of prognosis: one that
masquerades as truth yet is in fact an interpretation of a particular cause, be it a pulse or
the flight pattern of birds, and another sort that is “truly innate.” In my opinion, this
distinction mirrors a similar distinction that Iamblichus makes in his discussion of wildly
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diverse divinatory practices.395 In short, Iamblichus argues that there are true divinatory
practices – which lead to divine prognosis – and false ones, which amount to nothing
more than human calculation or cultivation of human skill.396 Peter makes a similar
move; whether they are measuring pulses, reading bird patterns, sacrifices, or “many
other means,” they are ultimately nothing more than predictions, hence the repeated use
of the verb προλέγω to mark predictions of immediate events. True prognosis, Peter tells
us, is “truly innate”, and ultimately “needs nothing more for comprehension, not
prophesying darkly and ambiguously, so that the spoken words would need another
prophet for their comprehension, but clearly and simply, as our teacher and prophet, by
the innate and ever-flowing Spirit, always knew all things (Hom. 3.12).”397
What does it mean that prognosis is “innate” (ἔμφυτος)? Peter repeats the claim
that true prognosis is innate to the True Prophet multiple times throughout the Homilies
(Hom. 2.10; 3.11, 15, 22, 26). Prognosis does not come from causes external to the True
Prophet, e.g., in nature or in the “present,” but channels into the True Prophet through his
particular somatic composition. Indeed, as I had already discussed in the previous
chapter, the True Prophet is uniquely capable of prognosis because he is ‘homoousias’
with God the father, in contrast to normal humans who are by nature incapable of
prognosis without the direct intervention of God the father, as we saw in Peter’s case.

Iamblichus writes, “There are, therefore, many kinds of divine possession and divine inspiration is
aroused in many ways. Hence, there are indeed many different signs for it…. As a result of these
diversities, the characteristics of those inspired are also many kinds (Ἔστι δὴ οὖν πολλὰ τῆς θείας
κατοκωχῆς εἴδη καὶ πολλαχῶς ἡ θεία ἐπίπνοια ἀνακινεῖται, ὅθεν δὴ καὶ πολλὰ τὰ σημεῖα αὐτῆς ἐστι καὶ
διαφέροντα…. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων καὶ τὰ σημεῖα τῶν ἐπιπνεομένων γίγνονται πολυειδῆ; De Myst. 3.5, 9-16)...”
396
De Myst. 3.15; 6.4; 10.3; Addey, Divination, 248-50; Struck, Divination, 235-43.
397
… καὶ οὐδενὸς δεῖται πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν προφητεύων ἀμαυρὰ καὶ ἀμφίβολα, ἵνα ἄλλου προφήτου χρείαν
ἔχῃ τὰ λεγόμενα πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν, ἀλλὰ ῥητὰ καὶ ἁπλᾶ, ὥσπερ ὁ διδάσκαλος ἡμῶν καὶ προφήτης ὢν ἐνφύτῳ
καὶ ἀεννάῳ πνεύματι πάντα πάντοτε ἠπίστατο.
395
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The same “ever-flowing Spirit” that rendered the True Prophet capable of “changing
forms” as he traversed history also supplies him with prognosis. Like Iamblichus, then,
prognosis is possessed, not produced. Seen from this angle, both Iamblichus and the
Homilies can be seen as responding to the possibility that prognosis could exist
somewhere beyond the divine. Just as Iamblichus argues that the gods alone are
responsible for furnishing true prognosis, so too the Homilies argues that only he who is
ontologically divine could possess it. For both, prognosis completely transcended mere
gnosis; divination, medical arts, cultivation of skill, philosophy, and other modes of
discursive reasoning had to be reinterpreted as merely human endeavors, unfit for true
forms of divine prognosis. In this way, both the Homilies and Iamblichus arrive at a
similar conception of divine prognosis: panoptic “knowledge” distinct from human
modes of intellection and possessed only by the gods.

The Light Mind and Prognosis in the Kephalaia of the Teacher
Unlike Peter and Iamblichus, “Mani” – or at least the Mani available to us through the
surviving literature – does not distinguish his understanding of revelation from discursive
processes of knowledge acquisition nor from medical epistemologies. Like them,
however, Mani distinguishes between prognosis and divination (ⲣⲉϥⲕⲁⲟⲩⲛⲟⲩ).
Nevertheless, we can trace a distinctly Syrian trajectory on the concept of “prophecy” as
it shifts from the Sasanian milieu to the Roman Near East. As I argue below,
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Manichaeans living in the Roman Near East398 began to conceptualize their prophet’s
understanding of “revelation” as prognosis (Coptic: ⲛⲟⲩⲡⲣⲟⲅⲛⲱⲥⲧⲏⲥ, from Greek
prognosis). While we cannot discern direct lines of influence extending from Iamblichus
or the Homilies to the Manichaeans, the very deployment of prognosis as a shorthand for
revelatory knowledge intersects with ideas of the same articulated by Iamblichus and the
Homilies. Like the others, these Manichaeans understood prognosis as total panoptic
knowledge, not limited to knowledge of future events, and as uniquely characteristic of
one’s divine ontology. Indeed, as we will see in this section, it is Mani’s prognosis that
most characterizes him as a prophet, the “Apostle of Jesus Christ.” Ultimately, then, the
resonance of revelatory concepts clustering around prognosis furnishes evidence that
Manichaeans in the Roman Near East were theorizing prophecy in ways that resonated
with their Syrian neighbors.
In order to sharpen our reading of Manichaean conceptions of revelation as
embodied in the Kephalaia of the Teacher, it is helpful to first to look at the passages
from the Cologne Mani Codex, where we see a variety of different modes of acquiring
revelation. We have already explored the idea of “rapture” as found in Baraies the
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While scholarship on the Coptic Kephalaias have proceeded apace, there remains much that needs to be
clarified. I depend primarily on Pettipiece’s and van Lindt’s suggestions that the Kephalaias emerged as a
recognizable genre of Manichaean literature somewhere in late antique Syria, most likely, Palmyra. See
Pettipiece, Pentadic Redaction, 90; van Lindt, Names, 225-30. As for the “vexed” problem of the possible
“Syriac” originals of the Kephalaia, see Pettipiece, Pentadic Redaction, 12 f. 22. His wariness with fixing a
Syriac original is laudable. One might question, however, whether there was even a “Greek” translation at
all, which would mean that Kephalaia was written in Egypt and in Coptic. If so, this would dramatically
undermine my argument here. Nevertheless, the very fact that the Kephalaia routinely mentions
Mesopotamian communities like the Baptists and Nazoreans, little known Sasanian places like Mesene and
Susiana, and figures like Shapur and Ardashir makes it likely that the Kephalaia was ultimately rooted in
Sasanian Mesopotamia. At the same time, the very fact that its contents and literary structure presupposes
missionizing activities, coupled with the dearth of any “Eastern” texts in Sogdian or Uyghur that resemble
the Coptic Kephalaia, helps us fix the Kephalaia to the earliest missionary efforts to the Roman Near East,
that is, to late antique Syria.
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Teacher’s homily to his brothers in the second chapter of this dissertation. In this section,
I look to Mani’s understanding of revelation as found in his Letter to Edessa (CMC
63.13-65.22). In this letter, Mani writes,

I did not receive the truth and the secrets of which I speak, nor the laying of hands that is in my
possession, from men nor from fleshly creatures, nor even from my engagement with the
scriptures. But when my most blessed father, who called me into his grace, since he did not wish
that I and the rest of those in the world perish, saw me and pitied me, with the purposes of offering
well-being to those prepared to be chosen by him from the various sects. Then, by his grace, he
pulled me from the council of the many who do not recognize the truth. He revealed to me his
secrets and those of his undefiled father and of the whole cosmos. He revealed to me how they
existed before the creation of the world, and how the foundation for all works, both good and evil,
was laid, and how they manufactured the things that came from this mixture in those times…

τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὰ ἀπόρρητα ἅπερ διαλέγομαι καὶ ἡ χειροθεσία ἡ οὖσα παρ᾿ ἐμοὶ οὐκ ἐξ
ἀν[θρώπ]ων αὐτὴν παρέλαβον ἢ σαρκικῶν πλασμάτων, ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲ ἐκ τῶν ὁμιλιῶν τῶν γραφῶν.
ἀλλ᾿ ὁπηνίκα θεωρήσας με οἴκτιρέν [με] ὁ μακαριώτατος [πατὴρ] ὁ καλέσας με εἰς τὴν χάριν
αὐτοῦ καὶ μὴ [βουλ]ηθείς με ἀπολέσθαι [και] τοὺς λοιποὺς τοὺς [ἐν τῷ κ]όσμωι, ὅπως ὀρέ[ξηιτην]
εὐζωσ[ίαν] ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἑτοίμοις ἐκλεγῆναι αὐτῶι ἐκ τῶν δομάτων, καὶ τότε τῆι αὐτοῦ χάριτι
ἀπέσπασέ με ἀπὸ τοῦ συνεδρίου τοῦ πλήθους τοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ γινώσκοντος καὶ ἀπεκάλυψε
μοι τά τε αὐτοῦ ἀπόρρητα καὶ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀχράντου καὶ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου. ἐξέφηνε δέ μοι
καθ᾿ ὅν ὑπῆρχον τρόπον πρὶν καταβολῆς κόσμου καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἐτέθη ἡ κρηπὶς τῶν ἔργων πάντων
ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ φαύλων καὶ ποίωι τρόπωι ἐτεκτονεύσαντο τὰ ἐκ τῆς συγκράσεως κατὰ τούτους
τοὺς... καιροὺς καὶ κ...
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What is striking about this passage is that Mani contrasts revelatory knowledge – as well
as his authority to “lay hands” – with knowledge one might gain from other humans,
from “fleshly creatures,” or from the scriptures.399 Mani therefore assumes that
“revelation” – here marked as “truth” and “secrets” – cannot be acquired through human
means or even from “learning” from the scriptures.400 We are not told, unfortunately, how
the Father “revealed” [ἀπεκάλυψε] such secrets to Mani. We can nevertheless flesh out
different conceptions of revelation through the CMC, which, as a whole, presents
multiple mediums for acquiring revelatory knowledge. For example, whereas Baraies the
Teacher privileged “rapture” as the marker of a true prophet, the CMC also regularly
presents other mediums for revelatory knowledge, such as visions, voices, and
“assumption,” as seen most dramatically by Mani’s recognition of and unification with
his divine Twin. We should be cautious of separating these different modes too sharply
with one another since they all lead to the same “content” – revelatory knowledge.
Before turning to the Kephalaia to understand how it conceives of prognosis, it is
necessary first to explain the relationship between the Light Mind [ⲡⲛⲟⲩⲥ ⲛⲟⲩⲁⲓⲛⲉ] – who
is the immediate source of revelatory knowledge – and the human body. For
Manichaeans, one of the most potent sites for exploring the interface between the divine
399

One might speculate why Mani addressed the Edessans in this manner. We should of course be mindful
that this is only an excerpt of the letter. Nevertheless, it is not implausible to think that the Edessans had a
particularly difficult time accepting Mani’s claims, especially because his teachings seem to be derivative
of other “Christian” and “Jewish” doctrines. If this much is accepted, Mani may be arguing that he did not,
in fact, receive his teachings from these communities or from their books, but that he received it entirely
through revelation.
400
For an alternate translation, see, G. Fox and J, Sheldon (trans.), Greek and Latin Sources on
Manichaean Cosmogony and Ethics (ed. S.N.C. Lieu; Corpus Fontium Manichaeorum Series Subsidia VI;
Turnhout: Belgium, 2010), 7. They translate this passage as “I did not receive from men or being of flesh
nor from written communications…” I think this downplays the importance of texts within the early
Manichaean movement, though it is difficult to be sure how best to translate this phrase. In any case, it does
not change the fact that Mani is arguing that he received revelations directly from a divine source.
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and the material lay in thinking through the effects of the Light Mind [ⲡⲛⲟⲩⲥ ⲛⲟⲩⲁⲓⲛⲉ]
inhabiting fleshly bodies. After all, according to Manichaean anthropogony, the human
body was formed as a perpetual prison for the divine light particles. It teemed with
demonic forces that polluted the very marrow of the bones with their evil influence.
Consequently, demons directed human thinking, epistemology, and their various carnal
appetites. The Manichaeans called this demonically-controlled human being the “Old
Man” (ⲡⲣⲙ ⲛⲉⲥ). When one accepted the teachings of Mani, however, the Light Mind
inhabited the fleshly body and subdued the sinful impulses ruling the body, turning the
person into a “New Man” (ⲡⲣⲙ ⲛⲃⲣⲣⲉ).401 But surely, the presence of a god within one’s
body must have had some visible, spiritual, or epistemological effects on one’s being! In
one chapter of the Kephalaia, for example, a disciple asks how a perfect god like the
Light Mind could occupy a small fleshly body in the first place, and why the person still
continues to suffer despite the presence of the Light Mind in his body, and other such
questions.402 In another incident, Mani chastises a congregation of Elect who dared to
laugh at a deformed member of their own congregation. The Light Mind is not visible to
the world, he proclaims, yet it had already perfected the ugly man’s body. 403 Another
disciple asks Mani why he is sometimes gloomy, irritable, and sometimes he is joyful
despite the presence of the Light Mind in his body. 404 Here, Mani acknowledges that the
work of the Light Mind is ongoing, yet blames the stars and the ill-effects of various
foods for one’s ongoing troubles, thereby carefully avoiding the possibility that the Light
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See, e.g., 1 Ke 56 (137.12-144.12).
1 Ke 38 (89.21-90.3).
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Mind could be at fault. Finally, one disciple asks, why an Elect member does not acquire
foreknowledge [ⲡⲣⲟⲅⲛⲱⲥⲧⲏⲥ] in the same way that the Apostle, in this case, the Prophet
Mani, does when the Light Mind inhabits their fleshly body.405
We will spend some time on this question, but it is again necessary to take another
detour into Manichaean system of emanation. This disciple’s question makes sense only
within the context of the Manichaean system of emanation. Indeed, the Light Mind is
sometimes referred to as the Father of all the Apostles [ⲡⲓⲱⲧ ⲛⲛⲁⲡⲟⲥⲧⲟⲗⲟⲥ ⲧⲏⲣⲟⲩ],406 or
sometimes just the Father.407 This is because the Light Mind is directly responsible for
calling into existence the three powers responsible for the active salvation of humankind:
the Apostle of Light, the Twin, and the Light Form. The Apostle of Light is the preincarnate form of the historical prophets, that is, Buddha, Zoroaster, Jesus, and of course,
Mani. The Twin is tasked with guiding and aiding the Apostle spread the gospel. When a
person accepts Mani’s teachings, the Light Nous descends to inhabit the body of the
proselyte and begins to transform the Old Man, whose body is occupied by the forces of
sin, into the New Man, whose body is now ruled by the five counsels of the Light Mind:
Love, Faith, Perfection, Patience, and Consideration.408 When the Manichaean dies, the
Light Form comes to redeem the soul of the departed and guide it back to kingdom of
light.
Within this soteriological drama, then, the Light Mind “fathers” the Apostle, the
Twin, and the Light Form. Therefore, these are all reflections of one another and
405

1 Ke 102 (255.22-257.7).
1 Ke 7 (35.21-22).
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1 Ke 20 (64.8-9).
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For further descriptions of the Light Mind, see: 1 Ke 9, 56, 96, 99, 38, 114. For recent translations of the
same theme in 2 Ke, see Gardner and Lieu, Manichaean Texts, 227-29.
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involved in the process of redemption. Yet there is a problem here: the Light Mind, who
“fathers” the Apostle also inhabits the fleshly body of the Elect. Therefore, why is the
Elect not an Apostle? And more specifically, why does he not share in the same
prognosis as the Apostle? After all, it is the Light Mind who is responsible for furnishing
the Apostle with revelatory knowledge. In one Kephalaia, Mani says, “The Light Mind
also, which came from the beloved Christ and was sent to the holy Church, is a letter
[ⲟⲩⲉⲡⲓⲥⲧⲟⲗⲏ] of peace too, in which all the revelations and wisdom [ⲛⲁⲡⲟⲕⲁⲗⲩⲯⲓⲥ ⲧⲏⲣⲟⲩ
ⲙⲛ ⲧⲥⲟⲫⲓⲁ] are written down / all in the light and everything that had happened… it was
prior to all mankind, and all that… to happen at the last in it, as the holy church shall
understand all things [ⲙⲙⲉ ⲁϩⲱⲃ ⲛⲓⲙ].”409 The Light Mind therefore furnishes revelatory
knowledge to the Apostle and these revelations encompass the entire scope of history,
from the moments “prior to mankind” and the eschaton. It therefore stands to reason that
an Elect should also possess the prognosis, since he too is inhabited by the Light Nous.
Let us now return to where we left off, with the Elect asking Mani why the Elect
do not receive the same prognosis that the Apostle Mani received.

Once again, one of the Elect questioned the Apostle, saying to him: The Light Mind that shall
come and be revealed of the Holy Church, and assumes the [body of the] faithful and the elect:
Why shall it not deposit [ⲙⲁϥϭⲁⲓⲗⲉ] prognosis [ⲛⲟⲩⲡⲣⲟⲅⲛⲱⲥⲧⲏⲥ, from Greek prognosis] to them
as for the apostle? In my opinion, it ought to be revealed to them in a revelation [ⲛϭⲱⲗⲡ ⲁⲃⲁⲗ ⲛⲉⲩ
ϩⲛ ⲟⲩⲁⲡⲟⲕⲁⲗⲩⲯⲓⲥ, from Greek apocalypse]. Just as all things are unveiled for the apostle [ⲟⲩⲁⲛϩ
ⲁϫⲛ ⲡⲁⲡⲟⲥⲧⲟⲗⲟⲥ], so also should they be revealed for the elect and they become foreknowers
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[ⲛϭⲱⲗⲡ ⲁⲃⲁⲗ ⲛⲛⲉⲕⲗⲉⲕⲧⲟⲥ ⲛⲥⲉⲣϣⲁⲣⲡ ⲛⲣⲉϥⲥⲁⲩⲛⲉ]. So that they will attain those matters, be they
easy or difficult. You ought to find them, knowing each other’s heart, because the child of the
Apostle is the Mind. For whoever understands it is able to unveil all things from it [ϩⲱⲃ ⲛⲓⲙ ϭⲱⲗⲡ
ⲛⲉϥ ⲁⲃⲁⲗ], just as with the apostle! (1 Ke 102; 255.26-256.4)

The Elect asks Mani why the rest of the Elect do not gain the same prognosis that the
Apostle gains even though the Light Mind dwells within both the Apostle and the Elects.
In fact, it would be beneficial for the Elect to have this prognosis since then they would
succeed in all their endeavors; they would become “Foreknowers.”410
In response, Mani assures the Elect that the Light Mind can indeed bestow
prognosis through revelations to the Elect, yet it chooses not to do so. Mani provides five
practical, totally uninspiring, reasons:411 1) If they received prognosis, then they would
become apostles and not be humble; 2) They would come to know one another’s “hearts”
and “counsel and considerations,” and they will come to despise on other; 3) Knowing
one another’s evil “counsel”, they will become enemies and disrupt the unity of the
Church; 4) They will know the length of their bodily existence and squander it; 412 5)
They would “reveal” (ⲛⲉⲩⲁϭⲁⲗⲡⲥ ⲁⲃⲁⲗ) their prognosis to “magicians and diviners”

Interestingly, Hippolytus states that the Elchasaites called themselves “foreknowers” (προγνωστικοὺς;
Refutations 10.3). The word here in Coptic is ⲡⲣⲟⲅⲛⲱⲥⲧⲏⲥ. It is clearly a Greek loan word, made all the
more striking by the fact its juxtaposition with the “native” Coptic word for “foreknowers” [ⲛⲥⲉⲣϣⲁⲣⲡ
ⲛⲣⲉϥⲥⲁⲩⲛⲉ]. Greek words abound in Coptic, so it is difficult to assess exactly how much weight one should
give to the use of the Greek loan-word here.
411
Mani’s responses to the Elect’s questions are clearly constructed in order to fit the broader pentadic
redaction of the entire Kephalaia. For example, his first response amounts to nothing more than a claim that
the Elect and the Apostle are different. His second and third responses are nearly synonymous and the
fourth and fifth responses demonstrates an astonishingly low level of confidence in the Elect. We are
therefore probably not dealing with the ipsissima verba of Mani. If so, we are in a stronger position to
assert that this particular chapter emerged from a period following Mani’s death, again somewhere in the
Roman Near East, most likely Syria itself.
412
This passage is too fragmented to get its exact meaning.
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(ⲛⲛⲙⲁⲅⲓⲥ… ⲛⲓⲣⲉϥⲕⲁⲟⲩⲛⲟⲩ; Magician [ⲛⲛⲙⲁⲅⲓⲥ] is distinct from Zoroastrian Magi, who
are ⲙⲙⲁⲅⲟⲩⲥⲁⲓⲟⲥ), who would go around the world making money. Mani concludes this
chapter by saying that the Elect will indeed gain prognosis once they are released from
their evil bodies, saying “Everything that has occurred and that will occur is unveiled to
them [ⲧⲟⲧⲉ ⲛⲧⲉ ϩⲱⲃ ⲛⲓⲙ ⲉⲁϥϣⲱⲡⲉ ⲙⲛ ⲡⲉⲧⲛⲁϣⲱⲡⲉ ϭⲱⲗⲡ ⲛⲉⲩ ⲁⲃⲁⲗ]!”
The concept of prognosis here coheres well with both Iamblichus’ and the
Homilies’ understanding of prognosis. First, prognosis is clearly more than just
knowledge of future events; like the definitions of prognosis as panoptic knowledge
discussed earlier, prognosis here encompasses the entire scope of history, knowledge of
one’s lifespan, and delves into the very minds of humans. It is relayed via “revelations”
[ϩⲛ ⲟⲩⲁⲡⲟⲕⲁⲗⲩⲯⲓⲥ] straight from the Light Mind to the Apostle. Second, the Prophet’s
prognosis differs from the attempts to grasp prognosis by the “magicians” and “diviners,”
whom the Coptic word specifies and limits as “Diviners of a Moment (ⲟⲩⲛⲟⲩ).”
Prognosis therefore not only distinguishes between the Prophet and the Elect, it is far
superior to prognosis of magicians and diviners, echoing constructions of divine
prognosis as distinct from the sorts of “traditional” divination discussed above. Finally,
prognosis marks the prophet’s ontological unity with the divine – here configured as the
recognition and the assumption of the Light Mind and the principle of the Apostle into
the body of Mani413 and his church, respectively. While Mani’s responses to the Elect
betray a lack of confidence in the elite of his own Church, this chapter of the Kephalaia
demonstrates that Manichaeans were thinking intensively about the ontological and
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epistemological interface between the divine and material through ambient notions of
prognosis.

Conclusion

In this chapter I argued that the late antique Syrian Syrians participated in a broader
discourse on the epistemological limits of prognosis. I traced these converging lines
along three communities in particular, the “Neoplatonists,” the “Jewish Christians”
responsible for the Ps.-Clementine Homilies, and the Manichaeans. At the same time,
other proximate communities like the Syriac-speaking Christians and the rabbis rejected
the possibilities of human beings “grasping” divine knowledge. When we study these
communities side-by-side, therefore, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the late
antique Syrian intellectual environment nurtured such discourse on divine knowledge
which in turn shaped the environment itself. In the next chapter, I extend this argument to
Jewish materials and argue that we can see how the broader discourse on prognosis might
have shaped Jewish conceptions of “Torah” in the post-Talmudic era.
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CHAPTER FIVE: ANGELIC CONTEMPLATION IN THE SAR TORAH MACROFORM

In the previous chapter I argued that late antique Syrians were theorizing about prophecy
along converging lines. I tracked this shift by attending to the ways that they fashioned
prognosis as divine, panoptic knowledge. No longer anchored to horizontal models of
information production, prognosis switched polarities, moving from the earthbound
grasping after bits of data to intimate participation with the divine. Of course, individuals
and communities theorized prognosis through the prism of their own traditions, histories,
and resources. Whereas Iamblichus argued that one could only grasp prognosis by
participating in the activity of the gods who possessed the transcendent causes for all
encosmic events, the Ps.-Clementine Homilies characterized prognosis as panoptic
knowledge that coursed through the prophet Jesus by virtue of his ontological connection
with God the Father. Furthermore, given the fact that they emerge from a shared milieu, it
is not surprising that they both fashioned this understanding of prognosis against both
“false” forms of prophecy and Greek models of knowledge production, especially
philosophy. Manichaeans too discussed prognosis along similar lines, claiming that it
belonged only to the embodied principle of the Prophet, Mani, and distinguished this
definition of panoptic divine prognosis from the type of prognostic knowledge gained
from traditional divinatory practices. At the same time, rabbis and Syriac-speaking
Christians began to delimit the proper boundaries of intellectual inquiry on divine
matters, emphasizing the impropriety or the impossibility of attaining knowledge
reserved for the divine. This shift, I argued, may have been spurred by circulating interest
in and theorizations of divine knowledge among these other Syrian communities.
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In this chapter, I extend my argument to the earliest body of Jewish “mystical”
literature – the Hekhalot corpus. It must be stated from the outset that the origins and
continued transmission of the Hekhalot corpus are still live topics of debate, as I
elaborate below. Indeed, the very categories of “origin” – in so far as it supposes a single
moment of emergence – and “transmission” – in so far as it supposes a discrete object
passing through time and space – are ill-suited for the study of a corpus as radically fluid
and varied as the Hekhalot literature. As such, this chapter makes no explicit attempt at
placing the Hekhalot corpus within “Late Antique Syria.” Rather, it attempts to tease out
overlapping concerns and shared developments in conceptualizations of “divine
knowledge” found within the Hekhalot corpus. In other words, I experiment with
contextualizing the Hekhalot corpus by placing it within the converging ideas of
prognosis discussed in the previous chapters, thereby examining this corpus as a
“privileged example” for how this broader “prognostic turn” might prove instructive for
understanding late antique Jewish conceptions of divine knowledge.414 I do not seek to
make a strong argument regarding the “originary” provenance of this corpus. I look more
specifically at the Sar Torah macroform [§§281-294, 297-206], which is appended to the
macroform known as Hekhalot Rabbati [§§81-121, 152-173, 189-277].415 I argue that the
Sar Torah’s strategy for marketing its “magical” means of acquiring Torah rhetorically
constructs a difference between human and angelic modes of comprehension, and
I adopt J.Z. Smith’s understanding of “privileged example.” See: J.Z. Smith, Drudgery Divine: On the
Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1990), vii-viii.
415
In light of the often radical textual fluidity of Hekhalot texts, I adopt Schäfer’s distinction between
“microforms” and “macroforms.” See: P. Schäfer, The Hidden and Manifest God: Some Major Themes in
Early Jewish Mysticism (trans. A. Pomerance; Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992), 6
n. 14. Microforms and macroforms are referenced through Schäfer’s Synopse. See: P. Schäfer (ed.),
Synopse zur Hekhalot-Literatur (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1981).
414
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between an “inert” Torah and the “divine aspects” of Torah. Whereas the Sar Torah
macroform aligns its conception of an “inert” Torah alongside rabbinic models of
handling Torah, which it portrays as a profoundly fleshly and corporeal mode of
comprehension, it fashions the “divine aspects” of Torah as something both
instantaneously knowable and as requiring a non-human angelic mode of instantaneous
comprehension. Both are complementary strategies for marketing the Sar Torah, and
both, I argue, reflect an analogous development alongside the notion of prognosis
discussed in the previous chapter.

Contextualizing the Hekhalot Corpus
Despite a lack of a consensus regarding the provenance, purpose, or even the “proper
approach” to the Hekhalot corpus, scholars have begun to secure a clearer picture of its
development.416 Crucial to this enterprise has been the growing awareness of the
differences between those traditions that would make their way into the Hekhalot corpus
and the Hekhalot corpus itself as a coherent body of literature. For example, following
the pivotal work by earlier scholars, Boustan has recently argued that the Hekhalot corpus
as a coherent body of literature emerged sometime in the seventh century and developed
only afterwards.417 In so doing, he distinguishes between “Hekhalot”-like traditions,
which are a motley jumble and compilations of theurgic names, songs, and prayers that

For a review of approaches to Hekhalot literature, see: R. Boustan, “The Study of Heikhalot Literature:
Between Mystical Experience and Textual Artifact,” Currents in Biblical Research 6:1 (2007): 130-60.
417
R. Boustan, “The Emergence of Pseudonymous Attribution in Heikhalot Literature: Empirical Evidence
from the Jewish ‘Magical’ Corpora,” JSQ 14 (2007): 18-38; Michael Swartz, Mystical Prayer in Ancient
Judaism: An Analysis of Ma‘aseh Merkavah (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992), 219.
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emerged from a diverse range of contexts, and the Hekhalot corpus proper, which
organizes and authorizes those traditions by drawing on various literary structures and
figures from rabbinic literature. Boustan employs the stratigraphic method used by
Michael Swartz, whose work also attends to the diverse literary strata within the Hekhalot
corpus.418 Swartz, for his part, has demonstrated through both internal and external
evidence that the earliest traditions (in this case, pre-classical piyyut) that would
eventually make their way into the Hekhalot corpus emerged in diverse contexts and
were later redacted together to become the Hekhalot literature as we know it. These
traditions emerged sometime in 4th-7th century Palestine, putting them within the orbit of
the texts studied thus far.419 Swartz corroborates this late antique Palestinian context by
bringing in external evidence from an early “pre-classical” piyyut in the genre of seder
beriyot to bear on the discussion.420 For the sake of demonstration, I reproduce the crucial
section of the piyyut here:

With whom did you take counsel / and who comprehended you / when you determined to perfect /
the heavenly host? / In your heart you decided / in your thought you conceived / in which wise to
create them / and with what seal. / In joy you created seven palaces for yourself / and for every
palace its contents are known. / Their doors you beat down / and appointed guards / and one must
show a seal / to every guard.
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Babylonia and Back,” in Hekhalot Literature in Context: Between Byzantium and Babylonia (eds. R.
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בלבך נמלכתה במחשבותיך בנתה כאיזה צד. את מי נועצתה אז מי הבינך בשורך לשכלל צבא עליונים
 דלתותם דפקתה. גהצתה ובראתה לך היכלות שבעה וכל היכל והיכל ידוע מה בו.לברותם ובאיזה חותם
...ושומרים מיניתה וחותם להראות לכל שומר ושומר

This passage contains many of the key ideas found in Hekhalot literature: the heavens are
described as seven “palaces” [hekhalot], these palaces are populated by heavenly beings,
angelic guardians are stationed at the entrances of each hekhal, and perhaps most
importantly, someone could ascend through each hekhal by showing an appropriate seal
to the guardian.421 While some sort of genetic connection between this passage in seder
beriyot and sections of Hekhalot literature is undeniable, as Swartz put it, these few lines
amount to only a drop in the veritable sea of piyyut. Therefore, we cannot take this
passage as evidence that Hekhalot literature existed in the form we have them at this
early point in time. Furthermore, it is important to note that there are no references to the
rabbis nor to any rabbinic literary forms in this passage or in seder beriyot as a whole, in
stark contrast to the Hekhalot corpus itself, which are steeped in rabbinic references,
knowledge of rabbinic values, and rabbinic literary forms. It would not be an

Intriguingly, the idea of using “seals” and the general language of “seals” is used throughout antique
“poetry.” For example, in the so-called “Psalm of the Naasenes,” it says, “For that reason, Father, send me /
Bearing seals, I will descend and I will pass through the aeons; I will reveal all the mysteries and show the
forms of the gods; I will transmit the secrets of the holy way, calling them Knowledge…” [τούτου με χάριν
πέμψον πάτερ / σφραγῖδας ἔχων καταβήσομαι / Αἰῶνας ὅλους διοδεύσω / μυστήρια πάντα δ'ἀνοίξω /
μορφάς τε θεῶν ἐπιδειξω / καὶ τὰ κεκρυμμένα τῆς ἁγίας ὁδοῦ / γνῶσιν καλέσας, παραδώσω]. See: M.
Marcovich, “The Naasene Psalm in Hippolytus (Haer. 5.10.2),” in The Rediscovery of Gnosticism:
Proceedings of the International Conference of Gnosticism at Yale; New Haven, Connecticut, March 2831, 1978 (vol. 2; ed. B. Layton; Leiden: Brill, 1981). Also, see the Odes of Solomon, esp. Odes 4, 8, 23, 24.
For a broader comparison with “Gnostic” and “Magical” materials, especially the Ascension of Isaiah, see
M. Himmelfarb, “Heavenly Ascent and the Relationship of the Apocalypses and the ‘Hekhalot’ Literature,”
HUCA 59 (1988): 73-100.
421

228

understatement to say that Hekhalot literature “rabbinizes” diverse traditions to create a
relatively coherent literary corpus.
The lack of any references to the rabbis or to rabbinic values suggests that we
cannot identify the creators of Hekhalot traditions as the rabbis from the “classical”
rabbinic period. This is in line with David Halperin’s argument, which cuts the cord of
continuity that Scholem wove between the early rabbis and the creators of the Hekhalot
literature.422 That is, the “rabbinization” of “Hekhalot” traditions appear to have been a
post-Talmudic phenomenon, datable from the seventh century onwards, though many of
its traditions reach back into the fifth or possibly even fourth century. These points
ultimately indicate that the “creators” of the Hekhalot corpus were most likely late
antique Jews located within the sphere of rabbinic influence, though they themselves
were not rabbis.
For my purposes, the differences in ideology, chronology, and the multiple
contexts of their emergence among the early Hekhalot traditions, the classical rabbis, and
the Hekhalot corpus furnishes a convenient trajectory for situating my argument.423 To be
clear this trajectory operates primarily as a heuristic, not as a commitment to pegging the
corpus to any particular location in time and space. This trajectory in turn helps expose
the gaps of “internalist” narratives and assumptions that situate Hekhalot literature in a
direct line from Second Temple Judaism through the rabbis to Hekhalot literature. If the
422
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Hekhalot corpus cannot be fully “explained” by leaning on classical rabbinic literature or
even on those early traditions that make their way into the corpus, then scholars must
look broadly at non-“Jewish” comparanda that might furnish better contexts for analyzing
the gaps between these domains. Put another way, the Sar Torah macroform under
discussion in this chapter emerged in a thoroughly rabbinicized milieu, perhaps in the
early medieval period. They are only partially contextualizable vis-à-vis classical
rabbinic corpus and there is virtually no trace of similar traditions in the time of the
Amoraim.424 In light of these gaps, I argue that the shift in thinking about prognosis
among various late antique Syrian communities provides a prism through which to
explore the Sar Torah’s articulation of “angelic” comprehension and the divine aspects of
Torah. While the Sar Torah’s conceptions of such must be seen as an analogous
development, and not a genealogical or homologous one, I sketch out possible points of
intersection in the conclusion of this chapter.
Approaches to the Hekhalot literature are equally varied and controversial. A
number of scholars build on Gershom Scholem’s approach to Jewish mysticism in order
to uncover late antique forms of Jewish “mysticism.”425 As a result, they tend to read
through the text to uncover that mystical core. In contrast, the “Princeton” school of
Hekhalot literature, following the “revisionist” work of Peter Schäfer and Martha
Himmelfarb, begin their encounter with the Hekhalot corpus by first attending to its
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Scholarship over the past two decades have demonstrated that the rabbis represented only a small
portion of the late antique Jewish population. Therefore, we should not expect to find traces of the rabbis in
these early piyyutim. For more, see: S. Schwartz, Imperialism and Jewish Society: 200 B.C.E. to 640 C.E.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 104-28.
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For an overview of the arguments and methods of scholars who follow in Scholem’s steps, see Boustan,
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literary surface and textual strata.426 This is the approach that I take here. After all, as
already noted, both Swartz and Boustan have demonstrated the value of form and
redaction criticism for evaluating the dating of various strata in the Hekhalot macroforms
relative to other strata. Their conclusions that various strata of the Hekhalot corpus
emerged in different times and contexts amounts to a devastating critique against those
who hunt after individual mystical experience behind the text; these texts are simply too
compromised and refracted by contingency for scholars to reassemble a unitary
“experience.” Scholars like Elliot Wolfson and Seth Sanders have challenged the very
bifurcation of “experience” from “literature,” and in their own ways, have insightfully
demonstrated that this difference lies among scholars, not in the text.427 Nevertheless, as
Boustan has carefully argued, it is precisely those literary forms that structure the
Hekhalot corpus that allows us to speak of it as a coherent corpus.428 Therefore, I do not
make any claims to define “Merkavah mysticism.” Instead, I seek to operate within the
poetics of the text and work outwards from there.
Finally, scholars have tended to contextualize Hekhalot literature alongside a
wide range of Jewish materials, especially the rabbinic corpus, Jewish “magical”
artifacts, and piyyut. While Jewish texts are perhaps the most obvious places to begin,
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For a programmatic discussion on the study of Hekhalot Literature as a literary corpus, see: P. Schäfer,
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such materials do not “solve” the “mystery” of Hekhalot literature. In other words, the
materials that the scholarly community acknowledges as relevant comparanda ought to be
broadened to include a wider set of lens and texts. In this vein, I suggest that new avenues
of research may open up if we juxtapose Hekhalot literature alongside those communities
examined in the previous chapter who were both roughly proximate and contemporary to
the rabbinized Jews responsible for the Hekhalot corpus. In this sense, I echo Annette
Yoshiko Reed’s call to expand the range of comparanda used for the study of Hekhalot
literature to include not only Neoplatonic sources but a wider range of “Christian”
materials.429 Building on her insight regarding late antique Syria as a particularly fruitful
region for further contextualization, I demonstrate that a lateral cross-sectional view of
Hekhalot literature demonstrates that some materials in the Hekhalot literature resonate
strongly with shifts in the conceptualization of prognosis discussed in the previous
chapter.

A.Y. Reed, “Rethinking (Jewish-)Christian Evidence for Jewish Mysticism” in Hekhalot Literature in
Context, 349-77. For Syriac comparanda, see: A. Becker, “Polishing the Mirror: Some Thoughts on Syriac
Sources and Early Judaism,” in Envisioning Judaism: Studies in Honor of Peter Schäfer on the Occasion of
his Seventieth Birthday (vol. 2; eds. R.S. Boustan, K. Herrmann, R. Leicht, A.Y. Reed, and G. Veltri; Mohr
Siebeck, 2013), 897-915. In part, both Reed and Becker respond to the rather narrow range of comparanda
that scholars have used to contextualize Hekhalot literature. Whereas a focus on Jewish comparanda – be
they piyyut or magical artifacts – have drawn attention to how Hekhalot literature’s overlaps with these
domains, the comparison with other comparanda has been somewhat lacking. The study of Christian
comparanda, for example, is limited to depictions of Jesus in the New Testament and a systematic
comparison with Islamic-era materials remains wanting. The purpose of this chapter aims at precisely this
broader contextualization by highlighting how a common environment shaped diverse notions of “divine
knowledge” among various communities, including those Jews responsible for the Hekhalot corpus.
Furthermore, though I am in full agreement of Becker’s argument that one should pay attention to Syriac
literature in its own literary and historical trajectory, at the same time, his argument also demonstrates the
limits of using Syriac materials as comparanda when one organizes it under the “sign of the Merkavah.” Of
course, the “merkava/merkavta” is found throughout Syriac literature, even in the “earliest” Syriac
hymnbook known as the Odes of Solomon. Nevertheless, it is not the appearance of the merkavta in the
Odes, for example, that may be useful for contextualizing Hekhalot literature, but the fact that the Odes
uses liturgy to literarily demonstrate and perhaps, even naturalize, ascent and glorification of God.
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From Torah to Torah: Angelic Contemplation and Torah in the Sar Torah Tradition
In this section, I provide a literary reading of the Sar Torah – the Prince of Torah –
macroform [§§281-306],430 which is usually appended to Hekhalot Rabbati.431 I argue
that this macroform’s rhetorical fashioning of a distinct “epistemological” domain that is
both different from rabbinic conceptions of Torah and identified as a divine “measure” of
Torah [ ]מידות התורהparallels a similar shift in definitions of prognosis from discursivelyproduced prior knowledge of future events to the divine sense of prognosis that I traced
out in the previous chapter.432 My argument that this macroform’s bifurcation of “Torah”
and the “divine measures of Torah” is a rhetorical and literary strategy is inspired by
Bhabha’s discussion of “Third Space.”433 By reading the Sar Torah macroform as a text
designed to persuade its reader about the value of the Sar Torah “magical” praxis, I make
no claim to know what Torah “actually” was within rabbinic institutions, only that the
Sar Torah macroform seeks to distinguish itself from it by allying itself with a
contemporaneous and proximate notions of divine revelation. Ultimately, I argue that in

For more on this Sar Torah macroform, see: P. Schäfer, Hekhalot Studien, 269-72. J. Dan, “The
Theophany of the Prince of the Torah” (Heb.), Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Folklore 13-14 (1992), 127-58,
139-41; E.E. Urbach, “The Traditions on Merkavah Mysticism in the Tannaitic Period, (Heb.), in Studies in
Mysticism and Religion (eds. E.E. Urbach, R.J. Weblowsky, and Ch. Wirzubski; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1967),
1-28; M. Vidas, Tradition and the Formation of the Talmud (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014),
169-80; D. Halperin, Faces of the Chariot: Early Jewish Responses to Ezekiel’s Vision (Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck, 1988), 464-66; Swartz, Scholastic Magic, 221-22.
431
For an introduction to the Hekhalot Rabbati macroform, see: Ra‘anan Boustan, From Martyr to Mystic:
Rabbinic Martyrology and the Making of Merkavah Mysticism (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 36-47; P.
Schäfer, “Zum Problem der redaktionellen Identität von Hekhalot Rabbati,” in Hekhalot-Studien, 63-74;
James R. Davila, Hekhalot Literature in Translation: Major Texts of Merkavah Mysticism (Leiden: Brill,
2013), 37-48.
432
Epistemology is not, of course, a universal category. It is a tool for me to focus on one aspect of this
chapter. As I argue in this chapter, when talking about Sar Torah traditions, epistemology and corporeality
cannot be separated in so far as the body is both the site and instrument of what we would call knowledgeacquisition and transmission.
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the process of creating Sar Torah traditions, whose ultimate goal is to render “Torah”
immediately accessible and comprehensible to late antique Jews, not only was “Torah”
literarily and conceptually reconceived in ways that distanced itself from rabbinic
conceptions of Torah but the discourse around human comprehension also shifted to
accommodate the possibility for humans to comprehend in a divine, or perhaps better,
“angelic” mode of contemplation. In order to make this set of interrelated arguments, I
follow the general narratival arch of the macroform itself and highlight those passages
that are crucial for my argument, occasionally drawing from non-Hekhalot texts.
The Sar Torah macroform is appended to Hekhalot Rabbati and can be divided
into four major sections: §§281-298 might be best described as an extended historiola
introducing and marketing the praxis of Sar Torah; §§299-303 contains the Sar Torah
praxis, which details what one must do in order to compel the Prince of Torah to descend;
§§304-305 is an extended postscript, also designed to market the power of the praxis;
§306 supplies two additional prayers one must say before they recite the Sar Torah
praxis. These prayers are in the form of Qedushah hymns, which are found throughout
the Hekhalot corpus but most densely in the Hekhalot Rabbati macroform. Each of these
sections were likely composed in different times and places and were only later joined
together to form a coherent whole. This makes it difficult to speak of a unitary “author”
or mystical “experience” behind the text. My argument here will mostly focus on the
historiola and the Sar Torah praxis.
The historiola narrative can be sketched out easily enough. The scene takes place
in Jerusalem in the moments before the Jews set out to build the Second Temple. As it
turns out, God had ordered the Jews to not only build the Temple, but to also study Torah
234

while they do it. The Jews complain that they can only do one onerous task at a time. God
agrees with his children that these tasks are too heavy for the Jews and promises to give
them the Secret of the Torah, which will allow them to learn the Torah instantaneously
“without labor or toil.” This will presumably allow the Jews to go ahead with the task of
building the Temple. Upon hearing God’s promise, the angels object, claiming that God’s
glory and praise depends on the Jews constantly forgetting and relearning the Torah. God
overrules their objection and appears to the Jews in the Jerusalem in the still unbuilt
Temple and gives them the Secret of the Torah. Zerubbabel b. Shealtiel, the governor of
the province, then stands up and mediates the Secret of the Torah by “interpreting the
meaning of the angelic names.”

Human Corporeality and Angelic Comprehension
The Sar Torah’s differentiation between the mere presence of the Torah and its divine
aspects can be detected by attending to how it distinguishes between human practices of
handling Torah and “angelic” modes of comprehending of Torah. The Sar Torah alludes
to this bifurcation already in the opening passage.

R. Ishmael said: Thus said R. Akiva in the name of R. Eliezer: From the day that the Torah was
given to Israel until the latter House was built, the Torah was given but its majesty, worth, glory,
weightiness, greatness, ornamentation, awe, dread, fear, wealth, loftiness, pomp, sweat, strength,
power, rulership, and its might were not given until the latter House was built and the Shekhinah
did not dwell in it (§281).
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אמ'ר ישמעאל כך אמ' ר' עקיבא משום ר' אליעזר הגדול מיו' שניתנה תורה לישראל ועד שנבנה בית האחרון תורה ניתנה
אבל הדרה ויקרה כבודה וגדולתה ותפארתה אימתה פחדתה יראתה עושרה וגאותה וגואנה זיעתה וזיותה עוזה ועזוזה ממשלתה
434

וגבורתה לא ניתנה עד נבנה הבית האחרון ולא שרת בו שכינה

This passage telescopes to two pivotal moments in Jewish history, the Sinai event and the
return of the Jews from the Babylonian captivity, in order to make the controversial claim
that the latter moment was far more important than the former or any time in between.435
This is explicitly confirmed by a passage in the conclusion of the narrative, which quotes
the words of Haggai, “At that moment, He said, ‘The Glory of this latter House shall be
greater than that of the former one’ (Hag. 2:9). For in the former sanctuary, I was not
bound to my children except by this voice…”436 Whereas God could only communicate
with the Jews through his voice in the era that began at Sinai to these moments prior to
the building of the Second Temple, the Secret of the Torah ushers in a new epoch of
Jewish history, one characterized by God’s full presence, his Shekhinah, inhabiting the
Temple among his children. Yet what does it mean that God gave a powerless,
unadorned, and impotent Torah to the Jews through Moses on Sinai?437 This passage
rhetorically and radically distinguishes between “mere” Torah, which, as we will see, is
what the rabbis possess, and its true worth, which is what the narrative seeks to market to
434
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its audience. Words like “majesty,” “wealth,” “glory,” and so on make up the regular
panoply of terms that Hekhalot literature uses to describe heavenly beings and objects.438
The narrative goes on to describe the Jews’ complaint against God. They
complain that they are overworked since they must both engage in Torah and build the
Temple. Here, I suggest that we discard notions of some abstract sense of “intellectual
weariness” or “intellectual labor,” which are ultimately rooted in Greek notions of the
separation of the intellect and the body. Rather, the Jews’ complaint only make sense if
we understand the study of Torah as physically wearying and laborious, indeed, as
toilsome as building an entire Temple. This will be important when we investigate the
angel’s protest later in the narrative. Thus, the Jews say,

You have cast many troubles upon us. Which one shall we grasp? Which shall we abandon? For
you have put upon us great toil and great burden. You said to us, “Build a House! Although you
are building, be busy with Torah. [§282]

הרבה צרות הפלתה עלינו אי זו נתפוס אי זו נעזוב השלכת עלינו טורח גדול ומשוי גדול אמרת לנו בית א'ע'פ שאתם
439

...בונים עיסקו בתורה

The intersection between physical toil and engaging in Torah comes through better in the
Hebrew. The study of the Torah is something to be “grasped” comes from the root תפס\ש,
which carries it with a sense of both the physical act of taking hold and intellectual
comprehension. The Jews also call God’s tasks for them a great “toil” and a “burden,” a
438
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word that carries a sense of physical weightiness. These points hint at something that will
be demonstrated later in the narrative, namely, that the human body is as much an
instrument for human comprehension as it is an instrument for heavy labor. Both are
“hard labor.”
God ultimately acquiesces to his children’s complaint and promises to give them
the “Secret of the Torah” which will allow them to learn Torah effortlessly. In fact, God
goes on an extended monologue detailing what (he thinks) the Jews want. He says,

I know what you seek and my heart has recognized what you desire: much Torah is what you seek
and a multitude of talmud and a great many traditions, to inquire about halakha what you wish for,
and a multitude of ribbui440 is what you desire, to increase testimony in mountains upon
mountains, to raise up hills upon hills of sagacity, to increase talmud in the courtyards,441 and
pilpul in the streets, to multiply halakha like the sand of the sea, and ribbui like the dust of the
inhabited earth,442 to establish yeshivot in the gates of the tents, to expound in them the forbidden
and permitted, to declare impure in them that which is impure, and to declare pure in them that
which is pure, to declare the ritually fit that which is fit and the unfit that which is unfit, to
recognize in them types of blood and to instruct the menstruant on what they should do, to tie
crowns on your heads and the wreath of kings on the heads of your children, to compel kings to
bow to you, and to compel nobles to prostrate before you, to spread your name on every shore, and
your renown in their cities, to enlighten your faces with the radiance of the day, between your eyes
like the planet Venus. If you merit this seal to make use of my crown, no ignorant person shall be
found in the world and there shall not be a fool or simpleton among you (§§287-288).

M40, O1531, D436 have “Secrets.” V228, “Rabbi.” B238, “Rabbanim.” N8128, “Rabbotim.”
Reading here “in the courtyards” from M40, O1531, N8128, D436, V228, and B238, instead of “with
difficulties” in M22.
442
B238 “Rabbanim,” V228 “Rabbi,” M40, N8128, and D436 “Rabbis,” O1531 “Secrets.”
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כ'ו אני יודע מה אתם מבקשים ולבי הכיר מה אתם מתאוים תורה מרובה אתם מבקשים והמון תלמוד ורוב שמעות לשאול
הלכה אתם מצפים ולהמון ריבוי אתם מחמדים להרבות תעודה הרים הרים להעלות תושייה גבעות גבעות להגדיל תלמוד בקושיות
 להשיב ישיבות בשערים אהלים לפרש להם איסור והיתר לטמא בהם.ופלפול ברחבות להרבות הלכה כחול הים וריבוי כעפרות תבל
את הטמא ולטהר בהם את הטהור להכשיר בהם את הכשר ולפסול בהם את הפסול להכיר בהם את הדמים ולנידות מה יעשו לקשור
כתרים בראשיכם ועטרת מלכים כראש בניכם לכוף מלכים להשתחות לכם להזקיק רוזנים להשתטח לפניכם להפקיע שמכם כל כופה
וזכרכם בכרכיהם להאיר פניכם כזריחת יום ובין עיניכם ככוכב שחרית אם תזכו לחותם זה להשתמש בכתר שלי עם הארץ לא
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...ימצא בעולם וככב וכסיל וטפש לא יהיה בכם

This passage is filled with references to post-Talmudic rabbinic institutions and practices:
Torah, Talmud, traditions, halakha, legal dialectic (pilpul), midrashic methods of
category inclusion (ribbui), yeshivot, ritual purity, the forbidden and the permitted, and so
on. In contrast to Dan who reads this passage as the jealous outpouring of Jews who
desired material things as recompense for the study of Torah,444 or Urbach, who sees in
this text a moment of self-critique against the materialistic desires of the rabbis,445 or
Vidas, who sees this list as what God wants the Jews to abandon,446 I read it within the
genre of a historiola: it is designed to “sell” the Sar Torah praxis and is therefore a part of
God’s marketing ploy. This long parade of a list is not primarily meant to convey a sense
of what the Jews actually desire or reject – though they may very well desire or reject
such things – but to communicate how much sheer work and toil will be required of the
Jews if they hope to acquire these things through their own paltry means of human
comprehension. God thus uses the language of superabundance, e.g., “heaps,” “hills upon
hills,” “multitude,” “mountains upon mountains,” “dust of the inhabited earth,” and
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dangles in front of the Jews their wildest dreams, e.g., “to compel kings,” “tie crowns,”
and so on, in order to demonstrate the sheer impossibility of these things. He is setting up
the Sar Torah praxis as the perfect answer to this problem.
Yet, as Vidas has pointed out, this is only one list.447 In fact, there is another list.
The passage goes on to say,

You are happy but my attendants are sad. For this mystery is one of the mysteries that goes forth
from within my storehouse. The sound of your academies are like fatted calves of the stall. You no
longer learn with labor nor with toil, but rather by the name of this seal and by the invocation of
the awesome crown. The amazed one is amazed by you. Many die from groaning over you and
their soul departs upon hearing of your glory. Riches and wealth grow mighty upon you, the great
ones of the world cling to you. The family that you marry into, pedigree surrounds it from all
sides. The one blessed by you is blessed, and the one praised by you is praised. You are called
ones who make the many righteous (Dan 12:3), they call you those who make beings meritorious.
The proclamation of new moons goes forth from you, and the intercalation of years from the
prudence of your wisdom. By your hands the patriarchs are anointed and by your mouth the
fathers of the law court stand. You establish the Exilarchs, the judges of the cities act on your
authority. The reform of the world issues from you and there is none who opposes it… (§§289291).448

אתם שמחים ומשרתי עציבים שרז זה אחד מן הרזים יוצא מיבית גנזאי קול ישיבות שלכם בו כעגלי מרבק לא בעמל ולא
ביגיעה אלא בשם חותם זה ובזכרון כתר נורא וחדווה דווה עליכם רבים מתים באנחתם ויוצא נשמתם על שמע כבודכם
עושר וממון מתגבר עליכם גדולי עולם מודבקים בכם משפחה שאתם נושים ממנה סובבת אותה וחסות ויחזקיה ככל
צדדיה המברך בכם המבורך והמשתבח בכם משתבח מצדיקי הרבים אתם נקראין מזכי ביריות קוראין אתכם קביעות
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חדשים מכם תצא ועיבור שנים מעורמת חכמתכם על ידיכם נשיאים משתמשחין על פיכם אבות בית דין עומדין ראשי
...גליות אתם מעמדין שופטי עיירות מרשות שלכם תקנת עולם מכם תצא ואין מי חולק עליה

God’s claim that his attendants are sad is part of his ploy: he wants to demonstrate how
lucky the Jews are that God is giving them something that even the angels hold dear. For
his part, Vidas does not see a direct relationship between the two lists. Instead, he sees
the first list as what “the author abandons” and the second list as what he “embraces.”449
Regarding the first list, Vidas argues that it is in fact a parody of specifically postTalmudic Babylonian pedagogic ethos, one that was dominated by the study of
Talmud.450 As for the second list, Vidas argues that it “includes mostly general, nonacademic kinds of prominence,” and, as a result, sees this list as radically discontinuous
with the first. Of course, he acknowledges that yeshivot and other rabbinic institutions do,
in fact, appear in the second list, though he downplays them.451 I am skeptical that the
model of “abandonment” and “embracing” captures the relationship between these two
lists. Instead, I suggest that we align the two lists according to the binary introduced in
the beginning of Sar Torah macroform; whereas the first list, which is heavily associated
with the rabbinic practices of learning, are aligned with the mere “presence” of the Torah,
the second list is aligned with the power of Torah that God will soon give to the Jews.
Therefore, it is not that the Jews seek the wrong things in the first list, but they did not
ask God for enough things. God wants the Jews to know that once they merit the “name
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of the seal and the invocation of the crown,” they will not only be masters of rabbinic and
political institutions, but also wield royal power, compel princes, establish courts, send
out legal reforms that affect the world, and so on.
When God promises that he will relinquish the Secret of the Torah, (he says) that
the angels object. Again, we should be mindful that this is God is ventriloquizing what he
thinks the angels will say. As such, this is part and parcel of his ploy to market the
indescribable value of the Sar Torah praxis. According to God, the angels argue that if
God gives the “secret of prudence” to the Jews, then the Jews will no longer feel
compelled to worship God. Furthermore, all distinctions between the fool and the sage
will disappear, since everyone will be able to master the Torah. At the same time, the
God’s ventriloquization of the angels slips into a broader question regarding how angels
contemplate and comprehend. This question is intimately tied up with the human body.
According to God, the angels say,

Do not let this mystery go forth from your storehouse, and the secret of prudence from your
treasuries. Do not value flesh and blood like us, do not consider humans as our substitute.452 Let
them labor at Torah according to the measure453 in which they have labored and those who come
for generations and onward. Let them establish it with toil and with great anguish. This is your

452

The 10th century Karaite Salman b. Yeruhim seems to have had an alternative version of this text. In his
version, the angels tell God to, “Loathe (man) who is flesh and blood, not exalt him like us. Do not
compare him (garbled)… Hear our outcry, receive our admonition. Leave man to labor in the Torah, and let
him not resemble us” [ געל בשר ודם ואל תתהדרו כמונו ואל תדמה אותו בשאו כאשר בשתנו תשמע צעקתינו תקב תוכחותינו
]עזוב אדם יגע בתורה ולא ידמה לנו. There are important differences between his version and the one here,
though some sort of genetic relationship seems difficult to deny. See: M. Idel, “Tefisat HaTorah beSifrut
haHekhalot ve-gilguleyha bekabbalah,” in Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought (Jerusalem: Magnes Press,
1981): 23-84, 23-33. Halperin, Faces, 518-22. Also: I. Davidson, The Book of the Wars of the Lord:
Containing the Polemics of the Karaite Salmon ben Yeruhim against Saadia Gaon (New York: JTS of
America, 1934), 125.
453
For more on this understanding of “Measure” as it relates to Torah, see below.
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glory, this is your ornamentation: when they forget and reassess before you, calling out with a
whole heart, supplicating with a willing soul: May what we read remain in our hands. May what
we have studied be established in our hearts. May our inner affections take hold of whatever our
ears have heard. May our heart hold onto the paths of talmud which we heard from the mouth of
the master and may they honor each other. 454 But if you reveal this mystery to your sons, the lesser
shall become equal to the great and the fool like the wise. 455 [§292]

רז זה אל יצא מבית גזניך וסתר ערמה מאוצרותיך אל תשים בשר ודם כמונו אל תדמה בני אדם תמורתינו ייגע בתורה
כמדה שהם יגיעים ובאים מן הדורות ואילך יקיימו אותה בעמל גדול ובתשניק גדול זהו כבודך וזו היא תפארתך כשהן
משכחין חוזרים וסודרים לפניך קורין בלבב שלם לך מתחננים בנפש חפיצה יעמוד בידינו מה שקרינו יתקיים בלבינו
יתפשו כליותינו מה ששמענו אזנינו יחזיק לבבנו נתיבות תלמוד ששמענו מפי הרב ויהיה מכבדין זה את זה אבל אם רז זה
...אתה מגלה לבניך ישוה קטן כגדול וכסיל כחכם זו תשובת עבדיו

Schäfer has already demonstrated how this passage draws from a broader rabbinic trope
on the rivalry between angels and human.456 Nevertheless, this passage is distinct in that
what is at stake is the difference between human and angelic modes of contemplation.
Before continuing, it is necessary again to expand our interpretation of the words “labor,”

454

Swartz suggests that this passage means may the human honor the angel, not may humans honor one
another. Swartz, Scholastic Magic, 97 n. 134.
455
The chief angel concludes his argument by saying that if God were to relinquish this secret to the
humans, then “the lesser shall become equal to the great and the fool like the wise.” That is, there would no
longer be any competition among humans because they will all be equal in terms of wisdom. In that
respect, the humans would also come uncomfortably close to the angels. As we know in the case of Elisha
b. Avuyah, there was a tradition that there was no “competition” among the angels [b. Hagiga 15a].
Hekhalot Rabbati picks up on this theme and describes the relationship between Qaspiel and Dumiel, two
of the highest angels guarding the sixth palace, in the following manner: “His domain is the lintel of the
right side, but Qaspiel the prince used to thrust him aside, yet he has nothing against him: no grudge and no
hatred and no jealousy and no rivalry, but one is for my glory and the other is for my glory.” [230] The
highest angels, therefore, do not compete with one another in so far as they are both servants of God’s
glory.
456
Schäfer, Hidden and Manifest God, 49-53, 51. On rabbinic discussions on the creation and essence of
Angels, see: idem., Rivalität Zwischen Engel und Menschen: Untersuchungen zur Rabbinischen
Engelvorstellung (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1975), 51-55.
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“weariness,” and “great anguish” in this passage away from the way that it is usually
understood, that is, as some abstract sense of “intellectual labor” or the “weariness of
intellectual production.” We must see the “labor” of Torah study as actual physical labor
without assuming a strict division between the “intellect” and the “body.” In fact, as we
recall, the Jews’ complaint to God in the opening passages only makes sense if we
understand the study of the Torah as a physically laborious process on par with the hard
labor required to fashion stones to build a Temple. Once this is accepted, the angels’
protest makes better sense. After all, the angels cry out, “Do not value flesh and blood the
same as us. Do not consider humans as our substitute.” The verb tedameh []תדמה
reinforces this point in so far as the root  דמהis related to conceptions of similarity and
comparison. Given the immediate context of this passage, the angels are protesting that
giving humans the Secret of Torah will allow them to comprehend Torah like the angels,
that is, without labor, toil, or the need to reassess their learning. The unspoken fear is that
by relinquishing the secret of perfect comprehension to “flesh and blood,” they will be no
longer merely “flesh and blood,” but by virtue of their ability to comprehend Torah in
ways that transcend their bodily limitation, they might be transformed into something
bordering on the angels. It is therefore no accident that the angels emphasize the
mediation of the human body for the standard rabbinic practices of producing,
transmitting, and storing “Torah,” as seen by the many references to the hand, “soul,”
heart, inner affections, ear, and mouth – the corporeal, and hence, faulty, instruments by
which a human being receives, processes, and stores Torah.
Furthermore, the text uses a crucial word here – “measure.” The angels say, “Let
them labor at Torah according to the measure in which they have labored [ כמדה שהם
244

 ]יגיעיםand those who come for generations and onward. Let them establish it with toil
and with great anguish…” As I argue below, the word “measure” operates as a way of
assigning equivalent “value” between two heterogeneous things; in a way, it operates
much like the word “capital” does, in so far as “capital” renders two unlike things (e.g., a
tangible house and its “market price”) equivalent. The angels argue through a similar sort
of logic: the human body should acquire Torah only in so far as it has labored for Torah.
The measure therefore fixes two unlike things – “Physical Hardship” and “Torah” – and
naturalizes a model of equivalence that God will seek to upend in the following section.
In response, God argues that this “treasure” is in fact something that he had
reserved for the Jews precisely for this moment in time after their exile. I do not find
God’s response convincing at all; it sounds more like him trying to get the angels off his
back than an attempt to answer their complaint in good faith. In fact, God ultimately
argues that he “forgot” about this mystery until this moment. In any case, God being God,
the angels can say no more. God’s response also intimates something of the angelic mode
of comprehension. He says,

Do not, my attendants, do not my servants, do not pester me about this matter. This mystery shall
go forth from my storehouse and the secret of prudence from my treasures. I am revealing it
concerning it to a beloved people, I am teaching it to a faithful seed. For them it was hidden from
the days of old but from the days of creation it was decreed for them, yet it did not come upon my
heart to tell it to any of these generations from the days of Moses until now. It was kept for this
generation, to make use of it until the end of all generations, “For they have gone forth from evil
to evil and Me they did not know” (Jer. 9:2), since their heart was dulled from the exiles, so words
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of Torah were as hard as bronze and as iron to them. It is fitting to make use of it to bring Torah
like water into their midst and like fat on their bones. [§293]

אל משרתי אל עבדיי אל תטריחו לפני בדבר זה רז זה יצא מבית גנזיי וסתר ערמה מאוצרותי לעם אהוב אני מגלה עליו
לזרע נאמן אני אלמד אותו להם גנוז מימות עולם ומימי בראשית להם מתוקן לעולם ולא עלת על לבי ליתנה לכל הדורות
הללו מימות משה ועד עכשיו לדור זה היה שמור להשתמש בו עד סוף כל הדורות כי מרעה אל רעה יצאו ואותי לא ידעו
 כנחשת וכברזל להן ראוי להשתמש בו להביא תורה כמים457שנטמטם לבם מן הגליות והיו דברי תורה קשין באזניהן
458

...בקרבם וכשמן בעצמתום

As Vidas and others have richly demonstrated, the study of the rabbinic traditions was
often conceptualized in terms of embodiment.459 Here, God makes a series of metaphors
that fixate on the nexus between the human body and comprehension; the heart, which is
the primary site for what we would call “memory,” is dulled by the harshness of the exile.
The Hebrew word here comes from the root טמטם, which carries with it a sense of
physical, and perhaps even onomatopoetic obdurateness. The passage describes “Torah”
as hard as bronze and iron, recalling the sense of “inert” Torah mentioned in the
introduction of the narrative.460 In contrast, the mystery of the Torah would allow the
Jews to imbibe Torah “like water in their midst” and have it cling to them “like fat upon
their bones.” The human body thus continues to operate as both the means and site of
intellectual production, and though God does not explicitly “angelify” flesh-and-blood,

Only B238 and V228 has “in their ears.”
V228.
459
Vidas, Tradition, 185-90.
460
Vidas argues that references to “bronze and iron” ultimately parody Babylonian modes of studying
Torah through Talmudic dialectic. See Vidas, Tradition, 185-90.
457
458
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he makes it clear that the secret will “reactivate” the heart to allow the Jews to fully
embody the Torah.
Schäfer further suggests that the angels’ protest evokes a set of hymns found in
Hekhalot Rabbati, the so-called Gedullah hymns.461 Following his suggestion, I would
like to digress a bit to focus on these hymns to better contextualize the Sar Torah
macroform within Hekhalot literature. The Gedullah hymns as a whole highlight the
inimitable qualities of the yored hamerkavah, and at times suggests that the human being
is somehow equal if not superior to the angels. Still, it presents an alternative set of
concepts and idioms for articulating revelatory knowledge, one that focuses on ascent and
visions over the Sar Torah’s focus on transcending the epistemological limits of the
human body. Where they converge, however, is in their focus of revelatory knowledge
and their attempts at fashioning an alternative “epistemological” domain apart from but
with reference to Torah. In fact, the ability to “know” or “navigate” this “epistemological
domain” is called “wisdom” and this “wisdom” is explicitly defined against Torah. These
hymns begin by depicting the yordei hamerkavah as recipients of revelatory knowledge.
They say,

Greater than all is to bind oneself to him so as to make enter and to bring one into the chambers of
the palace of the Aravot firmament so that one stands to the right side of the Throne of Glory and
at other times to stand him opposite T‘TsSh to see whatever they do before the Throne of Glory
and to know what will happen in the future in the world: whom they bring low, whom they raise
up / whom they weaken, whom they make mighty / whom they impoverish, whom they make rich
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Schäfer, Hidden, 51. Idem., “Origins,” 245-53.
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/ whom they kill, whom they bring to life / whom they dispossess of an inheritance, whom they
give an inheritance / whom they bequeath Torah, and whom they give Wisdom.462 (§§81-82)

גדולה מכולם להזקק לו ולהכניסו ולהביאו לחדרי היכל ערבות רקיע להעמידו לימין כסא הכבוד פעמים שהוא עומד נגד
ט'עצ'ש יהוה אלהי ישראל לראות מה שעושין לפני כסא הכבוד ולידע מה שעתיד להיות בעולם למי משפילין למי מגביהין למי
מרפין למי מגבירין למי מרוששין למי מעשירין למי ממיתין למי מחיין למי נוטלין ממנו ירושה ולמי נותנין לו ירושה למי מנחילין לו
463

תורה ולמי נותנין לו חכמה

At least according to the opening section of the Gedullah hymns, the primary goal of the
yored hamerkavah is to acquire prior knowledge of events in the future. Furthermore, this
passage makes it clear that God’s angels – the anonymous “they” implied in the series of
verbs – are the primary agents of God’s will. The visionary thus gains prior knowledge of
future events by witnessing angelic activities. This passage juxtaposes a series of
opposites, with the first object characterized negatively and the second object positively,
and culminates with the juxtaposition of Torah and Wisdom. Curiously, this implies that
Wisdom is the superior opposite of Torah; indeed, whereas the angels cause humans to
“inherit” Torah (Heb. )מנחילין, most likely by means of a horizontal transmission of Torah
from Moses to the rabbis,464 Wisdom is given (Heb.  )נותניןalong a vertical axis from the
angels to human beings. This verbal difference leaves no doubt here that these two things
cannot and should not be conflated. On the one hand, this is highly unusual for the
Hekhalot corpus; I do not know of any other passage that so explicitly contrasts Wisdom

A related passage in Ma‘aseh Merkavah seems to riff on this idea. “R. Ishmael said: R. Akiva said to
me, I prayed a prayer and I gazed at the Shekhinah and I saw everything they do before the throne of
glory.” [§592]
463
V228.
464
m. Avot 1.1.
462
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and Torah.465 On the other hand, if we follow the principle that the more difficult reading
is more likely to be the correct one, then we should be willing to let it stand that Wisdom
and Torah are in fact opposites of one another. More importantly, this passage parallels
the Sar Torah macroform’s extended strategy for fashioning an alternative domain of
“angelic” contemplation; just as the Sar Torah macroform distinguished between the
mere presence of the Torah and its divine “power, glory, beauty,” especially in order to
articulate an epistemological difference between human and angelic comprehension, this
Gedullah hymn also highlights the superiority of angelic “Wisdom” over a “mere” Torah
transmitted from human to human.
The following Gedullah hymn can be seen as articulating what the opening
passage means by “Wisdom.” Whereas in the first hymn the visionary acquired
knowledge of future events by observing the angelic retinue go about their business, in
this hymn, he himself possesses the ability to know matters beyond human ken; he
possesses “Wisdom” not merely “Torah.” It says,

Greater than all is that he who peers into every deed that mortals do, even in inner rooms, whether
fine deeds or corrupt deeds. He knows and recognizes a thief, he knows and recognizes a man who
commits adultery, he knows and recognizes a murderer. He knows and recognizes the one
suspected of having contact with an impure woman. He knows and recognizes the one who
spreads malicious gossip / Greater than all is that he recognizes all sorcerers. [§83]

On the identification of “Wisdom” with “Talmud” among the Amoraim, see: Vidas, Formation, 118132.
465
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גדולה מכולם שהוא צופה בכל מעשי בני אדם שעושין אפילו בחדרי חדרים בין מעשים נאים בין מעשים מקולקלין גנב
אדם יו דע ומכיר בו נואף אדם יודע ומכיר בו רצח אדם יודע ומכיר בו נחשד על הנדה יודע ומכיר בו סיפר לשון הרע
466

.יודע ומכיר בו גדולה מכולם שהוא מכיר בכל יודעי כשפים

The yored hamerkavah gains panoptic visionary insight into the nitty-gritty aspects of
human affairs. He “peers” into people’s lives like a voyeur and “knows and recognizes”
those who are suspected of violating some important aspect of a rabbinically-inflected
Jewish society. The Gedullah hymns continues by describing all the terrible things that
will happen to those who harm, slander, or press a legal charge against the yored
hamerkavah. It concludes by describing the yored hamerkavah as completely “upright,
ritually fit, meek, humble, sensible, chosen, and set apart…”
Let us return now to the Sar Torah macroform. I argued above that the angels
protest God’s decision to relinquish the secret of the Torah because it would make the
Jews transcend their bodily limitations and render them more like angels in their ability to
master Torah instantaneously. The conclusion of the narrative corroborates this sense of
angelic contemplation, albeit indirectly. Here, God appears to the Jews in Jerusalem and
the Jews fall upon their faces in reverence. In response, God says,

Why are you falling down and falling upon your faces? Get up and sit before my throne in manner
that you sit in the yeshivah. Grasp the crown and receive the seal and learn the Order of the Book
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M22.
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of Torah:467 how you do it, how you inquire into it, how you make use of it, how they elevate the
paths of your heart, how your hearts peer into Torah.468 [§298]

למה אתם נופלין ומוטלין על פניכם עמדו ושבו לפני כסאי במדה שאתם יושבים בישיבה ותפשו כתר וקבלו חותם ללמדו
סדר ספר התורה היאך תעשוהו היאך תדרשוהו היאך תשמשו בו היאך מעלין נתיבות לבבכם היאך צופים לבבות שלכם
469

...בתורה

No longer are the Jews to prostrate themselves before God in submission, but to sit before
him as a student before his teacher. At God’s urging, the Jews “learn the Secret of the
Torah.”470 It is worth mentioning that the verbal pattern diverges from the second-person
imperfect to the active participle in the phrase “how they elevate the paths of your heart.”
The anonymous “they” can be no one else but the angels, who “elevate the paths of your
heart” so as to enable it to peer directly into the Torah.471 Whatever the exact meaning of
these phrases, they nevertheless express a sort of elevated corporeal epistemology
different from the laborious and faulty process of transmission outlined by the angels in
their complaint against God. When placed in that context, the angelicized heart
completely bypasses the normal means of Torah comprehension, transmission, and
retention to peer directly into Torah in a moment of instantaneous comprehension.
This is further corroborated by the conclusion of this section of the Sar Torah
macroform. Here, God appears to the Jews in Jerusalem and is about to transmit the Sar
B238, “Order of the Secret of this Torah,” D436, “Secret of Torah,” M40, “Crown of Torah,” O1531,
“Order of the Torah,” N8128, “Order of this Torah.” V228 lacks this microform.
468
D436 and M40, ‘How your hearts weary after Torah.” N8128 lacks this statement. V228 lacks this entire
microform. The best reading seems to come from M22 and B238.
469
M22.
470
There is considerable variation in the manuscripts what exactly the Jews are learning. See footnote 50
above.
471
There is a parallel in §565: “They placed wisdom into the heart of R. Ishmael.”
467
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Torah praxis to them. In order to do so, Zerubbabel b. Shealtiel, the governor of the
region at that time,

…stood up before Him like an interpreter and elaborated the names of the Prince of the Torah, one
by one, with his name, the name of his crown, and the name of his seal. 472 [§298]

מיד זרובבל בן שאלתיאל ועמד על רגליו לפניו כתרגמן והיה מפריש שמות שרי תורה אחד ואחד בשמו שום כתר ושום
חותם

Even though God tells the Jews to stand up as if they are in a rabbinic yeshivah, what
they study could not be further from the norm. Instead of study of Torah, Mishnah, or
Talmud, Zerubbabel “interprets” the angelic names of the Princes of Torah; this passage
implies that Zerubbabel somehow translated these divine names, thereby mediating the
transfer of divine names from the divine realm to the human. When we relate this
conclusion to the introduction, we come full circle: the “power” and the “glory” of Torah
is not simple mastery of Torah itself, or at least narrowly measured by rabbinic
conceptions of Torah, but a sort of linguistic “epistemology” or “wisdom” modeled after
angelic modes of comprehension.

Making Torah Instantaneous: Equating Measure of Torah and Value of Torah

Swartz, Magic, 105; For a parallel, see §581: “R. Ishmael said, As soon as I stood on my feet and I saw
my face illuminated from my wisdom, I began to explicate every single angel who is in every single
palace….”
472
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I have argued so far that the Sar Torah macroform raises the possibility that human
beings could contemplate like the angels, instantaneously and without toil or labor. This
was intimately tied with the human body as the site and instrument of comprehension. In
this section, I turn to the other side of the same coin. If humans could “instantly know”
Torah, then Torah too must be articulated in such a way that makes it “instantly
knowable.” I argue here that the recurring phrase “Measures of Torah” expresses this
understanding of Torah.473 To put it differently, the ‘value of the Torah” is made
equivalent to its “measure” and ultimately to the entirety of the “Torah” itself; these are
all different aspects of the same “Torah.” I contextualize this part of my argument
through other “para-rabbinic” texts from the same time period as the Sar Torah traditions.
In §656, R. Ishmael says that after he learned the mystery of Sandalphon from R.
Akiva, “There was light in my heart like the light of lightning that goes from one end of
the world to the other.”474 This wonderfully evocative phrase intimates something of the
intensity, breadth, and immediacy with which R. Ishmael was able to comprehend Torah.
At the same time, the understanding of “Torah” itself begins to shift into something that
is instantaneously knowable. I argue that those responsible for the Hekhalot corpus did so
by framing “Torah” itself as an object that can be “measured” and therefore could operate
For previous discussions on the middot within a “mystical sense,” see M. Fishbane, The Exegetical
Imagination: On Jewish Thought and Theology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 67-70;
Interestingly, as Fishbane discusses, The Fathers According to Rabbai Nathan (A, 37) records a tradition in
the name of R. Meir. “R. Meir says: Why does the verse say, And you shall know the Lord?” To teach that
whoever possesses all these middot knows the knowledge of God” [ מלמד שכל אדם שיש בו כל מדות הללו יודע
]דעתו של מקום. Though it is not clear that these middot are hypostases of God, as Fishbane maintains, the
middot nevertheless serves as a way of identifying two unlike things – in this case, the “Knowledge of
God” and the seven “qualities” of God, e.g., Wisdom, Righteousness, Justice, under a single concept. Thus,
those who know the seven “measures of God” at the same time know the “knowledge of God.” As we will
see, the term middah will do the same in the Hekhalot materials as well.
474
Another parallel: R. Ishmael said: As soon as I hear this report from R. Nehuniah b. HaQanah, my
master, I stood on my feet and I asked him all the names of the princes of wisdom. And from the request
that I asked of him I saw light in my heart like the days of heaven [§580].
473
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as “a measure for” something else. The importance of understanding Torah along these
lines is that it articulates an emic approach to the instantaneous comprehension of Torah
that does not rely on foreign conceptions of an “Intellect” occupying the “body.” 475 We
are not dealing with a Platonic understanding of “Intellect” but a similar idea expressed
through the resources available to late antique “para-rabbinic” Jews. As I argue in the
next few pages, the “measure of Torah” becomes identical in value with the entirety of
Torah itself. By way of introducing this topic, let us look a few passages later in §§678679, where R. Ishmael recounts how Metatron

… illuminated my heart at the Gates of the East, and my eyeballs peered into the depths and paths
of Torah. And not a single matter that my ears heard from the mouth of my master and from the
mouth of the disciples was ever forgotten again. And as for all the paths of Torah on which I acted
in truth, never again did I forget them. Even if I myself had not done any Torah, this measure that
I fixed in Israel would correspond for me as the entire Torah since they increase Torah without
labor.”476

מיד האיר לבבי בשערי המזרח וצפו גלגלי עינ י מעמקות ובנתיבות תורה ושוב לא נשתכח מפי דבר מכל מה ששמעתי
 א'ר' ישמע' אם לא477.באזניי מפי ר' מפי התלמידים ובנתיבות תורה שעשיתי בהן לאמיתו שוב לא הייתי משכח אותו
.עשיתי תורה כלום רב לי המידה זו שקבעתי בהן בישר' כנגד כל התורה כולה כדי שירבו את התורה שלא ביגיעה

475

Just because an internal account for instantaneous contemplation can be made does not discount my
broader argument here that the environment – as shown by shifting understandings of prognosis among a
range of Syrian communities – for such an idea was an important factor in its emergence. History is not a
matter of either this explanation or that explanation, but both this and that.
476
As Swartz notes, this logic is already introduced in rabbinic literature in m.Pe’ah 1:1 and b.Qiddushin
39b (Swartz, Scholastic, 64 n. 5)
477
O1531. M22 lacks much of this section. V228 and M22 completely lacks §679.
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The purpose of the last sentence is clearly to market this Sar Torah practice as something
powerful. But how does it market its power? In contrast to our passage in §298, where the
heart itself peers into Torah, here R. Ishmael’s supercharged eyeballs “peer into the
depths and paths of Torah.” Torah becomes “spatialized” and suddenly has “depths” and
“paths.” Other phrases like the “pathways of Torah” and “chambers of Torah” are
sprinkled throughout the Hekhalot corpus.478 What these articulations have in common is
a sense of “measure” : rooms, paths, depths, and pathways are all measurable. In other
words, Torah itself becomes conceptualized as a “measure of something” and as
something that is “measurable.” Therefore, it is not a coincidence that R. Ishmael calls
the Sar Torah praxis a “measure” since this “measure of Torah” is equivalent to the
entirety of Torah []כל התורה כולה, as the passage above explicitly states.479 Most
importantly, the “measure of Torah” does not detract from the value of the “actual
Torah,” but by virtue of its isomorphic relationship to the Torah, it encapsulates the
“entirety of Torah.” In other words, the measure of Torah and the Torah itself have the
same “value.”
This concept may demand more explanation. Moderns distinguish between the
measure of a book, for example, from the book itself by demarcating an arbitrary number
(e.g. 8 by 11 inches) along an abstract “grid.” However, Masuzawa reminds us that this
Phrases like the “Chambers of Torah” [§§549, 556, 569, 678] may refer to memory practices, though
this form of symbolic reasoning is complicated by the fact that the word “chambers” is clearly drawn from
other domains of Hekhalot literature and not from any identifiable mnemonic practices.
479
Whereas the classical use of the word “measure” [ ]מידהis relatively restricted to exegetical principles,
e.g., binyan av and gezerah shavah, or to certain aspects of God, e.g., the “measure of mercy (of God),” by
this time, the word carries with it significantly more semantic baggage and must be translated differently
depending on context. For example, Davila translates “measure” as “characteristics,” “practice,” “being,”
“consistency” (Davila, Translation, 29), and Schäfer translates it as “quality” (Schäfer, Origins, 278), or as
“mystery” (Schäfer, Hidden, 112, 119) Though these definitions make sense within the context, they do
little to explain how the plain meaning of the word “measure” fits within the context.
478
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“grid” is not immanent feature of the book itself but a peculiar representation of it born
from a particular moment in time and space.480 As a result, we must reimagine how late
antique Jews thought about “measure.” For R. Ishmael, the “measure” of Torah and the
“value” of the Torah are, in fact, identical. I suggest therefore that the ability to
comprehend Torah in a moment of angelic comprehension went hand-in-hand with an
understanding of Torah that is “instantaneously comprehensible.” The Sar Torah
traditions rendered Torah “instantaneously comprehensible” by rearticulating it as
something measurable and, therefore, the measure of something. By knowing the
“measure of Torah,” one knew the Torah itself.
Not surprisingly, this understanding of Torah as a “measure of” and as something
measurable finds itself at home in certain Hekhalot traditions. Here, let us return briefly
to a famous narrative in Hekhalot Rabbati, where one of the guardians of the sixth palace,
Dumiel, gives R. Ishmael a pep-talk before he is allowed into the seventh palace. Dumiel
says,

Before you I testify and forewarn you twice that the descender does not descend to the chariot
unless he has in himself these two measures: he is one who has read the Torah, Prophets,
Writings, studies Traditions, midrash, laws, lore, and the interpretation of laws – forbidden and
permitted action, or he is one who has confirmed every negative commandment that is written in
the Torah and he has kept all the prohibitions of the laws and of the customs and of the
instructions which were said to Moses from Sinai. If he says to him, to Dumiel the prince: I have
in me these two measures, then Dumi’el the Prince binds himself to Gabriel the scribe and writes
For an in-depth discussion on the “grid” as an abstract representation rather than as an “immanent”
measure of any given object, see: T. Masuzawa, In Search of Dreamtime: The Quest for the Origin of
Religion (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 23-25.
480
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the papyrus for him and he hands the papyrus on the pole of the wagon of this man, and the
papyrus says, “Such and such is the Torah of so-and-so, such and such are his deeds, and he seeks
to enter before the throne of his Glory.” (§§234-235)

והיה אומ' לו שתים לפניך אני מיעיד בה ומתראה בה אין יורד היורד למרכבה אלא מי שיש בו שתי מידות הללו מי שקרא
תורה נביאים וכתובים ושונה משנה ומדרש הלכות ואגדות ופתרון הלכות איסור והיתר או מי שקיים כל לא בכתובי' בתורה ושמר
 אם אמר לו לדומיאל השר יש בו אחד משתי מידות הללו481כל האזהרות של חוקים ושל משפטים ולתורות שנאמרו לו למשה בסיני
 לו את הניאר והיה תולה את הניאר ביסיקרא של קורון של אותו אדם483 לו לגבריאל הסופר וכותיב482היה דומיאל השר מחזיק
484

לומר לך כך וכך תורתו של פלו' וכך וכך מעשיו ומבקש ליכנס לפני כסא כבודו

Dumiel identifies two “measures” here: first, the complete mastery of the rabbinic corpus
(de-rabbanan), and second, the mastery of the laws written in the Torah (de-orayyta). Yet
Dumiel does not use the tried-and-true shorthand of “de-rabbanan” and “de-orayyta.”
Rather, he goes completely in the opposite direction by both expanding the number of
legal “domains,” almost to the point of absurdity, and by making finer-and-finer
distinctions between domains of law. After all, what exactly are the differences between
the “prohibitions of the law,” the “customs of the law,” and “forbidden actions?” When
read as a work of rhetoric, the passage is clearly trying to highlight the difficulty of
entering the seventh palace; by pushing to expand the number of legal domains, the text
insinuates that it is impossible for anyone to enter. This is prime marketing strategy; the
creator of this passage wants to demonstrate the “theurgic” power of the divine names by
demonstrating that they are equivalent to these insurmountable “measures.” This leads us
“In Sinai” found in M22, N8128.
Probably “to bind” []נזקק, as in M40, O1531, N8128, D436, V228.
483
Kotiv or Koteiv is unique to M22.
484
M22.
481
482
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squarely back to the question of why Dumiel calls them “measures.” The use of the word
“measure” is not accidental; it transforms what we would call a “domain of law” into a
“measure of law.” These “measures” of Torah contains the value of the Torah itself.
Neither Gabriel nor Dumiel distinguishes between the “measures of Torah” and the
“Torah” itself when he writes: “Such-and-such is the Torah of so-and-so, such-and-such
are his deeds…” The “measures of Torah” are identical with the value of the Torah itself.
They do not “refer to” the Torah – as if they are separate from the Torah– but are the
linguistic content and breadth of Torah. After all, it would make no sense to allow
someone into the seventh palace who only possesses a “measure of Torah” if “measure”
was merely meant to reference Torah; the measure itself must somehow encapsulate the
value and the content of Torah.
The idea of a Torah that is both “measurable” and “measure of something” seems
to have migrated to other corners of the post-Talmudic Jewish literature. Though this
discussion far exceeds the present boundaries of this chapter, it is worth briefly
mentioning two texts that “play” with such an idea.485 It must be admitted, however, that
neither text explicitly uses the word “measure” []מידה. Nevertheless, their parallels with
the Hekhalot traditions discussed above will be hopefully apparent. In the late midrashic
text known as the Midrash Alpha Beta de-Rabbi Akiva,486 for example, in which
“Merkavah”-like traditions are woven into the literary warp-and-woof of the text, it says,

485
486

This idea was sparked by a conversation with Annette Yoshiko Reed and Jillian Stinchcomb at PSCO.
Also known as the Alphabet (Otiyyot) of R. Aqiva.

258

… From here you learn that understanding is greater before the Holy One, blessed be he, than the
Torah. For even if a person reads the Torah, the Prophets, the Writings, and recites the Mishnah,
Midrashim, Halakhot, Aggadot, Shemu’ot, Tosefot, Moshvot, Ma’amadot, Haggadot, and all the
Orders of Creation, but does not have understanding, his Torah is equivalent to nothing, as it is
said, “The understanding of those who understand will be hidden…” (Isa. 29). Another matter:
Why did the Holy One create the world with the letter Bet in Genesis and conclude the Torah with
the letter Lamed? For if you put them together, they are Bet-Lamed and when you reverse it, they
are Lamed-Bet. The Holy One said to Israel, My sons, if you establish these two letters – BetLamed and Lamed-Bet – I will attribute to you all as if you have established the entire Torah from
the letter Bet to Lamed.487

מכאן אתה למד שגדולה בינה לפני הק''ב יותר מן התורה שאפילו אדם קור' תורה נביאי' וכתובים ושונה משנה ומדרשות
הלכות ואגדות שמועות ותוספות מושבות ומעמדות והגדות וכל סדרי בראשית ואין בו בינה אין תורתו שוה כלום שנ' ובינת נבוניו
תסתתר (ישעיה כ''ט) ד''א מפני מה ברא הק''בה את העולם בב' בבראשי' וסיים בל' התור' כדי שכשתדבקם ביחד אינן אלא בל וכי
תהפוך אותם אינן אלא לב אמר להם הק''בה לישראל בני אם אתם מקיימים שני דברים הללו בל ולב אני מעלה עליכם כאלו קיימתם
...'את התורה כולה מב' ועד ל

These sections comes from a section of the Midrash Alpha Beta organized around the
letter bet. In the first section, the midrashist argues that understanding [binah] is superior
to sheer knowledge of “Torah.” He makes this argument by listing each domain of the
rabbinic curriculum – that is, demonstrating the rabbinic measure of Torah. This parallels
the strategy that Dumiel used in the passage above. The result is an accordion-like
conception of Torah, both expandable to include a range of distinct domains and

487

A. Jellinik (ed.), Bet ha-Midrasch: Sammlung kleiner Midraschim und Vermischter Abhandlungen aus
der jüdischen Literatur (vol. 3; Leipzig, 1853-77; Repr., Jerusalem: Bamberger & Wahrmann, 1938), xivxvii, 12-64. I am not aware of more recent work on this text, though it may be useful as a tool for
rethinking the development of “Hekhalot” literature and its possible “impact” on other literary domains.
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collapsible under a single conception of Torah. Though the word “measure” is not
explicitly mentioned here, I think the similarities are nevertheless clear: “understanding”
is measured against the entire “measure” of the rabbinic Torah. Yet, this text differs from
the Hekhalot text above in one crucial aspect. Whereas R. Ishmael had said that his
“measure” – that is, the Sar Torah praxis – should be considered as great as [ כנגד...]רב לי
the entire Torah, here, “understanding” of the Torah is measured against the rabbinic
breadth of Torah and is found to exceed it. Therefore, in both cases, the “measure of
Torah” itself is primarily used to measure that which is equivalent or even beyond it in
value.
The second section [davar aher] narrows the scope to just the Pentateuch, that is,
the “Torah of Moses.” Here, the midrashist asks why the Torah begins with the letter Bet
[“in the beginning”:  ]בראשיתand ends with the letter Lamed [“in the eyes of all of Israel”:
ישראל-]לעיני כל. God seems to be saying that the entire breadth of the Torah can be
measured by the letters bet and lamed, the letters that bookend the Pentateuch. The value
of this measure is found to be equivalent when measured from the front to back [bet to
lamed] and back to front [lamed to bet].488 Similar to the passages from the Hekhalot
literature discussed above, God says to the Jews that if they “establish” Bet-Lamed and
Lamed-Bet, that is, the beginning and end of Torah, then he will consider them to know
the entire Torah. Put differently, he will attribute to them the entire “value” of the Torah
if they “establish” in their hearts just the opening and concluding letters of the Torah.

Though the Hebrew word lev [ ]לבmeans “heart,” which is often depicted as the seat of memory, it is not
clear what bel [ ]בלmight mean.
488
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Again, the understanding seems to be that the “measure” of the Torah – bookended here
by the letters bet and lamed – are in fact equivalent in value to the entire Torah.
Another example might be found in the medieval text known as the Alphabet of
Ben Sira.489 According to this text, Ben Sira is the son of the prophet Jeremiah, and thus
his “wisdom” carries with it a prophetic nuance. In one passage, it says:

It is said about Ben Sira that he learned the Book of Leviticus in one day. The teacher said to him,
“The order of creation were altered for you.” Ben Sira answered, “There is nothing new under the
sun,’ for Jeremiah did likewise. Moreover, it is written, ‘And Benaiah ben Yehoiada the son of a
living man’ (2 Sam. 23:20). Was everyone dead and only he alive? But ‘living’ must mean that he
was alive in the study of Torah, for he learned the Book of Leviticus in one day.” It is also said
about Ben Sira that during that year he mastered the entire Pentateuch. The second year he learned
the Prophets, and the Writings, the Mishnah, the Talmud, the Halakhot, and the Aggadot. During
the third year, he studied the fine points of the scribes and of the Torah. In the fourth year, the
lighter matters and the heavier matters, verbal analogies, cycles, and Gematria. In the fifth year, he
learned the conversation of the ministering angels, the palm trees, and the demons, as well as fox
fables. During the sixth year, he mastered Sifra, Sifrei, Tanna de-bei Eliyahu, matters that are deep
(sealed?) for humans. By the seventh year there was not a major or minor subject that he had not
studied.490

אמרו עליו על בן סירא שביום אחד למד ספר ויקרא ואמר רבו עליך נשתנו סדרי בראשית חזר לו והלא ירמיה למד כן
ועוד שבנייהו בן יהוידע למד ספר ויקרא שנ' ובנינו בן יהוידע איש חי וכי כל עולם כולו מתים נינהו אלא שהוא חי בתורה שלמד
ספר ויקרא ביום אחד אמרו עליו על בן סירא בשנתו למד כל התורה כולה שנייה למד נביאים וכתובים משנה ותלמוד הלכות ואגדות
489

For an English translation and short commentary, see: David Stern and Mark Jay Mirsky (eds.),
Rabbinic Fantasies: Imaginative Narratives from Classical Hebrew Literature (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1990), 167-202; For the Hebrew text, I rely on Eli Yassif, Sippurei Ben Sira bi-Yeme haBenayim: Mahadurah Biqortit u-Firke Mehqar (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1984).
490
Yassif, Sippurei, 212-13.
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שנה שלישית דקדוקי סופרים ודקדוקי תורה שנה רביעית קלות וחמורות גזירות שוות תקופות וגימטריות שנה חמישית שיחת
מלאכי השרת שיחת דקלים ושיחת שדים וממשלות שועלים שנה שישית סיפרא וסיפרי ותנא דבי אליהו ודברים החתומים לבני אדם
...שנה שביעית לא הניח דבר גדול ודבר קטן

Ben Sira’s stupendous mastery of the entire rabbinic curriculum over an absurdly short
span of seven years parallels fantasies of the same in the Sar Torah traditions, even as it
ultimately works to parody the entire notion of “Wisdom.”491 At the same time, it
“measures out” the full breadth of Torah by parsing out each domain of rabbinic learning
for the purpose of fantasizing about the stupendous mastery of Torah, a strategy that we
had seen above in both the Alphabet of Rabbi Aqiva and in the Hekhalot literature. Given
Ben Sira’s relatively quick mastery of the entire breadth of rabbinic knowledge, it is no
surprise that Ben Sira’s teacher suspects some miraculous deed operating behind the
scenes. One wonders whether the creators/redactors of this passage had Sar Torah
traditions in mind, which were certainly circulating among post-Talmudic Jews at that
time. In fact, in an alternative version of this text, the text glosses the “great things”

491

King Nebuchadnezzar asks Ben Sira why people have to fart. He says that if they did not fart, they
would not know when they had to defecate and would thus soil their clothes. For more about parody in the
Alphabet of Ben Sira, see D. Stern, “The Alphabet of Ben Sira and the Early History of Parody in Jewish
Literature,” in The Idea of Biblical Interpretation: Essays in Honor of James L. Kugel (eds. H. Najman and
J.H. Newman; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 423-48. Stern has noted to me that Ben Sira’s mastery of the Torah and
Rabbis fits within the text’s parody of Geonic Babylonian culture; therefore its connection to Hekhalot
literature might not be as strong as I assume. In my defense, I would add two points: First, as mentioned
above, a later gloss reads the “Great Things” mentioned in the text as a reference to the Ma‘seh Merkavah.
I do not think that it is a coincidence that this gloss invokes Hekhalot literature precisely within this
context; the later editor saw the similarities between the fantasy of rabbinic mastery embedded within
Hekhalot literature with the same found in the Alphabet of Ben Sira and equated them. In this sense, I
should clarify that I do not see the Alphabet of Ben Sira as a literary parallel to the Hekhalot literature nor
as a parody of Hekhalot literature. Rather, in so far as both Hekhalot literature and the Alphabet of Ben Sira
engage with rabbinic culture from a position that lies beyond the rabbinic fold, I do not think that it is too
surprising that both texts craft conceptions of Torah with similar rhetorical moves for similar purposes.
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mentioned in the last line of the passage as the Ma‘aseh Merkavah [ דבר גדול זה מעשה
]מרכבה, perhaps referring to the Hekhalot macroform known by that name [§§544-596].
This understanding of “measures of Torah” bears on my reading of the conclusion
of the Sar Torah macroform [§§299-303]. These passages come after the narrative and
were probably composed independently.492 The praxis itself is a combination of
adjurations and recitations of the “midrash of the Sar Torah,” which presumably refers to
the narratival historiola. This section concludes by marketing the power of the Sar Torah
praxis:

When he completes the twelve days of adjuration, he goes forth to all the measures of Torah that
he seeks, be it Miqra, Mishnah, or Talmud, or to a vision of the Chariot, and he goes forth with a
measure of purity away from grief and from great affliction.493 For the learning is in our hands, the
intervention of the ancient ones, and the tradition of the ancients, which they wrote and set down
for generations to come, for the humble to make use of it. And whoever is fit is answered by it and
whoever is not fit is answered by them. (§303)

492

Nevertheless, the very fact that they are joined together means that the redactor(s) of this particular Sar
Torah macroform saw something in the praxis that was conceptually similar, generative, or continuous with
the narrative. Perhaps the fact that the praxis calls for the practitioner to “fix the midrash of the Torah in
prayer thrice daily and nightly” occasioned the generative or conceptual link between the praxis and the
narrative. After all, one of the things that God urges the Jews to do is to “seek out” [היאך תדרשוהו: same root
as midrash,  ]מדרשthe Sar Torah in order to gain a vision of the Torah. Furthermore, the reference to the
taqqanah may refer to the narrative where it says that the “Taqqanat haolam will go forth from you.”
References to “grief and great pain” also parallel the major complaints that the Jews had against the double
burden of Torah study and Temple-building and the reference to the “ancients” writing down the
“teaching” and bequeathing it to future generations parallels Zerubbabel’s act of transmitting the Secret of
Torah.
493
The word here in Hebrew [ ]סיגוףcarries with it a sense of ascetic practices. See Jastrow, 975.

263

וככלותו שנים עשר ימי' יוצא לכל מידות תורה שמבקש אם למקרא אם למשנה אם לתלמוד או לצפיית המרכבה כי במדת
טוהר הוא יוצא מצער ומסיגוף גדול כי תלמוד גדול הוא בידינו תקנת ראשונים ומסורת עתיקים שכתבו והניהו לדורות
494

להשתמש בו צנועים ומי שראוי נענה בו ומי שאינו ראוי להם נענה בהם

After the practitioner “adjures” the angels for twelve days, they come to “raise the
pathways of the heart” [§298] so that he might “go forth” into every “measure of Torah”
and with a “measure of purity.” To be clear, the practitioner does not acquire “Torah,”
but the ability to “go out” into the measures of Torah.495 What is at stake is the mode of
acquiring and conceptualizing Torah. Therefore, the angels who “raise the pathways of
the heart” renders the person into someone capable of immediately comprehending
Torah. They lead the person away from “great grief and from great afflication,” which
refer to the “grief” and “afflication” of trying to retain Torah through the faulty
instruments of the human body. By the same token, the term “measures of Torah” are
separate domains of rabbinic learning and denotes them as immediately comprehensible
domains of Torah, as I argued above. In this way, both the knower of Torah grasps at a
form of panoptic and instantaneous mastery of Torah and the Torah itself becomes
configured as an object that is instantaneously knowable.
Most curious about this concluding passage, however, is the intrusion of the
phrase “Vision of the Chariot.” It is a “measure of Torah” or not? After all, the text says
that the person goes forth to “every” measure of the Torah, which means that what
follows should contain everything the text considers to be a “measure of Torah.” Though
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M22.
I suspect that the verb to “go out” deliberately evokes the “spatialized” aspects of Torah discussed
previously, namely, the “pathways” of Torah, the “depths” of Torah, and so on.
495
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the “Merkavah” appears once in the narrative as the “Throne of Glory” (§298) and once
in reference to the “Princes of the Merkavah” (§302), they appear only incidentally.
Picking up on the seemingly anomalous phrase “Vision of the Chariot,” Swartz argues
that this section represents a “late synthesis” of the Sar Torah and Merkavah traditions,
which seems to assume that the Vision of the Chariot is in fact a measure of Torah. 496 I
think that the manuscript evidence points to an alternative reading, namely, that it is not a
“measure of Torah” but in fact an affiliated but ultimately distinct domain of revelatory
knowledge. After all, though all seven manuscripts in Schäfer’s Synopse consider the
Miqra and Mishnah as measures of Torah [ ]מידות תורהand use the word “whether” [ ]אםto
mark that they are complementary aspects of Torah, four of the seven manuscripts497 use
the word “or” [ ]אוinstead of “whether” [ ]אםprior to the phrase “Vision of the Chariot.”
As a result, the use of “whether” [ ]אםto include the “Vision of the Chariot” as a
“measure of Torah” in the other three manuscripts looks suspiciously like an attempt to
harmonize the text. I suspect that the “or” [ ]אוin the four manuscripts implies a
disjuncture; the “Vision of the Merkavah” is not to be considered a measure of Torah in
the same sense as Miqra, Mishnah, or Talmud, but an affiliated domain of revelatory
thought accessible through the same praxis. If so, this is further evidence that late antique
Jews were theorizing a form of revelatory “epistemology” affiliated yet distinct from a
rabbinically-inflected notions of Torah.

Swartz, Magic, 107. Halperin, Faces, 434; Davila writes, “In other words both the power of instant
Torah-learning and the visionary journey to the chariot are in view, a combination that weakens scholarly
efforts to separate the Sar Torah traditions from traditions about descent to the Chariot.” (165)
497
D436, M22, M40, O1531.
496
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Conclusion: Method as History
I have argued above that in their fashioning of an alternative “magical” model for the
acquisition of Torah, the Sar Torah traditions articulates both a conception of Torah that
is rhetorically distinct from rabbinic models of “laborious” comprehension and an
alternative model of human comprehension, a sort of angelic comprehension that
transcends epistemological limitations of the human body. This articulation of an
instantaneously-knowable “measure of Torah” and the instantaneous knower of Torah
can be seen against the backdrop of broader theorizations of prognosis; “Torah” becomes
the precinct of the angelic knower, removed from rabbinic modes of corporeal knowledge
production and transmission.
In this concluding section, I examine one way of thinking about the relationship
between the broader theorizations of prognosis discussed in the previous chapter, on the
one hand, and the Sar Torah traditions, on the other. I begin with the assumption that
these separate phenomena are “related” to one another in some manner; how they are
related, however, is something that we cannot divine. The best that I can do is to point
insistently to the parameters set at the beginning of this study: the fact that these
theorizations of prognosis and angelic comprehension and the “Measures of Torah”
happened in roughly the same place and time period is the best argument that they are
interrelated and not simply “internalist histories” playing out along their own tidy
temporal or spatial planes. I recognize completely that this is a tautological statement
between “method” and “result.” We are caught in the same problem that the Iamblichus
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and the Ps.-Clementine warns us against: the conclusions to our answers are
predetermined by the parameters and the variables we set, and “truth” is again deferred.
Nevertheless, I wish to briefly argue for the value of thinking about the Hekhalot
corpus alongside a wider range of texts, even in the face of tautological reasoning. The
goal, after all, is to find something “interesting” – to put it in J.Z. Smith’s terms – or
aesthetically satisfying – as Ankersmit argues.498 After all, as Ankersmit reminds us,
“truth” is not the criteria for historical investigation, but what is at stake, and the
scholarly discussion the “truth” of my historical representation is precisely what is
important and interesting.499 In that sense, the study of Hekhalot literature alongside a
richer variety of texts – especially “Neoplatonic,” “magical,” and “Christian”– may help
tell more interesting and satisfying narratives of the past, narratives whose “historical”
plausibility will always be up for grabs. I would like to focus particularly on the usage of
“Neoplatonic texts” and “Neoplatonism” as comparanda for the study of Hekhalot
literature, not because they are inherently more “useful,” but because they have been so
instrumental in modern definitions of “mysticism.”
For the most part, scholars of Hekhalot literature following Scholem have tended
to limit their engagement with other corpora to a rather narrow range of non-Jewish
sources.500 Calls for broader range of comparanda, sounded by Annette Yoshiko Reed,
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Smith, Drudgery Divine. F.R. Ankersmit, Historical Representation (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2002).
499
Ankersmit, Historical, 35.
500
The debate between Schäfer and Boyarin, for example, regarding the “Christian” influence in 3 Enoch
around the figure of Enoch-turned-Metatron, who is called the “Little YHWH” ()יהוה הקטן, may be seen as
indicative of the state of using Christian comparanda in the field. Indeed, though both Schäfer and Boyarin
have different views on the “Christian-ness” of the “Little YHWH,” especially the “channels” or
“responses” through which that idea may have made their way into 3 Enoch, which as every party
acknowledges, is a late-medieval macroform, their discussion centers regarding its relationship to
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Adam Becker, and Steven Wasserstrom, have inspired my own thinking about the
“location” of Hekhalot corpus vis-à-vis other corpora.501 Furthermore, thanks to the work
of Ra‘anan Boustan in particular, we are in a better position to judge the development of
Hekhalot literature in its medieval Byzantine and Mesopotamian contexts. It is within
these specific contexts that a greater attention to the historical development of those ideas
that have traditionally been framed as “philosophy” or “mysticism” might provide a
better picture for the development of modes of articulating human and divine difference
and similarity in the Jewish corpora.
This is not, of course, to revive the specter of “mysticism” must less “philosophy”
as essential categories of or distinct from “religion.” At the same time, the heuristic value
of such obviously imperfect categories for organizing our archive of the past should also
not be ignored. In this sense, I break from both Wolfson and Schäfer, who sees little
value of the study of Neoplatonism for the study of Hekhalot literature. In the words of
Wolfson, “However, as I noted above, this typology of unitive experience has its roots in

Christianity centers primarily on passages from the New Testament, especially the letters of Paul. While
practically this long-durée focus serves as a way to anchor the debate, it does remarkably little to answer
the question of historical representation - “Why here and why now?” In other words, whereas Boyarin sees
a genealogical argument from ancient “binitarianism” weaving its way throughout multiple “Jewish” and
“Christian” communities and appearing in 3 Enoch, and Schäfer sees an act of imitation, in which 3 Enoch
“responds” to the New Testament depictions of Jesus, I posit that we should look at the development as an
analogous development, tethered to a particular time and place, that is, the medieval Byzantine and/or
Abbasid empire. See: P. Schäfer, The Origins of Jewish Mysticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2009), 322-27; idem., The Jewish Jesus: How Judaism and Christianity Shaped Each Other (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2012),141-49. D. Boyarin, “Beyond Judaisms: Metatron and the Divine
Polymorphy of Ancient Judaism,” JSJ 41 (2010): 323-65; idem., “The Gospel of the Memra: Jewish
Binitarianism and the Prologue to John ,” HTR 94.3 (2001): 243-84; idem., “Two Powers in Heaven; or, the
Making of a Heresy,” in The Idea of Biblical Interpretation: Essays in Honor of James L. Kugel (eds. H.
Najman and J. Newman; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 331-70.
501
Reed, “Rethinking.” Becker, “Polishing the Mirror.” S.M. Wasserstrom, Between Muslim and Jew: The
Problem of Symbiosis under Early Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 181-205.
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Neoplatonism, which is completely irrelevant to the corpus of Hekhalot mysticism.”502
Instead, Wolfson seeks to evoke an alternative “native” framework from which to assess
the Jewish mysticism, highlighting instead the angelification and possible deification of
the yored hamerkavah. I have tried to do the same in my analysis of the Sar Torah
macroform above, though I dispute the “either/or” logic interwoven in Wolfson’s
argument. Schäfer, though critical of Wolfson’s larger characterization of Jewish
mysticism, nevertheless echoes Wolfson’s sentiment that Neoplatonism – or at least
Neoplatonic focus of unitive experience with the Divine – has no place for the study of
Hekhalot literature.503 I agree: “Neoplatonism” – or at least as it is reduced here to a
mystical union with the One – has no place for the study of Hekhalot literature. At the
same time, curiously enough, both seem to forget that “theurgy” – which is often used
heuristically to describe the “magical” character of the Hekhalot corpus – itself comes
from a specific and influential strand of Neoplatonic thought and that it is as foreign to
the Hekhalot corpus as “Neoplatonism.” To separate “theurgy” from “Neoplatonism” is
to make an interpretative judgment on what ‘Neoplatonism’ is and what theurgy is not,
judgments that operate on the level of description, essence, and value.504 Indeed, by
announcing that “Neoplatonism” has no value for the study of Hekhalot literature, the
historical development of “Neoplatonic” thought throughout late antiquity must be passed
over in silence, when in fact its historical development might tell us something about the
E.R. Wolfson, “Mysticism and the Poetic-Liturgical Compositions from Qumran: A Response to Bilhah
Nitzan,” JQR 85.1-2 (1994): 185-202, 193.
503
Schäfer, “Origins,”19.
504
Indeed, we cannot historicize “Hekhalot” literature without historicizing its “comparanda,” in this case,
theurgy itself. Indeed, as Ilinca Tanaseanu-Döbler has demonstrated, theurgy as it existed in the past was
primarily as a discourse, one that meant different things to different people and different times, and not a
stable set of conceptions of practices. See: I. Tanaseanu-Döbler, Theurgy in Late Antiquity: The Invention
of a Ritual Tradition (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013).
502
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intertwined late antique and medieval Christian theorizations of revelation, liturgy, and
ascent, all of which should interest scholars of Hekhalot literature.
At the risk of making mountains out of molehills, when pushed to its limits, the
logic that “Neoplatonism” has no place for the study of Hekhalot literature can be
deployed against categories of “Manichaeism” or “Jewish-Christianity” or “Christianity”
itself, thereby foreclosing all possibilities of comparison, since all categories are
ultimately “foreign” in so far as they masquerade as abstractions of particular elements
and come freighted with their own problematic histories. When placed in such stark
terms, I do not think that Schäfer or Wolfson would deny the possibility or value of
comparative work. Yet in order for Neoplatonism to be useful, we must disambiguate and
historicize “Neoplatonism” itself.
By way of closing, I offer up the Ps-Dionysian corpus as an example of the
naturalization of “Neoplatonic” thinking among Syrian Christians living in the sixth
century and as a way of making the study of Hekhalot literature more historically
“interesting.” This period was, perhaps not coincidentally, the “gestation period” for the
emergence of Hekhalot literature. Ps.-Dionysius stands within a centuries-long tradition
of Syrians thinking about the power of symbols, ascent, and the nature of divinity. To be
crass about it, Ps.-Dionysius “Christianizes” a form of Iamblichean and Proclean
Neoplatonism, which at this point, took Iamblichus’ understanding of symbolic theurgy
for granted. Of course, Neoplatonic thought was beginning to spread among other Syrian
communities as well, though selectively filtered through the needs of these
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communities.505 In any case, the Ps.-Dionysian text known as Divine Names centers on
the power of liturgy and prayer as a theurgic vehicle of ascent, even more than his
forebears, Iamblichus and Proclus.506 The Divine Names assumes that the divine names of
God are not merely spoken; they are “hymned,” and when they are properly conceived,
the hymnist “ascends.” One cannot help but be reminded of the opening lines of Hekhalot
Rabbati: “What are the songs that one must say in order to peer into the Vision of the
Chariot, to descend to it in peace and to ascend to it in peace?”507 and the ensuing pages
of Qedusha songs. This raises the possibility that liturgy played a role in smuggling in
“foreign” Neoplatonic ideas and naturalizing them in late antique Jewish literature, a
possibility that is bolstered by the fact that Christian and Jewish liturgy from this time
period share a number of concerns, tropes, and literary patterns. 508 Furthermore, Ps.Dionysius emphasizes the process of “unfolding” [ἀνεπτύξαμεν] the divine names of God
and angels, whereby one might achieve greater intellectual insights into the nature of the
unknowable God.509 This focus on the “Names of God” and their “unfolding” strikes me
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A. Becker, Fear of God and the Beginning of Wisdom: The School of Nisibis and Christian Scholastic
Culture in Late Antique Mesopotamia (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 126-54,
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Ps.-Dionysius writes, “Let us stretch ourselves through prayers upward to the more lofty elevation of the
kindly Rays of God. Imagine a great shining chain hanging downward from the heights of heaven to the
world below. We grab hold of it with one hand and another, and we seem to be pulling it down toward us.”
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ἐκείνην ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω παροῦσαν, ἀλλ’ αὐτοὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνηγόμεθα πρὸς τὰς ὑψηλοτέρας τῶν πολυφώτων
ἀκτίνων μαρμαρυγάς. (680C, 68). See P. Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and an
Introduction to Their Influence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 145.
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“These, then, are the divine names. They are conceptual names and I have unfolded them as well as I
can. But of course, I have fallen well short of what they actually mean. Even the angels would have to
admit such a failure and I could scarcely speak praises as they do. Even the greatest of our theologians are
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as remarkably similar to one theme in Hekhalot literature, that is, the “interpretation” [lit.
“separating out” [ ]]הפרשof the “theurgic” names of God and his angels. As we have seen,
when Zerubbabel receives the crown of Sar Torah, he “interprets” [ ]הפרשthe names of
the Prince of Torah. In another passage of Hekhalot Rabbati, R. Ishmael asks, ‘What is
the difference/interpretation of the songs that a person sings and descends into the
Merkavah?” [?]מה הפריש שירות שאדם משורר ויורד למרכבה. Finally, Ps.-Dionysius’ focus on
angelic hierarchy intersects with the Hekhalot literature’s descriptions of God’s angels, if
not broadly late antique conceptions of divine “intermediaries”510 and “spiritual
taxonomies.”511 Together, these points form a sort of dense map of family resemblances
that overlaps with the values and concerns of Jews responsible for the Hekhalot corpus.
Of course, such broad strokes are more provocative than probative. Nevertheless, they at
least open up the possibility for more “interesting” historical representations of the Sar
Torah traditions.

handed down to me. I have passed them unchanged to you and to other sacred men, and I will continue to
do so as long as I have the power of words and you have the power to listen.” : Ταύτας ἡμεῖς τὰς νοητὰς
θεωνυμίας συνῃρηκότες, ὡς ἐφικτόν, ἀνεπτύξαμεν οὐ μόνον αὐτῶν τῆς ἀκριβείας ἀπολειπόμενοι, τοῦτο
γὰρ ἀληθῶς καὶ ἄγγελοι φαῖεν, οὐδὲ τῆς κατὰ ἀγγέλους αὐτῶν ὑμνῳδίας, καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων γὰρ ἀποδέουσιν
οἱ κράτιστοι τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν θεολόγων, οὔτε μὴν αὐτῶν τῶν θεολόγων οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀσκητῶν ἢ
συνοπαδῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἡμῖν ὁμοταγῶν ἐσχάτως καὶ ὑφειμένως. See: C. Luibheid (trans.), PseudoDionysius: The Complete Works (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 130-31.
510
S. Ronis, “Intermediary Beings in Late Antique Judaism: A History of Scholarship,” CBR 14.1 (2015):
94-120; idem., “Corrigendum,” CBR 14.3 (2016): 407-409. Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius, 47-90.
511
Marx-Wolf, Spiritual Taxonomies.
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CONCLUSION

I set out at the beginning of this dissertation to employ time and space as the primary
parameters for navigating the “archive” of ancient texts. In so doing, I broke with models
of scholarly comparison that are constrained by disciplinary habits, boundaries, and/or
implicit canons. As a way of navigating through the archive, I focused particularly on
discursive constructions of “prophethood” and “prophecy” as they developed within the
late antique Syrian milieu. My broader goal was to propose a historical representation of
late antique Syria as an environment marked by a peculiar density of individuals and
communities theorizing about divine knowledge and the possible ways of accessing that
divine knowledge. As such, I compared and juxtaposed texts within this “late antique
Syrian” archive that have little to do with one another from a disciplinary standpoint, yet,
I argued, cohere together when reembedded into their shared milieu. Such a model for
representing the past, moreover, is potentially more fruitful than asking questions that
relate to the definition of “prophecy,” in so far as the very category of definition already
assumes traditional metaphysical ideas like essence, value, origins, development, and
dissipation. As noted in the introduction, such questions have typically dominated
scholarship on “prophecy” and “prophethood.” Finally, I sought to plug my dissertation
into a range of separate scholarly conversations, especially in the fields of Jewish
mysticism, “Jewish Christianity,” Neoplatonism, and Manichaeism. Again, to be clear, I
did not seek to define “prophecy” from within any particular discipline, but to use my
idiosyncratic definition of “prophecy” as a way to cut across these disciplines.
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In chapter one, I looked at Baraies the Teacher’ homily in the Cologne Mani
codex to argue that the Mesopotamian followers of Mani began to theorize
“prophethood” as a disembedded object of discourse. These early followers of Mani were
not talking about whether Mani was a prophet or not, but what prophethood itself meant.
I argued that this “disembedding” of prophethood was not merely a precipitate of earlier
“Jewish Christian” traditions, but must be seen within its local context. I made a series of
smaller arguments to make this case. First, Baraies’ the Teacher attempted to speak to
both factions of the early followers of Mani, not to two different “religious”
communities. Second, what was at stake was the authority to speak for Mani in the period
following his execution. In other words, though Baraies’ argument is about Mani’s
relationship to the chain of “ancestral prophets,” its purpose is to position Baraies and his
faction as the “authentic” representatives of the community. Finally, I argued that Baraies
pulls this off successfully by demonstrating his mastery of ancient writings, thereby
signaling that he possessed the true interpretations of the writings that Mani and the
ancestral prophets had left behind.
In chapter two, I traced out the transformations of Manichaean prophethood as it
entered into the Late Antique Syrian milieu. I looked especially at the Kephalaias and
argued that there is not a single “master” Manichaean prophetology but multiple
prophetologies that emerged in different local contexts. I proposed that these
developments in Manichaean prophetology, moreover, express a uniquely Manichaean
anxiety regarding the position of Manichaeism vis-à-vis existing Syro-Mesopotamian
“Christian” churches. In short, prophetology emerged as a conceptual tool for
Manichaeans to both assert their identity as Christians – that is, as members of the
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Church of Christ – and as superior to those local Christians dotting the SyroMesopotamian milieu. I contextualize these developments in early Manichaean
prophetologies by turning to contemporaneous and proximate Syriac literature, especially
The Laws of the Various Countries, the Syriac Acts literature, and the Didascalia
Apostolorum.
In the third chapter, I turn to the discursive effects that the Manichaean
penetration into the late antique Syrian milieu had on local Syrian communities. I argue
that the Manichaean presence made prophethood an urgent discourse among Syrian
“Jewish Christian” communities. Manichaean arguments about Mani’s prophethood and
revelations, as discussed in chapter two, spurred Syrian Christians to reciprocate and
theorize more robustly an alternative prophetological system. I look specifically at the
Pseudo-Clementine Homilies and argue that contemporary embryological discourses
undergird its unique prophetological system. Such discourses are marshalled to make two
interrelated points: first, to argue that “revelatory visions” or apparitions cannot impart
true knowledge of God, and second, to polemicize against the apostle Paul, whom it
marks as a representative of the false prophetess. Both these points, I argue, surgically
respond to Mani’s self-presentation as Paul redivivus.
Whereas the first three chapters focused on the emergence of “prophethood” as
discourse in the late antique Syro-Mesopotamian context, the next two chapters focus on
“prophecy” itself. In the fourth chapter, I situate the shifting meanings of prognosis
among late antique Syrian communities. While local Syrian communities were in broad
agreement that Greek philosophy was a poor path for gaining knowledge of the divine,
the Neoplatonists, “Jewish Christians,” and the Manichaeans argued that it was possible
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to attain “divine prognosis.” At the same time, Syriac-speaking Christians and rabbis
argued that one should study only those things that God had decreed as appropriate for
study, suggesting that they are responding negatively to theorizations of prophecy among
the other proximate communities. In fact, I argue that the Neoplatonists, “Jewish
Christians,” and Manichaeans began to conceptualize prognosis along converging lines,
namely, as total panoptic knowledge that could only be possessed by those who are
ontologically connected to the divine. The Neoplatonists and “Jewish Christians” defined
this conception of divine prognosis against discursive means of knowledge acquisition,
especially those aligned with Greek philosophy, and against the sort of incremental
knowledge made available through medical and divinatory prognosis. The Manichaeans,
in contrast, do not talk about Greek philosophy, but they argued that only the appointed
prophet could possess divine prognosis, since he both saw the “revelations” of the divine
and was an extension of the divine essence itself. Intriguingly, they too distinguished this
understanding of panoptic prognosis against the sort of prognosis offered by traditional
divinatory practices.
The fifth and final chapter extends the argument made in the fourth chapter to
apply to the Sar Torah macroform. I argued that in the process of marketing the Sar
Torah praxis to its audience, the macroform raises the possibility that humans could
“contemplate” in the same way as the angels, that is, instantaneously without toil or
labor. At the same time, the macroform had to articulate Torah as something that could
be “instantaneously known.” To do so, it contrasted rabbinic models of handling and
comprehending Torah, which it portrays as profoundly bound to human corporeality,
against its own “measures of Torah,” which “measured” the entire content and value of
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Torah and could be comprehended instantaneously. The Sar Torah macroform thus
promises its practitioners/readers that it would make them more like angels in their ability
to study Torah and rendered the true “value” of Torah into something only attainable
through angelic contemplation. In attempting to contextualize the Sar Torah macroform,
moreover, I argued that it should not be seen merely as a natural “outgrowth” of rabbinic
culture nor through other Hekhalot traditions. Rather, I suggested that this shift in
thinking about angelic contemplation and the divine measures of Torah make sense
within the broader shifts that I had already outlined in chapter four, especially the idea
that human and discursive modes of knowledge acquisition as profoundly incapable of
attaining the true “value” or “measure” of the divine.
It is my hope that the foregoing analysis of these texts as tethered to a shared
milieu might spur further research into the relatively underworked fields discussed in this
dissertation. As a way forward, I suggest that some of the questions asked here might be
pushed further into the future or pushed more firmly eastward into Mesopotamia. How
might the prophetological systems in “Mandaeism,” for example, serve as useful
trajectories for the types of prophetologies discussed in this chapter? Could they be
mapped unto the prophetological models without having to rely on a “Jewish Christian”
or “Gnostic” core? What about the early Islamic prophetologies? Such questions raise the
hope that these fields could be integrated more fully into the field of “late antique
religions.”
At the same time, I think that the model for historical representation offered here
presents a somewhat experimental yet a potentially more interesting model for scholarly
practices of historical representation. It is more interesting, in my opinion, because the
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boundaries of what counts as comparanda remain perpetually open. At its core, it
dispenses with the text/context binary that so bedevils scholarly habits of situating “X” in
its “Y” context. The “texts” under discussion become nothing more than comparanda for
one another, echoing Derrida, “There is nothing outside context.” Or, put differently, all
the texts studied in this dissertation compose a single late antique Syrian “text,” albeit
one that remains written in different languages, by people with different agendas, and so
on. This model can be applied to a wide range of fields, though I think it would be
particularly powerful for the burgeoning fields of “Irano-Talmudica” and “Late Antique
Law.” Ultimately, the “narrative” that I spun in this dissertation remain my best attempt
at teasing out the historical traces within the texts, and one that and I hope that it is met
with greater refinement in the future.
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